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INTRODUCTION

T. Cuyler Young

The Thirteenth Annual Near East Conference was devoted to the important but almost universally neglected subject of Afghanistan. The choice of this topic is in itself an indication of the growing interest in the Eastern Islamic world which Princeton's Department of Oriental Studies and Program in Near Eastern Studies embody. The presence and participation of their Excellencies the Afghan Ambassador to the United States and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan testify to the appreciation and interest with which official circles greeted Princeton's initiative.

Sincere appreciation is here expressed to all the participants who presented the papers which are collected in this publication. The prime purpose of the Conference was informative. All discussions were conducted in plenary sessions. The papers here presented are those considered at the several sessions. Editorial changes in these papers have been held to a minimum.

AFGHANISTAN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Najib Ullah

Several prehistoric sites testify that Afghanistan was inhabited in very ancient times. The Rig Veda is the most ancient document that refers to Afghan places and to the people, who, since about 2,000 B.C., have lived in the territories of present Afghanistan. The Gothas, the sacred hymns of Zoroaster, who preached his religious reforms from Balkh or Bactria, sometime between 1,000 and 600 B.C., are the next written documents referring to Afghanistan.

In the age of Assyrian imperialism, the ninth to seventh centuries B.C., the territories forming Afghanistan came within the orbit of that great power, at least indirectly. From the second half of the sixth century B.C. to the time of Alexander the Great, the Achaemenian empire of Persia controlled Afghanistan. Alexander succeeded to that empire, crushed the fierce resistance of the Afghans, founded at least three Alexandrias in their territory, and left Greek colonies in Bactria and other important cities.

When the Macedonian empire was partitioned, Afghanistan, like Persia, became a possession of the Seleucids. But Chandra Gupta, the Mauryan King of India, conquered its eastern provinces and during the reign of his grandson, Asoka the Great, Buddhism was introduced in Afghanistan. In 240 B.C., Diodotos, the Greek satrap of Bactria, proclaimed his independence from the Seleucid empire and founded the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom, which later on conquered the rest of the country and spread over northwestern India.

About the same time, Arsaces or Arshak, emerging from Bactria, founded in Parthia a kingdom, which in the course of time conquered all Persia and became the rival of the Romans.

The Greek settlers of Afghanistan, identifying themselves with the inhabitants of the country with whom they shared common interests, became distinct from their Western brethren and an important element of the Graeco-Buddhistic culture. This culture, which was probably manifest in every phase of life, spiritual as well as material, left its impress on coins and sculpture.

In the coins of that period the Greek and Kharoshti scripts figure side by side, and the representation of Buddhistic and Hellenistic symbolic signs are an eloquent demonstration of a synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures. But the most splendid exhibition of that civilization is in the Graeco-Buddhistic art of sculpture, in which the realism, harmony, and proportion of Greek art are penetrated by the mysterious depth of the spirituality and imagination of India. This art, born in the Graeco-Bactrian period, continued to flourish in later centuries and reached its zenith during the Kushan Empire.

In the first century B.C. fresh waves of nomadic Scythians from the north displaced the Graeco-Bactrians from their possession of northern Afghanistan and opened an era of disorders and wars, in which those Scythians established their kingdoms in the Helmand Valley and in India. But they were succeeded by the Kushans of the Yu-Chi tribes, who, pushed from the borders of China, had come to the northeastern area of Afghanistan. About this time (around 50 A.D.) the last of the Graeco-Bactrian rulers, Hermaios, was dethroned in Kabul.

The Kushans succeeded in establishing their power over all Afghanistan, in removing the Chinese rule from eastern and western Turkistan, and in extending their empire into India. Their great King Kanishka, who ruled in the first half of the second century, introduced Buddhism into China. During the Kushan period, relations of friendship and trade were established between their country, called Aryana by Erathostenes and Strabo, and Imperial Rome. The road of Silk in that period flourished and became an artery of communication between Europe, India and the Far East. The gigantic statues and fresco paintings of Bamyan and the Graeco-Buddhistic school of sculpture of Gandahara are the vestiges of the highly developed civilization of that period.

In the fifth century A.D., the invading White Huns or Ephtalites, originating from the north of Sinkiang, appeared in northern Afghanistan and, conquering western Turkistan, clashed with the Sassanian empire of Persia. About the middle of the century they defeated the Persians on several occasions and became predominant in Afghanistan. They also, like their predecessors, attacked India and there established their rule. The Ephtalite administration was more military in character, not contributing, as did the Kushans, to the culture of the Iranian plateau.

In the middle of the sixth century, Anushirvan, the Sassanian emperor, in alliance with the Turkish Khan of Turkistan, put an end to the Ephtalite power and conquered the western, southwestern, and northern provinces of Afghanistan, while in Kabul and the eastern districts of the country the descendants of the Kushans ruled their smaller kingdom, falling gradually under the influence of Hinduism. Such was the general state of Afghanistan when in the middle of the seventh century the Sassanian empire was overthrown by the Muslim conquerors from Arabia.

The Islamic Period

In 652, the Arab conquerors entered Sistan, captured its capital, Zarang, advanced into the mountains of Ghor and the Helmand valley, and reached Kabul, where its Kushan king was captured. But, except in Sistan, the Arabs could not establish their rule over the rest of those territories, which regained their freedom.

In the north, about the same time, the Arabs captured Herat, Merv and Balkh, where some years later, responding to an abortive revolt, they destroyed the old Zoroastrian temple, Na Bahar, and the Islamic administration was secured. These conquered territories as far west as Nishapur formed Khurasan, one of the richest provinces of the Umayyad empire.

Khurasan provided for Islam a base of operation, from which during several decades the Muslims undertook the campaigns and conquests of Turkistan. Soon Khurasan became a flourishing center of Islamic civilization and the cradle of the national movements, which led to the fall of the Umayyad empire and the establishment of an Islamic administration of international character in Baghdad, under the caliphate of the Abbasids (750). In that empire the political and cultural roles of leading Khurasanians, like the rest of the Iranians, were predominant and their contribution to the sciences, Arabic literature, theology, and law was considerable. It was in this period that modern Persian or Dari language was shaped in Khurasan where its literature grew in brilliance under the protection of the local ruling dynasties of the Tahirids (820-870), who acquired their autonomy in western Khurasan; the Saffarids (870-890), who rose from Sistan, conquered Kabul and established an independent empire over the Iranian plateau, threatening Baghdad, the very seat of the caliphate; and the Samanids (890-989), natives of Balkh, who succeeded the Saffarids, expanded their rule from Bokhara over all Turkistan, Afghanistan, and the Iran of today.

The Samanid state was the first well organized Islamic empire of the east to encourage the translation of major religious, scientific and literary works into Persian, the progress of sciences and literature, and the development of agriculture, trade, industry, urbanism and communications. The Samanids also succeeded in establishing a well-developed administrative system, on the Abbasid pattern, comprising the central and provincial governments and the principalities under their protection. This system was followed in Afghanistan by the Ghaznavid empire (989-1149), which became powerful and independent with the fall of the Samanids and the conquest of Transoxiana by the Uighur Turks.

With the Ghaznavids the center of Khurasani administration moved to Ghazna in the heart of Afghanistan; the country was united by the conquests of Sistan, Ghor, and the eastern districts, and Persian became the official state language. The adherence of the majority of the inhabitants of Afghanistan--Pushtuns, Tajiks, and those of Turkish origin--to orthodox Sunnism made of that sect the official creed of the state and created a clear distinction between the Khurasanians to the east and the Persians on the Iranian plateau. The Persians were ruled by the Shiite Daylamite princes. Thus, because of its geographical location and religious concept, the Ghaznavid state was the first Islamic government to shape Afghanistan as a "national" entity, comprising the eastern parts of the Iranian plateau.

From the beginning of the eleventh century, the conquests of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in India introduced the Islamic culture of Khurasan into that subcontinent and laid the foundation of the Ghaznavid empire in India, which was later on enlarged by the Afghans of Ghor. These Ghurids succeeded the Ghaznavids in the second half of the twelfth century, conquering Delhi in 1193.

These conquests in India made of Khurasan for several centuries an imperial power and of north India for the same length of time a field of Indo-Islamic cultural exchange. They also linked thereafter the Afghan economy with the Punjab, Sind and the rest of northern India.

The Ghaznavid and Ghurid periods constituted the Golden Age of Islamic civilization in Afghanistan, due to the establishment of many intellectual centers in Ghazna, Bust, Balkh, Herat, Lahore, and many other cities, and the appearance of a great number of men of genius in the fields of the arts, poetry, belles lettres, history, philosophy, theology, mysticism, law, and the sciences.

It was in this period that Turkistan, western Khurasan, Persia, and the Near East also had their flourishing age of civilization under the Saljuq empire. The Saljuq Turks, adopting the Iranian civilization, overthrew the Daylamites, became the protectors of the caliphs of Baghdad, and defeated the Byzantines. In the second half of the twelfth century arose the Khwarazmian kingdom of another Turkish dynasty on the shores of the Caspian Sea; this kingdom destroyed the unity and power of the Saljuq empire and replaced it by its own. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Ghurid Kingdom of Afghanistan was also conquered by the last of the Khwarazm Shahs, whose ambition also threatened the caliphate of Baghdad. (It was because of this ambitious king of Khwarazm and his adventurous policy that Chingiz, the Khan of the Mongols, was tempted to invade the Islamic world. The Mongol catastrophe followed.)

Turkistan, Khurasan and Persia were destroyed, the great majority of their peoples massacred, their magnificent cities razed, and their countryside devastated. That disaster in its savagery, magnitude and speed had no precedent in the history of mankind. Chingiz Khan began his invasion in 1219 and died in 1227. In the course of these eight years, Afghanistan became a land of ruin and devastation.

Hulagu, the grandson of Chingiz, founded in Iran, in the middle of the thirteenth century, the kingdom of Ilkhans. In 1258 he sacked Baghdad and put an end to the Abbasid caliphate, but (about the end of the century his descendants and their followers became Muslim.)

In 1245 a descendant of the last Ghurid emperor, Prince Shamsal-Din Mohammed Kurt succeeded in establishing in Afghanistan an autonomous kingdom, under the Mongol suzerainty. This kingdom of Kurts tried for one and a half centuries to safeguard as much as possible the Khurasanian culture and traditions and to protect the people from the violence of the Mongol lords. About the end of the fourteenth century the Kurts were removed by another conqueror, Tamerlane, who renewed Chingiz Khan's devastations in Khurasan and Sistan and revived the memory of his Mongol ancestor. But after Tamerlane's death in 1404, Afghanistan witnessed under his descendants, ruling from Herat, an age of prosperity and brilliant literary, artistic and cultural renaissance. The monuments of that period in architecture, the painting, poetry, belles lettres, and historiography, as well as public works in the fields of communication and irrigation, testify to the civilization of the age.

Perhaps here it is not out of place to refer to the Islamic Khurasani culture of India, subsequent to the Mongol catastrophe in Afghanistan.

After the fall of the Ghurid empire, the viceroy of the conqueror of Delhi established an independent Islamic kingdom in India. He was succeeded by several Turko-Afghan and Afghan dynasties, whose rule expanded in India and advanced the cause of Islam and its culture, particularly encouraging architecture and Persian literature.

The Timurid kingdom of Khurasan was overthrown by the Uzbeks at the beginning of the sixteenth century, who, after a few years, were in their turn defeated by the rising Safavid dynasty of Persia. The Safavids succeeded in conquering Herat and Balkh and tried unsuccessfully to convert their inhabitants to Shiism, which was then the militant faith of Persia.

About this time a gallant, adventurous and refined prince of the Tamerlane descendancy, Babur, succeeded in establishing his rule in Kabul. Conquering eastern Afghanistan, he strengthened his position and undertook several incursions into India. Finally in 1526, defeating the Afghan Sultan of Delhi, he established his empire of the Great Moghuls. For two hundred years Afghanistan, divided between the Persian empire of the Safavids and the Great Moghuls of India, besides suffering occasional Uzbek incursions, was affected by the hostilities, truces and friendships of the occupant powers. In India, after Babur's death, an Afghan prince, Shir Shah Suri, expelled Babur's son and re-established a well organized and prosperous Afghan empire; after his own death, however, that empire collapsed and the rule of the Great Moghuls was restored.

Afghan Nationalism and National States

In the seventeenth century we witness in the eastern areas of present Afghanistan and the territories of what is now called the North West Frontier Province a series of Afghan uprisings against the Moghul rule, leading to continuous warfare. In the meantime, a revival of Pushtu literature of epic, nationalistic and lyric character became apparent.

The greatest of all those Afghan leaders was Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613-1689), most probably the greatest poet and thinker writing in Pushtu. For years he fought Aurangzeb's power and never yielded. His life was in itself an epic romance and his poems were the message of national revival.

The province of Kandahar, occupied by the Safavids of Persia, was also agitated and repressed. Particularly did Gurgin Khan, a Georgian governor from Persia, take very severe measures against the nationalists. The leading nationalist figure of Kandahar was Mir Ways Khan of the Hotak tribe of Ghilzais. He was sent as a prisoner to Isfahan, but succeeded in returning home and put an end to the Persian occupation. He established a national administration headed by himself, not as a king, but as a popular leader. Mir Ways died in 1715 and seven years later his son, Mahmud, conquered Persia and proclaimed himself emperor of Iran in Isfahan; meanwhile the Abdalis of Herat, revolting against the Safavids, expelled them from that area. Mahmud's forces opposed the invading army of Peter the Great of Russia in the

Caucasus and his successor defeated the Turks, restoring Qazvin, Hamadan, Tabriz, and Erivan to Persia.

In 1730 this short-lived Afghan empire was overthrown by Nadir Quli Afshar, a soldier of fortune, who restored Persia to the Safavids; in 1736, however, he deposed that dynasty to become himself the ruler of Persia, defender of its territories against the Russians and the Turks, and the conqueror of Afghanistan, North India and Turkistan. The antagonism of his countrymen turned this empire builder into a ferocious tyrant. He was murdered in 1747, after which his family found their protection with one of his commanders and companions, the young Ahmad Khan, a prince of the Afghan Abdali tribe. In July 1747, Ahmad Khan was elected in Kandahar by the representatives of the Afghan tribes as Ahmad Shah, King of Afghanistan. A council of the chiefs was constituted to advise him.

Ahmad Shah was able in a short period to organize his government and army to unite his realm from Nishapur to the Indus and from the Oxus to the Arabian Sea. In western Khurasan he restored the son of Nadir Shah as the ruler of that province under his protection. He subdued the King of Bokhara, assuring the non-interference of the Uzbeks in Afghan territories.

Following the traditions of the Ghaznavids and Ghurids, he conquered North India, restored the Moghul emperor of Delhi to his throne and crushed the Marathas, who had become the predominant power of India. The Punjab and Sind were recognized by the Moghul Emperor as the possessions of Afghanistan, while Kashmir was already part of it. Thus in the second half of the eighteenth century Afghanistan became the great power of the Muslim world in the east, second only to the Ottoman empire.

Ahmad Shah was not only a great conqueror, but also a great statesman, scholar and poet. Notwithstanding his ever increasing authority and prestige, all through his reign he observed the advice of the council of the chiefs and remained a democratic leader. Ahmad Shah's Afghan empire was a revival of the traditional Islamic Khurasani administration of pre-Mongol times. It had almost the same ideals and characteristics, but the environment was now changed by the new factor of European intervention and colonization.

The British East India Company was in the process of becoming a political entity in India and the Russia of the Tsars was advancing in the Caucasus and preparing to expand eastward toward Central Asia. The British East India Company, having acquired from the declining Moghul power the prerogatives of its local rulers, was then in a position to use the differences of the regional Indian states, such as that of the Marathas, Mysore, Hayderabad, Bengal, Oudh, for their own purposes.

After the defeat of the Maratha forces by Ahmad Shah, the British authorities, thinking of the possibility of an eventual Afghan and Islamic empire in India, were not without apprehension. They continued to assure Ahmad Shah of their loyalty toward his protege, the Moghul Emperor of Delhi; but all the time they were

gradually increasing their power. They were trying to separate the sovereign of Delhi from the Afghans and to place him under their own influence along with the other rival rulers of India.

The most important fact of that period was that neither Afghanistan nor the princes of India realized that Britain in particular, and the European powers in general, were different types of powers from those that they were used to meeting in their part of the world. These orientals, in their medievalism, could not conceive the intellectual, social, administrative, and military superiority of the newcomers.

The great emperor died in 1773 and his son, Timur Shah, succeeded in preserving his father's empire and observing his traditions; but twenty years later when he passed away, his sons, assigned to the governments of different provinces, quarreled among themselves. Finally, Prince Zaman, the most able of them, overcame the rivalry of his brothers by the help of Payenda Khan, the popular chief of the Barakzais. Zaman Shah was generous, cultivated, and brave, but unfortunately inclined to absolutism and accessible to intriguers. The mischievous intrigues of his prime minister and his own disregard of the chiefs' advisory council made him unpopular, while the conditions surrounding the empire were changing completely.

By that time Britain, in possession of the French colonies of India, was establishing her control over the Indian states. Russia was pushing southward and gaining the Persian territories south of the Caucasus, while France of the revolutionary period was embarking on her conquests of the Near East aimed to destroy the new British empire in India. In western Khurasan the rule of Nadir's descendants as proteges of Afghanistan had ended, and the Qajars were masters of Persia. The Sikhs, increasing in unity, became more turbulent, compelling the Afghan king to appoint Ranjit Singh, one of their chiefs and a former officer of the Afghan army of India, to the government of the Punjab. The Muslim princes of India, particularly the Moghul Emperor of Delhi, fearing the revival of the Marathas, were asking Zaman Shah to come to their rescue.

During the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte, the Shah of Persia, the King of Afghanistan, and the Sultan of Mysore were approached by the emissaries of the French conqueror, seeking their cooperation against Britain. This action and the presence of the French soldiers of fortune in Hyderabad and Mysore accelerated British expansion in bringing those two Indian states under British domination, and in taking advantage of the Marathas' internal dissensions to conquer their territories. These victories were followed by the British conquests of North India, as far as Sutlej, which was at that time the frontier of the Afghan empire. As already mentioned, Britain was apprehensive of the establishment of an Islamic empire in India. Therefore at the beginning of her Indian conquests, in 1798, Britain approached the court of Tehran and persuaded the Persian monarch to attack Afghanistan from the west to regain western Khurasan.

Amidst this changing atmosphere, the misdeeds of Zaman Shah's prime minister led the Afghan leaders to plan for a coup d'etat, aimed at the revival of the Council of Chiefs with the power of electing the kings and advising them in all state affairs. That plot was discovered and the chiefs, including Payenda Khan, the popular leader and supporter of the empire, were executed. This action of Zaman Shah roused

popular indignation, resulting in his overthrow by Fateh Khan, the son of Payenda Khan, and the ascendancy of Prince Mahmud, the Shah's brother, to the Afghan throne (1800). It was during these events that Ranjit Singh, the Governor of the Punjab, declared his independence.

Three years later, Mahmud was replaced by his brother Shuja, who seized the throne and in 1809 signed with Britain a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship against any eventual French or other European intervention. In the same year similar treaties were concluded between Britain and the new Sikh state as well as between Britain and Persia. The fear of a Franco-Russian alliance after Tilsit urged upon Britain these alliances. But it is strangely interesting to note that in the Anglo-Persian treaty the clause providing for a Persian attack on Afghanistan in any eventual Afghan drive eastward was renewed.

Soon after the conclusion of the Anglo-Afghan treaty, however, Shah Shuja lost his throne to his brother Shah Mahmud, who was brought back to Kabul by Fateh Khan. As prime minister, Fateh Khan took the reins of the government in his own hands and in a short period succeeded in uniting the country, restoring its economy, regaining the control of the outer provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and Kashmir, and opening an era of prosperity and progress. Once more Afghanistan became a power in that area.

In 1814, Persia and Britain renewed their treaty of alliance and two years later, after subjugating the chiefs of western Khurasan, the Persian forces threatened Herat. Fateh Khan defeated the Persian army but Kamran, the envious son of Shah Mahmud, in conspiracy with Tehran, obtained his father's consent to arrest Fateh Khan and deprive him of his sight. The people's indignation was so intense that Fateh Khan's brothers conquered the capital and Mahmud, in distress, executed Fateh Khan and lost all his kingdom except Herat, where in 1818, he founded a small principality, reigning jointly with his son, who finally murdered him in 1829.

In the same year of Fateh Khan's execution, Ranjit Singh, seizing the opportunity, crossed the Indus and imposed his suzerainty over the Afghan governor of Peshawar. A year later he annexed Kashmir and defeated Dera Ghazi Khan, and in the next year Dera Isma'il Khan.

In 1826, Dost Mohammed Khan, the young brother of Fateh Khan, became the ruler of Kabul and its neighborhood, while his other brothers were already in possession of Ghazna, Kandahar, and Sistan. Kamran, the son of Mahmud, was ruling in Herat. The Uzbek lords, nominally tributaries of the Amir of Bokhara, seized the northern districts of Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and Sind; these last two, left on their own, became exposed to British influence.

Thus in ten years the vast Afghan empire, which had been restored by Fateh Khan, was completely dismembered and its national authority, represented by Dost Mohammed, had jurisdiction over no more than the immediate dependencies of Kabul.

The condition of Persia under Russian pressure was no better. Britain, notwithstanding her defensive alliance with Persia, did not help that country in her struggle to recover her lost territories south of the Caucasus. On the contrary, the Russians, getting firmly established in those territories, imposed capitulations on Persia in 1828 by the Treaty of Turkamanchai.

The Russians, desirous of reaching the borders of India, were encouraging the Shah of Persia to conquer Herat and Kandahar. To counteract the Russian activities and to establish her own control in Afghanistan, Britain raised an entire army in India for Shah Shuja, the ex-King of Afghanistan who had been living for twenty years in their territory, with which to recover his throne. Before the march of his mercenary army, Britain obtained from the exiled king the recognition of the independence of Sind, which became practically a British protectorate, and the Sikh occupation of what is now called the North West Frontier Province. Shah Shuja and his army, commanded by British officers, attacked Kandahar but were routed by Dost Mohammed, while Ranjit Singh occupied Peshawar (1834).

After his victory at Kandahar, Dost Mohammed Khan was elected king by the people of Afghanistan. But he refused the royal title and chose to be called Amir al-Mu'minin. Dost Mohammed's concern was the administrative and economic reunification of Afghanistan, the recovery of Peshawar and its dependencies from the Sikhs, and the Afghan alliance with Britain against any direct or indirect Russian aggression. He advocated the justice of this policy by direct appeals to Lord Auckland, the Governor General of India, and during his negotiations (1837-38) with the British representative in Kabul, Alexander Burnes, who was personally of the same opinion.

Lord Auckland and his cabinet rejected the Amir's proposals, insisting that Britain recognized independently the rights of each local ruler in Afghanistan and wanted to have separate relations with each. They also made it clear that Britain considered Peshawar and its dependencies the possession of their "Great Ally, Maharaja Ranjit Singh" by the right of conquest and expected that the Amir, contenting himself with his actual possessions, would avoid any relations with Russia and Persia and remain a British friend and ally. Lord Auckland also refused to give any formal guarantee to defend Afghanistan against a Persian offensive, which was by then being organized against the city of Herat.

In the meantime, Count Simonitch, the Russian envoy in Tehran, persuaded Mohammed Shah of Persia, with a large army commanded by Russian and Polish officers, to attack Herat (1837), which was besieged; the Amir's brothers, the feudal lords of Kandahar, were enticed to join the Shah by receiving assurances that Herat would be delivered to them and that the Shah of Persia, without interfering in Afghanistan's affairs, would help them to regain the Afghan territories occupied by the Sikhs. The Russian Count also succeeded in opening a personal correspondence between Amir Dost Mohammed and the Tsar, Nicholas I, and in delegating Captain Vicovitch to Kandahar and Kabul. But Amir Dost Mohammed Khan avoided negotiating with the Russian representative as long as Lord Auckland's uncompromising attitude did not put an end to the British mission of Alexander Burnes. The Amir also prevented his brothers of Kandahar from joining the Shah of Persia.

(Mohammed Shah of Persia could not overcome the resistance of Herat, which was besieged for ten months. Finally a British ultimatum and the show of force in the Persian Gulf obliged the Shah to return to Persia,) while the Tsar's government, because of other interests, deserted their Persian allies in their adversity and later on repudiated the diplomatic activities of their representative in Afghanistan, who, after burning his papers, committed suicide in a hotel room of Saint Petersburg. In 1839, after the conclusion of a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the British Government in India, the Sikhs, and ex-Shah Shuja, Afghanistan was invaded by the British army; Shah Shuja, who besides his former concessions agreed to receive in his capital a British resident with a permanent detachment of British troops, was crowned in Kandahar as the king of Afghanistan. After a severe battle in Ghazna, the forces of Dost Mohammed were dispersed and Kabul conquered. The British administration was established under the guise of Shah Shuja's government but soon it became apparent that the British forces could not leave the puppet king unguarded. Revolts broke out all over the country and Dost Mohammed reappeared to inflict more injuries on the British army of occupation. After his family was captured, however, he surrendered himself to the British who brought him as a royal prisoner to India. The Amir's disappearance did not end the hostilities. The national struggle under the leadership of the Amir's son, Akbar Khan, continued all over Afghanistan, causing tremendous losses to both sides, particularly the complete annihilation of the British army of Kabul, the assassination of Shah Shuja, and the destruction of Kabul city. The complete withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan took place in 1842, while the British enterprise in Qalat, the capital of Baluchistan, also failed, and the next year Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was restored on his throne.

During Dost Mohammed's reign, the Sikh state came under British administration, as had been expected from the beginning of the British patronage of the Sikhs.

(Amir Dost Mohammed moved to Peshawar and took possession of the Afghan territories west of the Indus). Although he had no further interest in involving himself in the Anglo-Sikh war and interference in the Punjab, the anti-British feelings of the Afghan chiefs compelled him to go further. Unfortunately, that action involved him in the defeat of the Sikhs, leading to the British occupation of Peshawar in 1849. A few years later the Amir reconquered the northern districts of Afghanistan from the Uzbeks and brought Kandahar under his control. In 1855, he concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with the British government in India and two years later another treaty of military assistance. (In 1856, Persia, supporting a successor of Kamran, occupied Herat. The British government once more declared war and Persia agreed in the Treaty of Paris to respect the integrity and independence of Afghanistan and not to interfere in the affairs of Herat.)

During the Indian mutiny, Dost Mohammed was invited by the Muslims of India to come to their rescue as their ruler and to oust the British. But the Amir, realizing the modern conditions of the world, abstained from interfering in India, hoping, as Sir John Lawrence and some other British statesmen were advocating, that the Trans-Indus Afghan territories would be restored to Afghanistan. Britain, however, came out victorious and the opposite thesis of the inclusion of those territories in

British India prevailed. (Just before his death in 1863, the Great Amir, as he is called by posterity, finally brought Herat under his direct administration and completed the unity of Afghanistan.)

His successor, Amir Shir Ali Khan, followed his father's friendly policy with Britain. [He paid a state visit to India and undertook a program of modernization. A cabinet was formed, the regular army was modernized, an arms factory was founded, a state college was established, and the first newspaper appeared.] Amir Shir Ali was in diplomatic contact with the Ottoman empire and Persia. During his reign Russia conquered Turkistan and became a neighbor of Afghanistan. Kaufmann, the Russian Governor General, kept up an occasional correspondence with him, but Amir Shir Ali was very apprehensive of the Russian advance. He sought with insistence a clear guarantee from Britain to defend Afghanistan against any Russian aggression and proposed an offensive and defensive alliance. At first British authorities were hesitant and vague in pledging themselves, but later on when Disraeli's government too became worried about the Russian activities, Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, insisted on sending a British envoy accompanied by British troops to Herat or to some other point close to the Russian territory. By that time the British occupation of Baluchistan and some other events aroused the Amir's suspicion. Therefore, he did not agree to the Viceroy's proposal, while about the same time General Stolitoff, the Russian envoy, reached Kabul, promising non-interference, help and alliance. [No treaty was concluded with Russia, but Lord Lytton also ordered the British envoy-designate, General Sir Neville Chamberlain, escorted by 1000 soldiers, to drive toward Kabul. At the border the British mission was not allowed to proceed, and Britain declared war (1878). The Amir, leaving his son, Yaqub Khan, in Kabul, left for the north, expecting the promised Russian assistance. That help never arrived and even the Russian Governor General of Turkistan advised Shir Ali to come to terms with the British Government. Shir Ali died a few days later and his successor, Yaqub, was compelled by the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) to cede to Britain, as assigned territories, the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi and the control of the Khayber and Michini passes.] He accepted, in the same treaty, not to have any foreign relations except with British India and to receive a permanent British Resident, escorted by a small force, in Kabul. In exchange, Britain guaranteed the defense of Afghanistan against any foreign aggression. This treaty was resented by the people and a few weeks after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavaignari in Kabul, a revolt broke out, the British residency was attacked and burned; the envoy and his staff perished, and in retaliation, British forces marched under General Roberts to Kabul. Again Afghanistan was occupied and Amir Yaqub Khan, who abdicated, was taken to India. This time also Britain could not establish an effective administration in Afghanistan and suffered great losses because of the national resistance all over the country.

Once more in 1880 Britain was seeking a way to get out of Afghanistan, when Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan, a grandson of Amir Dost Mohammed, who had been living for twelve years as an exile in Russian Turkistan, came to northern Afghanistan to join the national resistance. He had already organized his forces in the northern districts of Afghanistan, when he was approached by the British emissaries to negotiate the transfer of power, the British evacuation, and the future of Anglo-Afghan relations.]

Before reaching Kabul, Abdul Rahman was elected by the people as their king and his delegate concluded with the British representative the agreement of evacuation, including recognition of Afghan independence.

Amir Abdul Rahman agreed to have diplomatic relations with Britain only and Britain agreed to defend Afghanistan as an ally against any outside aggression. Abdul Rahman ruled until 1901, and during his reign organized a centralized government and a modern army. He removed completely the semi-feudal powers of the chiefs and the clergy. He introduced modern machinery and encouraged trade, agriculture and forestry. He was also planning, as he wrote in his autobiography, for the establishment of a legislative council and modern education. His main object was to establish direct relations with London, instead of with the colonial government of India, and to obtain from Britain, a corridor linking Afghanistan to the sea. For these purposes and other important matters, in 1895 he sent his second son, Sardar Nasrullah, escorted by a large staff, as his envoy to Queen Victoria. Amir Abdul Rahman's other great achievement was the delimitation of the Afghan borders, through the assistance of Britain.

In 1885, Russia invaded Panjdeh, northeast of Herat. The small Afghan forces defended the area heroically and the Amir decided to pursue the war. But the British government, obliged to join as an Afghan ally, dissuaded him, fearing a general conflagration.

Negotiating the Anglo-Afghan border, Amir Abdul Rahman tried to persuade the British authorities that their intention of keeping their gains in the Treaty of Gandamak would never secure a peaceful border, and would never achieve the prosperity and progress of the tribes, who would resist the foreign domination and create unnecessary misunderstandings between the two countries. But the British strategists were insistent on their proposed border line and the treaty was signed in 1893 between Abdul Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand. This treaty did not secure the British administration beyond the borders of the plains, where they had been since 1849. On the contrary, it compelled British forces to be in a perpetual state of war and continuous collisions with the Pushtun tribes.

Amir Abdul Rahman Khan's son, Amir Habibullah, was the great modernizer of Afghanistan. He was the founder of the first modern schools: Habibiya College, the Military College, and certain scientific institutes. In his reign towns and road communications developed, press and publicity progressed, and complete security increased the people's prosperity. He renewed his father's treaty with Britain, but rejected the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, recognizing an independent Afghanistan inside the sphere of British influence. His reign was the period of the growth of modern nationalism and the dawn of an intellectual and literary renaissance, promoting democratic ideas. The young intellectual class began to demand a constitutional regime and the unrestricted freedom of Afghanistan to exercise her sovereign rights in international relations.

During the First World War the representatives of Turkey and Germany arrived at the Amir's court, seeking an Afghan alliance. A strong anti-British party was supporting that course of action. But the Amir, conscious of the inevitable repercussions of such an adventurous scheme, courageously opposed that movement and declared Afghan neutrality. At the same time he opened secret negotiations with Britain and obtained from her a certain assurance regarding the removal of restrictions on Afghan foreign relations after the end of hostilities. (This understanding was of a confidential nature and could not remove the unpopularity of King Habibullah among the nationalists, caused by his opposition to their anti-British policy.) When the war ended, he reminded the British Government of that recognition and his last letter on this matter was dispatched a few days before his assassination (20th of February, 1919).

His son, King Amanullah Khan, declared war on Britain and the Afghan forces under Marshal Nadir Khan captured Tahl in the British territory. On the Kandahar and Khayber fronts, the Afghan forces suffered great losses, but soon an armistice was arranged and peace negotiations started in Rawalpindi, concluding in a treaty in which Britain recognized Afghanistan's full sovereignty (August 8, 1919). (This treaty was followed, after long negotiations, by a final Treaty of Friendship in 1921. After 1919, Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with the USSR, Turkey, Persia and several European countries. Inside the country the administration was organized on the western style. A Council of State was founded. New laws were promulgated and more public schools were opened in the capital as well as in the provinces.)

(King Amanullah was a patriotic nationalist. He was a supporter of the freedom movements of the East, which made him very popular among the nationalists of India, the Arab world, and Turkey, but caused at the same time the reaction of the more powerful conservative colonial circles against him. Those circles were looking also with apprehension at Russo-Afghan relations. Amanullah in his early thirties was a sincere man, but emotional, inexperienced in the intricacies of European diplomacy and impatient in his plans to modernize an isolated and armed people, unconsciously subject to foreign provocation and incitements by selfish, ambitious and fanatical elements of the nation. His position became more vulnerable, having around him adventurous men, who were isolating him from his loyal and more experienced servants. His new colleagues were not able to assist the king in drawing up a sound economic plan, promoting the standard of living, and securing the stability of the royal schemes of progress.)

(After a successful tour of Europe, the USSR, and the Middle East, Amanullah Khan returned home and convoked a National Assembly, to pass the first constitution of Afghanistan. He also undertook drastic measures of westernization, among them the emancipation of women. Unfortunately in the winter of 1928, an uprising put an end to his regime and destroyed his great achievements.) A brigand seized the throne and the country was plunged for ten months into civil war and barbarism. The next autumn Marshal Nadir Khan succeeded in restoring order. (He was elected king of Afghanistan and in four years of his reign (1929-1932) he re-established the government's administration and modern institutions. Convoking the Grand

National Assembly, he passed in 1930 the Afghan Constitution. Nadir Shah paid great attention to the economic development of Afghanistan which was followed with greater concern during the reign of his son, H. M. Mohammed Zahir Shah, whose rule is also marked by the establishment of Kabul University and the growth of public education for boys and girls. In 1935, Afghanistan entered the League of Nations and in 1936 established diplomatic relations with the United States. It was during those years that the international trade of Afghanistan developed, the agricultural and industrial enterprises were begun, and some credits and loans were obtained from Germany and elsewhere. The diplomatic relations of Afghanistan widened, including the Arab states, Japan, China, and many other European countries.

In World War II, Afghanistan remained neutral and after the end of the war pursued her economic and cultural developments. Economic relations with the United States progressed and commercial loans with the Export-Import Bank were contracted. (As a member of the United Nations, Afghanistan enjoyed U. N. technical assistance besides American help in economic and technical fields.) In more recent years, the United States and the Soviet Union have become the two main countries to supply Afghanistan with technical and financial assistance while West Germany, Czechoslovakia, India, Japan, and some other countries also have had their share. Politically in the post-war world Afghanistan continued her old traditional policy of neutrality and friendship with all. Only her relations with Pakistan remained strained, due to the unsettled problem of "Pushtunistan," which emerged from the changes of the status of the Indian subcontinent.

The people of Afghanistan, linked with the transborder Afghans, could not remain indifferent to their aspirations. Excluding any territorial claim, Afghanistan was pleading, long before the establishment of Pakistan, and has been advocating since then, the Pushtuns' right of self-determination. Particularly did the problem become more complex after the decision of Karachi in making the North-West Frontier Province a part of the one unit of West Pakistan. The Afghans found this decision contrary even to the 1947 declarations of the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and the assurance of his Foreign Minister on the first of January, 1948, to the Afghan Government, concerning the independence of the tribal areas and the self-government of the North-West Frontier Province. The Pakistan Government, claiming the British rights as a successor state, has considered the Afghan demand to be an interference in her domestic affairs. Therefore, these divergent views have prevented in the post-war years the close cooperation of the two countries, which for eight hundred years shared a complete unity of culture and identity of interests.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN

Donald N. Wilber

In the long series of conferences on the Near East held at Princeton University attention has been focused upon countries which are familiar to more people, participants and others, than is Afghanistan. Such countries are better known because their serious internal problems, their major disputes with their neighbors, or their critical role on the international scene have been given full treatment by the press, or because their relative accessibility has attracted many visitors, including journalists and students. Afghanistan is not well known, and any survey of its contemporary society and politics must begin with an introduction to the environment and to its peoples; next in order comes an examination of its institutions with some comparisons with those of other countries in the general region; and, finally, a description of its unique social and political problems.

Afghanistan is a country with a land area approximately equal to the sizes of Texas and Turkey; it has more people than Texas but fewer than Turkey. According to an official estimate the population is about 13 million, but given the absence of any complete census and the sparsely settled nature of much of the country, it may be hazarded that 10 million is a more realistic figure. Over 99.5% of the people are Muslims, with the great majority members of the Sunni sect.

All citizens of the country are called Afghans; they live in a considerable variety of topographical and climatic regions. The Hindu Kush range, an extension of the Himalayas, strikes deeply into the heart of the country, sending out other ranges at angles to its axis: it forms a major barrier to communications between the northern and southern regions of Afghanistan. Important rivers rise in these ranges. Rainfall is scanty, summers hot, and winters cold with snow falling in embarrassing quantity. Barren deserts stretch in a vast arc across the southern part of the country. Some 75% of the people are agriculturalists, tilling fields in the high mountains, along the banks of the river valleys, or on the plains at the foot of the ranges, and nearly everywhere the crops must be irrigated. Travel and transport by camel and donkey have been difficult and slow. Within more recent years the major population centers have been connected by graveled motor roads and now these routes are being realigned and paved.

For several centuries the focus of political authority has been to the south of the Hindu Kush, at Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, with the more productive north hard put to move its surplus staples across the Hindu Kush. Within the last decades there have been important movements of Pushtuns to the north to settle on the newly irrigated lands along the rivers flowing into the great Amu Darya. Now, however, great new hydroelectric plants are being completed to the south of the range. Military strength has long been concentrated just south of the range, to defend the passes as well as to face east toward the Indus valley; but the newer role of air power appears to be reflected in a wider distribution of the armed forces. This natural separation of the north and the south has given rise to rivalries and misunderstandings, and

the government strives to improve communications and eradicate inequalities of treatment.

A number of distinctive ethnic elements have long been resident in well defined areas of the country. Spreading across the east and southeast are major concentrations of Pushtuns, the so-called "true Afghans" who formed the backbone of the national movements which brought Afghanistan into being in the eighteenth century. A geographer, writing at the end of the tenth century speaks of "Afghans" resident in the area of present southeast Afghanistan and in the following centuries they spread as far west as Herat, into the Kabul River valley, and to the north of the Hindu Kush so that they now number from 50 to 60% of the population. Their language, Pushtu, is of the Iranian family and its literary use dates back to the ninth century. Largely nomadic in earlier times, the majority are now settled farmers.

Some two million Persian-speaking Tajiks are settled in the provinces of Kabul and Herat, along the Iranian frontier and north of the Hindu Kush. Primarily farmers, many are traders and artisans: they have no sense of community identity. Persian is the principal language of communication throughout most of the country, as well as the long established medium of culture. In the central mountains are some half million Hazaras, descendants of Mongol groups, who speak a dialect of Persian and are Shi'i in religion. As farmers they struggle to survive on inadequately watered fields and pastures, and as day laborers they are found in the larger towns. North of the Hindu Kush are Turk and Turko-Mongol elements; some of them still speak Turkic tongues. Most are Uzbeks and Turkomans but there are a few thousand Kirghiz in the Wakkhan corridor, the lofty tip of Afghanistan which comes into contact with China. } The major population elements of the north have blood brothers across the Amu Darya in the Soviet Socialist Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizia. Soviet writers have remarked on this fact, pointing out the economic advantages enjoyed by these peoples within the USSR in contrast to their situation within Afghanistan. } In the west are several hundred thousand tribesmen, tent and yurt dwellers, of the Chahar Aimak group; diverse racial types and languages are present. Isolated in the mountains of the northeast are some 60,000 Nuris. Long called Kafirs, they received this more flattering designation after their conversion to Islam at the very end of the nineteenth century. Probably a long established mixture of three ethnic strains, they speak languages of the Dardic group. Across the south of the land are groups of Baluchi pastoral nomads.]

In the normal course of events there is no overt hostility among these varied ethnic groups but at the same time there is little communication between them. Living in isolated, remote villages, all these peoples are but dimly aware of the desirability of cooperation to advance mutual interests. Just as in many other countries, the villager and the nomad do not tend to identify themselves with a geographical entity far larger than their own horizon, so that patriotism toward a nation called Afghanistan is not a matter of allegiance to a flag, an anthem, or a national spirit. Rather, the Afghans coalesce when Islam and other traditional beliefs and patterns are threatened.

Traditionally, Afghan society revolved around the courts of one or more amirs with these rulers dependent upon the loyalty and support of feudal landlords,

court officials, religious leaders, and tribal heads. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Abdul Rahman and Habibullah, determined to establish a central authority, acted to break the power of the landlords and the religious leaders. As one most important result of their actions, Afghanistan may be the only country in a vast area from the Mediterranean through Asia where the issue of the distribution of land to small farmers is not a pressing one. ✓

Present day Afghanistan features a large number of social classes but certain of them are more properly described as interest groups rather than structured layers of society. At the top of the social structure is the ruling family. Although the reverence for monarchy has never been as strong as in some other countries, the ruler enjoys general respect as the protector of Islam and the head of a Muslim state. ✓ Of a family originating in an important Pushtun tribe, he is considered by this majority element of the population to be primis inter pares. In earlier years the amir was readily accessible to the common man; then, under the constitutional monarchy the ruler tended to live in isolation from his subjects. (Now, however, this trend has been reversed with the shah and members of the ruling family traveling to all sections of the country and meeting with local groups quite informally. It should be noted that the ruling family lives on a modest scale and leads a most exemplary private life, devoid of any breath of scandal.)

The royal family and the regime which it heads depends upon the loyalty of the descendants of the dynasty which preceded it (Dost Mohammed line), of the ranking officers of the army, of the leaders of the Pushtun tribes, and of the high officials of the government, including the cabinet ministers, heads of departments and governors of the provinces. Until fairly recent years most of the highest posts were held by individuals of Pushtun origin, notably the governorships of the provinces, but this is no longer the case. For some thirty years and more Afghans have gone abroad to study at the college level and for post graduate work, and this "intellectual class," still small in number, has worked its way up to the highest levels of the government without reference to the ethnic origin of its individual members. This group is currently augmented by the recent graduates of the ever growing Kabul University, and educational policy now stresses local college training with post graduate work abroad.

Since this group is already so important in the conduct of government and will become increasingly powerful in the future, it is appropriate to define its characteristics. These intellectuals are not in a position to stimulate the inquiring and critical thought which leads to the evaluation of existing institutions and ideologies. Its members work for the regime, with the exception of a few in private business, either as graded officials or associated with the newspapers, periodicals, and historical societies which are under the guidance and control of the government. However, through their activity in the radio and publications media the Afghans are learning a great deal about the history and culture of their own country, much about the rest of the world, and much more about the plans of the government for the rapid economic development of the land. Except for the flood of material about "Pushtunistan," this

information is nearly all pitched in a rather low key, neither designed to arouse frenzied activity at home, nor to foster hatred of foreign enemies. The regime seeks the private views and advice of members of this group. As an example, the ruler frequently receives such individuals in audience, including students returning from abroad and members of special missions to other countries.

Not all of these intellectuals are wholehearted supporters of the regime. Some feel that more institutions and societies of the type they have observed in action in democratic countries should be brought into being in Afghanistan, and that officials with specialized training should be granted more responsibility and freedom of action. Others, comparatively few in number, believe that the regime is a relic of the past, and that the era of "feudal-monarchical" governments--to use the Soviet term--has passed. They feel that progress is not possible with any speed and efficiency under such a regime and that Afghanistan requires a form of the state socialism which has produced such material benefits in the USSR, across the Amu Darya, and in China.

(Members of the intellectual class tend to coalesce informally and to welcome into their ranks returning students.) It should be noted that almost all the Afghans who study abroad return to their country, willingly and with the conviction that they will make effective contributions to their country's future progress and development. |

(An important class in Afghan society comprises the local capitalists who are engaged in trading and banking and who direct private firms and industries.) This group was more influential a decade or two earlier, before the state began to supervise and to participate in all such ventures. (Another structured level is made up of individuals who are influential upon specific segments of the population; these people include tribal heads, religious leaders, and heads of established families in the provincial towns.)

(Somewhat nearer the bottom of the social structure are found the minor officials of the government, shopkeepers and skilled artisans, technicians, and industrial workers.) The first three groups comprise the emerging middle class, a class which is very small in number and unlikely to grow rapidly in the near future. The industrial labor group now numbers less than 5,000, but it is bound to expand very considerably in a few years as the new factories and industries come into full operation. At the very bottom of the society are the farmers, and settled and nomadic tribesmen.

(Mobility between classes is not pronounced in Afghanistan where family status continues to be very important. However, talented administrators and trained technicians move upward freely) and there are unlimited opportunities for the brightest students from any part of the country and from every ethnic group.

Turning to the political situation in Afghanistan, it seems appropriate to concentrate attention upon those features and characteristics which are distinctive to this country, making certain comparisons with other nations which are rather more familiar. It will be at once apparent that Afghanistan enjoys definite advantages over some other areas of the Near and Middle East, notably in the field of today's most

popular interest of the political scientist--that of internal stability. However, some of these advantages are offset by disadvantages, relics of the background and traditions of the country.

On the one hand, Afghanistan is not a brand new nation, suddenly appearing on the world's stage, and in desperate need of identity and status. Its name, its geographical limits, and its national characteristics have long existed in their present forms. On the other hand, Afghanistan exists on the map but in a sort of vacuum. Completely landlocked, off the lanes of modern traffic, long isolated both through the desire of its amirs and through the policies of the competing British and Russian empires, it remains in relative obscurity. It is not in a crisis condition and the prophets of upheaval and revolution, the roving journalists and authors, have not found it worthy of their critical attention.

(Afghanistan belongs to no major geographical grouping of states, to no regional association, and has no military alliance.) Its favor is not sought and its voice carries no particular weight in wider councils. Most writers on the Middle East place it beyond this region. More frequently it is included among the countries of South Asia, although it differs from nearly all of them with respect to topography, languages, religion, and cultural traditions. (From the point of view of ethnic and cultural ties, it should be very close to Pakistan: it is not. According to linguistic and historical ties, it should be close to Iran: it is not. It is a borderland of the USSR, with a very long common frontier, but it has no feelings of identity with any parts of the Soviet Union.)

Afghanistan continues to live on alone and this seems to be a posture difficult to maintain in today's world. The raging currents of nationalism and of ethnic and regional determinism have destroyed many older colonies and countries and reassembled them into many more new states. It is hard to believe that all of them will maintain their sovereignty over extended periods of time. Basic for the survival of a small nation today is its ability to attract friends and protectors and to play a special role within its own region. Should Afghanistan display an interest in forming an Aryan union with some of its neighbors, or a Turanian union with more of them? (Possibly not, but its leaders would be well advised to determine whether Afghanistan exists in the Middle East or in South Asia, to state their conclusion to the world, and to restudy the country's foreign policy in line with this conclusion.)

Afghanistan has been a constitutional monarchy since the nineteen twenties. Among such monarchies on the world scene, some may vanish in the near future and some should survive. Afghanistan belongs in the latter group. Barring the impact of foreign conflicts, this system of government is not threatened by internal dissent or potential upheaval. On the other hand, no system may be expected to continue static and unchangeable, as the local press and radio spreads the word of new doctrines, of new ideologies, of material benefits, and of escape from authoritarian controls into every corner of the world. Press controls are not designed to cut off news of the so-called revolution of rising aspirations which seems so appealing to so many millions.

It is not the desire of the Afghan regime to maintain a static political system. Rather, the problem is how so to act as to broaden the base of the government and bring about increased public participation in, and responsibility for, the conduct of the state. In other words, how can the government escape from traditional patterns of society which favor a closed system, when the tools for creating other patterns are lacking? For example, Afghanistan has no political parties, no labor unions, no opposition press, no loyal opposition, and no subversive groups.

N.B. The bicameral Parliament (Parleman) consists of the House of Nobles (Majlis-i-A'yan) and the National Council (Shura-yi-Milli): the first is an advisory group of fairly elderly appointees, and the second an elected body which consistently supports the regime. The prime minister is appointed by the ruler and the cabinet is responsible to him, rather than to the Parliament. The constitution grants very extensive powers to the Shah. Under Nadir Shah, 1929-1933, and under his son, Zahir Shah, after 1933, these powers have been delegated, in part, to other members of the royal family. First to the brothers of Nadir Shah in a period extending well beyond World War II, and then to cousins of Zahir Shah. Currently the third generation of the family is being trained for cabinet and other high posts. At present a triumvirate consisting of Zahir Shah and his first cousins, Prime Minister Daud and Foreign Minister and Second Deputy Prime Minister Naim, who are brothers, makes all major decisions of state.

The royal family seems ready and willing to relax its personal control, both because it believes in such a course of political evolution, and because it feels that others should take over part of the responsibilities. In fact, the royal family may be more willing to broaden the base of government than the public at large is to recognize the need. How may the regime act in this sphere? There are no local traditions of democratic government, other than that of the tribal councils and codes, in which to find inspiration. If the Afghan leaders survey the area in search of appropriate models, they may well become discouraged. Turkey has long been admired in Afghanistan, because of a supposed identity of national character and outlook and because of its success in bringing into being first a single political party and then a two party system. However, as of late May 1960 the Turkish model may seem less attractive. Iran has had a parliament and political parties since 1906 without succeeding in making democracy a living and effective institutional form. It has been suggested that the regime should establish a single political party, loyal to the government, which would work to break down barriers between groups, draw people into participation in elections and other organized activities, and propagate a program based upon common values and codes.

Throughout much of this part of the world government has long been regarded as an unnecessary evil imposed upon the people. Currently the Afghan government is very actively concerned with demonstrating that it is a government for the people, if not yet of the people. Through lectures, mass meetings, personal visits by members of the royal family, and by press and radio outlets, the regime is enunciating its goals of economic development and social reform and indicating just what this progress will mean to the average citizen. To what extent an atmosphere of receptivity and good will can be created throughout the country will naturally depend upon how rapidly how many people

reap the benefits of the economic development projects. Again it should be emphasized that internal security and stability appear to become more firm with each passing year, as the influence of the religious leaders and tribal heads declines, and as the strength and mobility of the armed forces, inherently loyal, increases. Only the "Pushtunistan" policy, as will appear in another context, could result in serious difficulties to the government.

Examining the political aspects of the program of economic development and social reform, it should be instructive to compare the two periods of activity in these fields in Afghanistan with the parallel movement in Iran. In Iran, after 1926, Reza Shah pushed through a program of industrialization, designed to make the country self-sufficient in basic commodities, and one of social reforms. Both programs were based upon an all out effort to imitate and catch up with Europe--the Europe about which he had heard and was never to see with his own eyes. Force was at his command: force adequate to crush dissident tribes, subdue aroused religious leaders, and wipe out potential political opponents. Without directly imitating the reforms of Atatürk, he followed a parallel path toward the same goal. At just this same time Amanullah of Afghanistan was inspired by the success of both these leaders, and, in addition, his convictions were strengthened by Europe as he saw it in the course of state visits which took him through several of its countries. Returning to Afghanistan in the autumn of 1928, he rushed through a series of sweeping changes which did violence to traditional beliefs and customs: the wearing of European dress, the unveiling of women, mass education of boys and girls, and many other actions, (all without an equal concern for economic development.) He failed: the conservative forces were too strong and his long isolated country contained too few enlightened individuals who understood the purposes of his actions and were willing to support their execution.

The bitter lesson was not forgotten when a new dynasty headed by Nadir Shah came to power and first priority was given to the development of the production of commodities and of hydroelectric power. A second attempt to promote social reforms did not come until recent years when the local climate had changed. On the one hand, the power and influence of the more conservative elements in the country was no longer strong, and, on the other, a more receptive atmosphere, resulting from the extension of educational facilities and a much wider awareness of what was going on in other countries of the world, prevailed. The most delicate step concerned the unveiling of women at Kabul and the other large towns; within the space of a few months this revolution was accomplished without any provocative announcements by the regime, and without any overt opposition.

In countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan, parliamentary democracy, as defined by constitutions, appears to have failed. Perhaps it did not manage to strike firm roots locally because the form was imposed upon an unrelated social structure and because ardent nationalists denounced the system as a tool of imperialism by which the colonial powers planned to maintain their control over the countries. It has not failed in Afghanistan because it has not really been tried, although the regime continues to be committed to this system. As suggested earlier, the government of Afghanistan might be well advised to attempt to relate and to adapt this system to its traditional religion,

codes, and social attitudes: in other words, to follow the example of certain other states and rewrite its constitution.

Fortunately for the stability of the country extreme nationalism has not appeared in Afghanistan. It must be realized that this term, with its very specific connotations to the western mind, is not indigenous to the region, and "nationalism" in Egypt, Iran and Iraq means something quite different, something more intimately related to local attitudes of inferiority in face of the material superiority of more advanced nations. In Afghanistan, national independence was an issue as late as 1920, but not since that time. Even should somewhat similar feelings exist, no outlets for propagating inflammatory feelings and doctrines are available. Most important, there are no foreigners to throw out of the country: no oil companies, no banks, and no foreign-owned enterprises of any kind. Nationalism has its role in the "Pushtunistan" issue, but this subject does not excite and arouse elements throughout the country. However, an active nationalism could result from strong foreign pressures, as the diverse elements of the country have often united to repel foreigners. In many parts of the world extreme nationalism incites hatred of countries or elements alleged to be hostile to national interests; it is fortunate that the Afghan regime does not encourage such hatreds.

In the field of foreign relations the policy of the Afghan government is one of absolute neutrality. The Afghans explain that this policy is of long standing and it is true that in early years the amirs maintained their neutrality by leaning toward Britain or Russia on occasions when one of these parties pushed too hard for privileges. Neutral during both World Wars, Afghanistan did enroll in a regional pact in the years between these wars: in 1937 it joined with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in the Saadabad Pact, an agreement of mutual non-aggression, providing for consultation in the case of aggression by other powers against any of its members. Theoretically, this agreement is still in force. This policy of neutrality does not spring from popular attitudes, since it was determined by the royal family, but there is no public dissatisfaction with the position. Indeed, on occasions in the past when the regime planned to reaffirm its neutrality the loya jirga, or great council, made up of hundreds of provincial and tribal leaders, was assembled at Kabul to hear the exposition by the heads of the government and to support the position of the regime. This policy of neutrality is neither positive (as defined by Nasser) nor negative (as defined by Mossadeq) and is not as firmly presented on the international scene as it is in the oft expressed willingness of the regime to accept economic aid from any nation provided no strings are attached.

In Persian, and in Pushtu, the word for neutrality is bi-tarafi (without a side) and it should be remembered that it is this word which appears again and again in the local press. The word is direct and blunt and without the many overtones which the English term has acquired through long usage in an endless range of delicate situations. It is quite reasonable to expect that Afghanistan should refrain from taking sides on any questions on which a bias would adversely affect its own interests, but it is a different matter when Afghanistan speaks in international councils. One might feel that countries whose primary interests relate to internal development waste time and energy by speaking out on international issues concerned with regions which are remote

in space and unrelated in any way to local concerns. However, membership in the United Nations appears to imply that every member is interested in everything that is going on in any part of the world. In the case of Afghanistan, this means that the country and its representatives have gravitated to the position of the so-called anti-imperialist and anti-colonial bloc. Thus, by its recent votes in the United Nations on issues which were unrelated to its own interests and on which it might have abstained, its mission chose to support the Algerian nationalists and the Castro regime in Cuba. Such a position is clearly the right and privilege of the Afghan Government, but in actual practice it entails a departure from the policy of non-alignment and a support of the communist bloc against its natural opponents. As reflected in the press and radio at Kabul, it means that each and everyone of the non-communist powers is described as a colonial nation. In other contexts some examination will certainly be directed toward the question as to whether the relative amount of aid flowing in from foreign powers has a measurable relation to the way bi-tarafi is interpreted by some of its advocates.

In conclusion, it may be well to point out that one reason Afghanistan is not better known abroad is the failure of the government to present its case in other countries. On the one hand, a tradition of secrecy within the government has been a handicap; until a few years ago neither the total amount of the budget nor its details were ever made public. Even today the student of Afghanistan finds it very difficult to obtain the information required for a full study on any aspect of the activity of the government. This is not because a veil of secrecy remains in operation, simply that effective machinery for the dissemination of information and adequate statistics are lacking. It is a pleasure to report that the Department of Research and Statistics of the Ministry of Planning has made enormous strides in this field in the last two years. It might be suggested that the regime would be well advised to select and train a cosmopolitan elite capable of presenting its interests abroad and authorized to draw upon all local sources of information. It is one thing for interested foreigners to explain Afghanistan to other countries of the world, as we are doing here, and it is quite another for the Afghans themselves to assume this responsibility and to attempt to make the name of Afghanistan a household word.

THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF AFGHANISTAN

Aloys A. Michel

1. Introductory Statement

The economic geographer who investigates Afghanistan's natural resource base is soon forced to two conclusions: 1) as regards minerals development, far too few of the nation's 245,000 square miles have been adequately surveyed to permit an accurate evaluation of the potential, but 2) on the basis of what is known the non-mineral, i.e., the agricultural and pastoral resources, are the most promising for development.

Let it be said at once that the above statements are subject to drastic revision if important mineral deposits are located. Although there has been sporadic geological and mineralogical surveying in Afghanistan for over half a century, it was only in April 1955 that a regular Geological Survey was established by Royal Charter in the Ministry of Mines and Industries.¹ By mid-1960, this unit had grown from 56 to 110 Afghan technicians and had 23 foreign experts provided by the United Nations, the German Federal Republic, and France.² The Afghan Geological Survey now has departments of geology, topography, mineralogy, radio-active minerals, hydrology, hydrometry, and research in deposits of river silt. There are laboratories for petrography, micropaleontology, chemistry, and photography.

The importance of this work for the future development of Afghan mineral resources can hardly be overemphasized. Modern techniques of aerial photography, photogrammetric mapping, mosaic interpretation, and geophysical prospecting can cut many years from the time required to obtain reliable and economically useful information in the past. The United Nations Technical Assistance Mission in Kabul has been particularly alert to these possibilities and has tried to keep its technicians employed in the fundamental projects which will ultimately prove most useful rather than having them squandered on specific searches for precious minerals. The United States International Cooperation Administration (ICA) provided a few experts in coal mining who probably did more to help the Afghan economy than all the gold prospectors who ever combed the Hindu Kush.

Major United States assistance also took the form of underwriting most of the cost of an aerial photographic survey made by the Fairchild Company of Los Angeles in the Autumn of 1957 and the preparation of basic maps at the scales of 1:250,000 and some detail maps on a scale of 1:50,000, both with 100-meter contours. The maps were supposed to be complete and in the hands of the Afghan Government by September, 1960, with a further program of aerial photography on scales of 1:60,000 and 1:30,000 scheduled to be undertaken by Fairchild.³ All of these maps will be a tremendous aid in the

1. Marcel Schwob, "The Economic Challenge in Afghanistan," United Nations Review, ii, July 1955, pp. 25-27.

2. Afghanistan News, iv, no. 36, August 1960, p. 2.

3. Ministry of Planning, Survey of Progress, 1959, vol. i, part ii, Kabul Government Printing House, August 1959, pp. 11, 17.

interpretation of the geological and geomorphological history of Afghanistan, particularly in estimating water resources and in preliminary plotting of formations that might contain coal or petroleum deposits. Although a 50-mile zone along Afghanistan's northern border was excluded from the Fairchild surveys through fear of Soviet objections, the Russians have agreed to fly this area and furnish photographs and maps on comparable scales.⁴ Such a survey is all the more urgent as it is the northern provinces which are most promising as sources of commercial quantities of petroleum.

Petroleum prospecting in the north, or new exploration in the southwest, could change Afghanistan's minerals situation overnight. One recalls the revolutionary changes wrought in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Sheikdoms by the discovery of high grade petroleum in great quantities. But even if such finds are made in Afghanistan, they alone would not provide the basis for integrated industrial development, based upon mineral raw materials, any more than they have in these southwestern Asian countries. To establish the other primary industries, Afghanistan must find coal of coking quality, iron ore of economical metal content, and various alloy metals, as well as the capital and technological know-how to build and operate metallurgical plants. In none of these resources is Afghanistan yet known to be adequately supplied, as the following enumeration makes clear.

II. Mineral Resources

A. Petroleum

Oil seepages in northern Afghanistan have been known for centuries, and helped support the development of Zoroastrianism in pre-Buddhist Bactria. Surface surveys were first made in the 1930's, but it has only been in the past ten years that actual test-drilling could be undertaken. Even then, it was delayed by Soviet protests over Western European teams working in the border zone and by shortages of capital, equipment, and such essential materials as barite mud to maintain pressure in the bores. From 1956 to 1958, engineers from the Ministry of Mines and Industries and contract technicians from Sweden carried out stratigraphic mapping of the promising Angut Hill anticline at Sar-i-Pul, 70 miles southwest of Mazar-i-Sharif. Two exploratory bores were sunk, both of which revealed horizons with some petroleum content. But in both cases the high specific gravity of the oil and its asphaltic quality were disappointing. On July 30, 1957 Afghanistan accepted a 25-year, interest-free loan of \$15 million from the USSR to support petroleum exploration. "According to the terms of the contract with the Soviet Techno-Export, the second project for petroleum exploration was set up in March/April 1958..."⁵ The site chosen was north of Sar-i-Pul in the Aq Chah area. A successful bore was reported in May 1960, but no details on quantity or quality have been made public.*

4. *Idem.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

* A knowledgeable person at the conference stated that the discovery was probably on the order of 500 million barrels, a substantial if not a spectacular find.

B. Coal

Normally, coal reserves are susceptible of much more accurate estimation than those of petroleum, a fugitive resource. But, again, the sparsity of survey data in Afghanistan leads to a wide variation in estimates. Four major coal deposits are known, of which two are being exploited on a commercial scale. All of them are on the northern flanks of the Hindu Kush. Kar Kar, about 15 miles northeast of Pul-i-Khumri, has received the most attention, including expert advice and new mechanical and electrical equipment under ICA Project No. 06-21-003. Estimates of reserves run as high as four or five million metric tons, but the ICA adviser, Paul Hamer, who worked at Kar Kar for about four years, believes that only 300,000 to 400,000 m.t. can economically be extracted. This Kar Kar coal is extremely important to Afghan industry, both because of its proximity to the Kunduz Valley, which has cotton and sugar-beet processing industries and is building a 200-m.t./day cement plant, and because the Kar Kar coal is the best quality being mined in Afghanistan. Annual production figures are given in Table I:

Table I
COAL PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN - In Metric Tons^a

MINE	1955/56	1956/57	1957/58	1958/59
Kar Kar	10,380	11,341	10,698	21,396
Ishpushta	10,390	17,567	8,950	12,350
Darra-i-Suf	1,410	0	0	0
TOTAL	22,180	28,908	19,648	33,746

^aSurvey of Progress, 1959, vol. iii, "Statistics," p. 5.

Housing and working conditions at Kar Kar have been improved considerably under the First Five Year Plan (1956/57 through 1961/62),⁶ poplar plantations to supply pit-props have been started, and the Ministry of Mines and Industries has obtained 104 coal trucks under an \$800,000 loan made in 1957 by the United States. The importance of this truck fleet lies in the fact that the Kar Kar mine is some 250 miles from Kabul over the 9800-foot Shibar Pass. When the new road and tunnel via the Salang Pass* are completed, with Russian assistance, about 100 miles will be cut from this journey, and the Kar Kar mines will be in an excellent position to supply the 100-m.t./day cement plant at Jabal-us-Seraj at the foot of the Salang Pass and 50 miles north of Kabul. Still, it seems probable that the industries of the Kunduz Valley, especially after the Pul-i-Khumri cement plant is completed (planned for 1961/62), will require all of the coal which can be produced at Kar Kar.

The smaller mine at Ishpushta, 180 miles from Kabul and tucked away in the Surkhab Valley near Doab, will not be of much help in this fuel problem. Reserves are estimated at between 100,000 and 350,000 m.t., but the coal is extremely

6. Actually, September 1956 to August 1961, to accord with the new fiscal year adopted in 1957.

* See Appendix on "Transportation Problems in Afghanistan."

friable, subject to spontaneous combustion from pyrite inclusions, and usually reduced to a powder by the time it reaches Kabul. Most of the Ishpushta coal is suitable only for mixing with molasses and pressing into briquets for use in the smaller industrial plants near the capital.

The real solution to the coal shortage in eastern Afghanistan would be to develop the deposits at Darre-yi-Suf ("Darra Yusuf" on some maps), about 85 miles south of Mazar-i-Sharif, which contain indicated reserves of 5 to 6 million m.t. (possibly much more) of good quality coal, some of it suitable for coking. Darre-yi-Suf has been mined only on an experimental basis (see Table I). To bring this promising field into production, housing, water, pitprops, power, and especially transportation have to be provided. If the coal is brought out via Mazar-i-Sharif, it must travel over 200 miles to reach the Kunduz Valley, and another 150 to reach Kabul over the Salang Pass. A much better solution would be to construct a good road via the upper Surkhab Valley to Doab, from which the coal trucks could take either the Shibar or Salang Pass routes to Kabul. This Surkhab road has been surveyed and estimated to cost \$120,000, but the Ministry of Public Works is fully occupied elsewhere for the present. They have, however, been able to spare enough men and equipment to level one stretch of the northern road (Qale-yi-Sarkari to Samangan).⁷ Exploitation of the Darre-yi-Suf coalfield, which could supplant Ishpushta and allow all of the Kar Kar production to be used in the Kunduz Valley, appears to offer the only permanent solution to the coal needs of Eastern Afghanistan.

Northwestern Afghanistan has some fairly good coal deposits, with estimates of inferred reserves ranging from 1.5 to 15 million m.t. These reserves are in the vicinity of Karrukh (or Masjh-i-Ghobi), about 65 miles northeast of Herat. Exploitation of this deposit, which probably can supply all foreseeable needs of Herat Province, has been only sporadic.

Southern Afghanistan, including the Helmand Valley region, has no known, economically developable coal reserves, but might be supplied from Karrukh once the road is improved by the Russians or by imports from the Mach fields near Quetta in Pakistan. This Helmand region has an excellent hydro-electric potential, so that light industry need not suffer from the absence of local coal. But any development of basic metallurgy in the region would meet serious obstacles because of the lack of coking coal and the prohibitive cost of electric power when used not only for the making of steel but also for the reduction of iron ore.

C. Iron Ore and Ferroalloys

We are again confronted by a lack of geological data. Since iron oxides are among the most common of minerals, it is highly likely that Afghanistan contains many deposits of iron "ore." The questions are, how high is the metallic content of these ores, and where are they located with respect to coking coal, fluxing agents, and markets? During the Morrison-Knudsen, Afghanistan, Inc. operations in the Helmand

7. Survey of Progress, 1959, vol. i, part ii, p. 13.

Valley, several deposits of iron ore were located and analyzed.⁸ The best of these, apparently, is the estimated two to three million tons of magnetite at Hajji Alam, about 30 miles east of Kajakai Dam and off the old Kajakai to Kandahar Road. A sample of this ore showed 64.17 per cent iron content with low sulfur and phosphorus inclusions, a composition well within the economic limits in any industrial economy. But with no local coking coal and with the market at Kandahar being limited to only 125 tons of primary iron and steel products per year,⁹ it is impossible to justify any metallurgical operations in the near future.

A second deposit of iron "ore" in the Koh-i-Khan Nashin area between the lower Helmand River and Pakistan (Baluchistan) is of more interest as a source of manganese, since a sample assayed at 16.52 per cent Fe_2O_3 (hematite) and 11.12 per cent MnO_2 , as well as oxides of magnesium, barium and some rare earths.¹⁰

Near Jabal al-Saraj, about 50 miles north of Kabul, is a thick vein of hematite which has been exploited intermittently for some 2000 years.¹¹ The original Five Year Plan¹² proposed building a blast furnace here, and the Afghans have now signed a contract with Soviet Techno-Export to investigate these deposits and determine whether and how they can be exploited. A major consideration is whether the Kar Kar or Darre-yi-Suf coalfields can supply coking coal. If they can, the Jabal-al-Saraj site is a good one, since it lies at the foot of the Salang Pass and has abundant water and limestone for flux. But while Jabal al-Saraj has certain transportation advantages for both Kabul and the Kunduz Valley, there remain serious doubts as to the present adequacy of the domestic market. All of Afghanistan imported less than 3000 m.t. of iron and steel shapes and forms (mostly coated plates and sheets, rods and wire) plus only 2.9 m.t. of pig iron in 1957-58. Imports of simple iron and steel manufactures (structural parts, cables, fretting, fencing, nails, bolts, nuts, etc.) amounted to less than 2000 m.t. in that year. Since the preceding imports represent small amounts of the diverse products of advanced industrial economies, one must conclude that there is not as yet a market for a domestic ferrous metallurgical industry in Afghanistan.

The most carefully investigated ferroalloy in Afghanistan is the chromite found in the Logar Valley south of Kabul. This ore has attracted quite a bit of interest and was the subject of a thorough survey by M. E. Volin of the United States Department of the Interior in 1949.¹³ No less than eleven surface occurrences were plotted, and the total reserves were estimated at 181,200 tons with a Cr_2O_3 content of between 35.8

8. International Engineering Company, Helmand Valley Industrial Survey, Phase I Report, prepared for Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., San Francisco, 1955, Section vii, pp. 12, 25.

9. Ibid., Section vii, p. 12.

10. Ibid., Section B-iv, p. 9.

11. Afghanistan News, ii, no. 14, October 1958, p. 15.

12. The Five Year Plan of Afghanistan, New York, 1956, p. 157.

13. M. E. Volin, Chromite Deposits in the Logar Valley, Kabul Province, Afghanistan, prepared for the Government of Afghanistan, Washington, D. C., U. S. Department of the Interior, 1950.

per cent and 57.5 per cent. Unfortunately, only 28,000 tons were found to meet the prevailing commercial specification. The costs of mining and shipping this ore to the United States were apparently too high to interest anyone in the small quantity available.

D. Nonferrous Metals

A similarly frustrating experience was had with respect to beryl from Darre-yi-Nur in the Kunar Valley about 40 miles northeast of Jalalabad. In 1957, encouraged by the ICA, an engineer of the Ministry of Mines and Industries personally supervised the mining and packing of 60 tons of beryl for export to a United States firm. When the ore arrived, however, it was found that it contained less than the 10 per cent commercial minimum of beryllium, although it did have some 2.5 per cent of lithium which could be reclaimed. Partly as a result of this experience, mining of this 1000 m.t. beryl deposit, which had proceeded at a rate of 30 or 40 tons per year since 1954, has been discontinued.

With regard to other nonferrous metals, particularly the polymetallic ores of copper, lead, and zinc, Afghanistan appears to be widely, if not handsomely, endowed. No known deposits are large enough to permit exports, but if and when Afghanistan were to develop an industrial economy, she would not be handicapped by the absence of these base metals. On the other hand, no sizable reserves of bauxite or other aluminum ores have yet been found.

E. Precious Metals and Gemstones

The Eastern Hindu Kush has been known for centuries as a source of gold and silver, as well as of rubies, amethysts, and tourmalines. Both vein (in Badakhshan and Kandahar) and placer (along the Kikcha and Amu Rivers) deposits of gold are known, but have not been worked in recent years.¹⁴ Silver is no longer mined in the Panjshir Valley, though it contains some deposits of lead with quantities of silver included. Herat and Kandahar Provinces offer other possible sources of silver.

Of more present importance is the semi-precious stone lapis lazuli, mined in the upper Kokcha Valley of Badakhshan. Here are some of the finest deposits in the world, some of them tapped for almost 4000 years and selling for as much as \$300 per kilogram today. Several thousand dollars worth of lapis lazuli are exported annually, while another 100 to 150 kilograms are sold to the Shirkat-i-Havjari-va-Navjari lapidary works in Kabul for domestic consumption.¹⁵ The Ministry of Mines and Industries has devoted quite a bit of time and effort to discovering new lapis lenses, and to improving the extraction and transportation from known mines. But, for the integrated economic development of Afghan minerals, some of this effort should be diverted to general geological and mineral exploration.

14. *Afghanistan News*, ii, no. 14, October 1958, p. 15.

15. Dr. Sultan A. Popol, Chief, Geological Survey (now Chief of Mining Section), Ministry of Mines and Industries, "Lapis Lazuli," Jeshyn, 1957, mimeographed brochure, 5 pages.

F. Non-Metallics

Far less spectacular than gold, silver or gemstones, but of far greater importance to the ultimate economic development of Afghanistan, are the nation's resources of non-metallic elements, the raw materials of the Chemical and construction industries. Frequently overlooked in resource surveys, such basic materials as common salt, limestone, gypsum, clay, glass sand and sulfur are absolutely essential to the development of an industrial economy and scientific agriculture as well as to the construction of factories, roads, and houses. As in other semi-arid regions, rain and surface water in Afghanistan have served to concentrate many of these minerals rather than to dissolve them irretrievably away.

Common salt, NaCl , is plentiful in Afghanistan. In the north are nearly pure rock salt domes at Taliqan and Khalifgan, both of which have been tapped for centuries. Salt flats near Tashkurghan, Andkhui and Herat are also used to supply local needs. South of the Hindu Kush, and particularly in the arid southwest, the ephemeral or playa lakes are surrounded by salt pans from which the local inhabitants obtain salt by a series of evaporations in dug basins, often boiling off the last water in metal pans set over fires of camelthorn and other desert scrub. These widespread salt flats provide a virtually inexhaustible reserve of NaCl from which the industrial base, NaOH , and the acid, HCl , may be obtained by electrolysis. In certain areas, the salt flats also contain high percentages of KCl , MgCl_2 , Na_2SO_4 (Glauber's salt), and other compounds of industrial value. Indeed, from the standpoint of agriculture, areas such as the middle and lower Helmand Valley have far too much salt in the upper soil horizons. But this excess can be turned to good advantage in some places if and when the salts are used as raw materials for artificial fertilizers and other chemicals needed in scientific agriculture. Unfortunately, no large deposits of nitrates or phosphates are yet known, although conditions for their occurrence are favorable.

On the Afghan slopes of the Safid Kuh in Nangarhar (Mashriqi) Province are many outcrops of talc, estimated at several million tons in total. The Ministry of Mines and Industries is taking increasing interest in commercial exploitation of this resource, which has been mined for years by the local Shinwari tribesmen and sold in Pakistan.

The sulfur deposits of Maimane, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Badakhshan Provinces are apparently of industrial importance, and the Russians have shown interest in their exploitation. Since sulfuric acid is one of the major raw materials of a chemical industry, used to produce other acids and to convert natural phosphates into superphosphates, these deposits will eventually be of considerable interest to Afghanistan as a whole.

Glass sand is plentiful, but the site of Afghanistan's first glass factory will probably be determined more in relation to cheap fuel than to the raw material which is so common. Both Mazar-i-Sharif and Kandahar have been suggested as sites, perhaps with a view to petroleum imports, and there has been mention of Czechoslovak

technical and financial assistance for such a plant.

The Czechs have built the first cement plant in Afghanistan, at Jabal al-Saraj, and are constructing the second, at Pul-i-Khumri. Again, fuel is a major consideration, limestone and gypsum being fairly widespread, particularly in the flanks of the Hindu Kush and underlying the plains areas of the southwest. Brick clay is also common, but the finer varieties used for ceramics and porcelain are less easy to find, the major sources being in Kataghan and Badakhshan. Two porcelain factories are in operation, one at the Consolidated Cotton Company in Kunduz and the other at the Shaker works in Kabul. The former has a capacity of one million pieces per year, the latter of one and one-quarter million, though neither is yet producing at the specified rate.

Most Afghan houses are built of sun-dried brick. Only the rich can afford stone which, although plentiful, is expensive to cut even in Afghanistan. But many more Afghans could afford homes of baked brick if fuel were not so scarce and expensive. Most Afghan brick-ovens are fired with vegetable materials: wood in a few instances, bagasse at Jalalabad near the sugar-cane plant, stubble and straw in agricultural areas, and desert scrub in the drier regions. The intensive hunt for anything which will burn denies to the soil its organic increment and has deforested vast regions of Afghanistan.

III. Wood and Water

Wood is another indispensable material, but one in which Afghanistan is very poorly provided. The only extensive virgin forests in the country are those in the high eastern Hindu Kush, remote and almost inaccessible except to the Nuristanis who live there and who once carved from enormous trees their amazing wooden idols. Wood, often ornamentally carved, is still their main building material. We know quite a bit about these forests because mountain climbers, anthropologists, and botanists seeking agricultural origins have frequented the ranges of Nuristan, but commercial exploitation of the timber would be extremely difficult and possibly unwise. Without these forests, the regimes of such rivers as the Kokcha, Panjshir, Laghman and Kunar would be more variable than they are, and flood problems in their lower courses (and in the lower Kabul River into which the last three drain) even more severe.

Today, most of the commercial lumber in Afghanistan comes from Pactya (Junobi) Province--southeast of Kabul in the areas of Gardez and Khost. These sections of the "Western Suleiman Mountains," which supply some tributaries to the Kabul but more to the Helmand and Indus systems, have already been excessively cut and overgrazed. Today one can see here the same processes which presumably denuded much of central Afghanistan in the past. Most of the higher Hazarajat as well as the central Hindu Kush, Kuh-i-Baba, Paropamisus and Band-i-Turkistan ranges receive enough moisture to support trees. But the trees were cut, and the seedlings grazed off or gathered for fuel, centuries ago. Now there are very few natural stands of trees outside of oases in northern, western, or southern Afghanistan. The main exceptions are the pistachios of the northern, loessal foothills, the wild junipers of the Paropamisus, and

the occasional tamarisk of the Helmand Basin.¹⁶ To make matters worse, if the present deforestation of Pactya (Junobi) Province is allowed to continue for another decade or two, only Nuristan will have any forests left. The Ministry of Agriculture recognizes the problem, and there is apparently an incipient reforestation program developing with the assistance of experts from the People's Republic of China.¹⁷ But this is not enough. Few resource problems of Afghanistan are as serious and potentially dangerous as that of forests and wood supply, a matter calling for immediate protective as well as remedial action. While it would manifestly be impossible for the Government to prohibit grazing in the eastern, forested areas, it would probably be a simple matter to forbid the manufacture or sale of charcoal and to regulate the cutting and use of what standing timber remains. The use of wood for fuel in cities and towns must be discouraged by promoting the use of briquets made from inferior grades of coal. The Afghan Government has long realized the critical importance of water, and has dealt vigorously with water management in every major drainage basin. Now, for the sake of water and soil as well as wood, official action on a broad front is urgent.

In contrast to wood, it is probably safe to say that no Afghan has ever considered water an expendable commodity. The entire system of land ownership and taxation is more attuned to water rights than to rights over soil. Indeed, the land is per se far less valuable than the water to irrigate it. Except in Mazar-i-Sharif Province, land which is not irrigated is not personally owned or taxed but may be dryfarmed by anyone. The most basic distinction made in Afghan agriculture is that between growing crops by irrigation and dryfarming (lalmi), relying solely upon rainfall.

Table II
ESTIMATED LAND USE IN AFGHANISTAN - Million Hectares^a

Waste lands and built upon	49.5
Meadows and pastures	3.2
Forests and woodlands	1.0
Arable lands:	
River irrigated	3.38
Spring irrigated	0.87
Karez irrigated	1.06
Dryfarmed (<u>lalmi</u>)	2.49
Additional area planned for cultivation	1.10
Further unused area suitable for cultivation	2.3
TOTAL	64.90

^aSurvey of Progress, 1959, vol. ii, p. 1. These estimates agree very

16. For a fuller description of the distribution of various species of trees, see Johannes Humlum, La Géographie de L'Afghanistan, Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1959, chs. vi and xxi, or the study by O. H. Volk, "Klima und Pflanzenverbreitung in Afghanistan" in Vegetatio, Acta Geobotanica, vol. v-vi, viii, The Hague, 1954.

17. Afghanistan News, iv, no. 36, August 1960, p. 15.

closely with those given in Donald N. Wilber, editor, Afghanistan, (Country Survey Series), New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1956, p. 213. The main qualification is that of the 7.80 million hectares of "arable" lands, probably no more than one-third are cultivated in a given season. The remaining two-thirds have to be fallowed because of water shortages or to allow soil fertility to return. See the discussion in Humlum, op. cit., pp. 164-166.

We have indicated that many high areas of central and eastern Afghanistan receive enough rainfall to support trees. Probably three-quarters of the land area would support vegetation of some sort, principally steppic grasses and xerophytic scrub, were it not for the continuous overgrazing by sheep and goats. Thus in forestry, agriculture, and pastoralism the problem is often not so much one of obtaining water but of proper use of what is there.

Since most of Afghanistan is deforested, while glaciers exist only in the extreme northeast, it is the rate of snow-melt and percolation of water in the highest valleys along with the winter and spring rains which determine the regimes of the major streams. As one would expect, these regimes are very uneven. Streams such as the Helmand and its major tributary, the Arghandab (which is really a collection of a system of sub-tributaries) reach their peak runoff in relation to spring rains and usually flood in April or May.¹⁸ Construction of storage dams at Kajakai and Arghandab has helped to control this runoff, and to delay the low water period downstream from July to September, thus greatly extending the irrigation period. The streams of northern Afghanistan, such as the Kunduz, which are more dependent upon snow-melt than upon rainfall, have their maximum discharge in June and their minimum in February or March.¹⁹ In the Kunduz River, the maximum natural discharge averages nine times the minimum; in the Helmand, prior to regulation, the maximum was thirty times the minimum. In the Kunduz, a wet year may bring down twice the total runoff of a dry one; in the Helmand and Arghandab, variations of three and even four to one are possible. As in all semi-arid regions, high variability from month to month and from year to year is characteristic.

The construction of massive dams and storage reservoirs serves both to regulate runoff and to provide hydroelectric potential. The Afghan Government has long been aware of the possibilities of multi-purpose river development projects to harness and improve water resources. The main limitation on such projects has been lack of funds. In the immediate postwar period, most of Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves were committed to the Helmand Valley project, designed to stabilize and extend irrigated acreage and to provide farms for landless peasants and nomads, as well as to prevent floods and furnish electric power. Unfortunately the irrigation aspects have been overextended, while the hydroelectric installations are yet to be completed. Although

18. Aloys A. Michel, The Kabul, Kunduz, and Helmand Valleys and the National Economy of Afghanistan, Washington, D. C., National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council, 1959, pp. 139-140.

19. Ibid., pp. 82-84.

the United States has extended loans totalling \$41 million and has devoted part of its ICA program to technical assistance to the project, the results have, on the whole, been disappointing and hurtful to American prestige in Afghanistan. The Afghans themselves have put at least \$40 million into the Helmand and may have to raise \$30 million more to finish off the project within its presently-contemplated scope. However, it now appears that the United States will grant another \$6 million to the project and will provide a team of twenty-five experts from the Bureau of Reclamation to advise on operating the project.²⁰

There is no doubt that regulation of Helmand and Arghandab runoff has reduced flood destruction, while an assured supply of water in the late summer has made possible double-cropping of more land and has substantially increased the production of fruit which is exported from the Kandahar region. The region's power potential has been greatly enhanced by the construction of the Kajakai dam, which holds 1.5 million acre feet of water and can produce 120,000 kva when the demand arises and funds, estimated at \$12 million, are made available for the hydroelectric installation. Of more immediate importance is the Arghandab dam, close to Kandahar, with a potential capacity of 12,800 kva, half of which is soon to be installed at the United States' expense, \$2.4 million including transmission facilities. This installation should eliminate Kandahar's chronic power shortage, which is sure to increase when the ICA-sponsored international airport and industrial district are completed. The installation of two 500-kva diesel generators at Kandahar in 1959 was only a stop-gap measure, especially as fuel must be imported. The 3000-kva hydroelectric capacity in the drop structure of the Boghra Canal will be a boon to Girishk (5000 population) and the Nadi-Ali, Marja, and Lashkar Gah areas, but is too far from Kandahar (8,000 people) to help in the industrialization of that much more important region. In summary, then, the hydroelectric potential of the Helmand Region is excellent, but its development has to be more realistically paced than it has been.

In the Kabul watershed, hydroelectric development is moving much more rapidly. The Sarobi dam and power plant, inaugurated in May 1957, has already alleviated the power shortage in Kabul city and made possible the start of cement making at Jabal al-Saraj one year later and the inauguration of the Gulbahar cotton textile plant in June 1960. Sarobi was built by the nationalized General Electric Company at a cost of \$14 million for 22,000 kva, which can later be increased by one-half. The key to proper utilization of the Sarobi site, and to meeting the ever-growing demands of the Kabul Region, lies in the construction of a much larger dam upstream at Naghlu. On January 20, 1960, the Ministry of Mines and Industries signed a contract with Soviet Techno Prom Export to build a 344-foot dam at Naghlu in the next five years. The Naghlu Dam will provide 60,000 kva at a cost of 1.3 billion Afghanis (about \$30 million at free market rates, much more at official rates), most of which will come from the 1955-56 Soviet \$100 million loan. The Naghlu reservoir will cover some 16 square kilometers, and the regulated discharge will firm up the power generated at Sarobi and at any of half a dozen potential sites in the Lower Gorge which can later be developed.

20. Afghanistan News, iii, no. 31, March 1960, pp. 2-8; and The New York Times, December 4, 1960, p. 11.

There are no substantial floodplain or terrace lands which can be irrigated in either the Upper or Lower Gorge sections of the Kabul River, but there is a great irrigation potential in the Jalalabad area, between the Lower Gorge and the Khayber Pass. Jalalabad lies at about 2000 feet elevation and so enjoys a warm winter climate. Citrus fruits, rice, and sugar cane are grown there, making the area of considerable importance to the Afghan agricultural economy. Hence the Royal Government of Afghanistan has embarked on a second project to build a dam at Darunta, at the end of the Lower Gorge. This will be a 75-foot dam, providing 10,000 kva hydroelectric capacity for Jalalabad, but principally designed to irrigate about 30,000 hectares on the south bank of the Kabul River towards Hazar-i-Nao. The total cost of the Darunta project, which will require four years to complete, is estimated at about \$40 million, of which \$22.4 million will come from the Soviet \$100 million loan. The contract with Techno Prom Export was signed on January 19, 1960, and construction began on August 18, 1960.

The third major drainage basin in Afghanistan is that of the Kunduz River, a tributary of the Amu Darya. In its lower course from Doshi to the town of Kunduz, the river irrigates some of the most fertile land in all of Afghanistan, fluvial deposits with wind-blown (loessal) increments. Here are the sugar beet lands which supply the factory at Baghlan, and the most important cotton-growing areas in Afghanistan supplying the modern ginning and cotton seed processing plant at Kunduz as well as the textile plants of Pul-i-Khumri and Gulbahar. To the east, along the Khanabad River, Afghanistan's most important rice-growing area occupies the lowlands reclaimed from marshes in the last 30 years, while the higher terraces, as far east as Taliqan, are devoted to cotton and wheat. To the north, along the Amu itself from Imam Sayyid or Qizil Qala to Khwaje-yi-Gar is another cotton-producing area, watered from the Amu or from its second Afghan tributary, the Kokcha.

The Kokcha River, which drains most of Badakhshan, has an excellent hydroelectric potential in its upper courses and in its lower course where it has dug a small canyon along the strike of south-dipping sandstones. But the upper reaches are sparsely populated, while the lower course, being entrenched in permeable sandstones, presents serious problems in dam construction. Siemens-Schuckert have suggested a low barrage with sufficient installed hydroelectric capacity (4500 kva) to pump up water to irrigate 125,000 acres between the Kokcha and the Amu at a cost of about \$2.5 million.²¹ Meanwhile, in a mass-participation, self-help program, 2500 laborers and local farmers have dug a 700-meter diversion canal in 22 days in the Archi area to prevent flood damage from the Kokcha.²²

On the Khanabad River, east of the city of that name, the Consolidated Cotton Company of Kunduz (63% Government-owned) has built a diversion dam and small hydroelectric station (1400 kva). Most of this power, however, is sent to Kunduz for use by the cotton gins and cottonseed oil-margarine-soap plant.

21. Michel, *op.cit.*, pp. 118-119.

22. *Afghanistan News*, iii, no. 31 March 1960, p.20.

The Kunduz River itself has only one small barrage, at Pul-i-Khumri, with practically no storage capacity, and a second diversion dam being built, with Soviet assistance, just below it. The first barrage was built by Siemens just before World War II, and serves as a bridge as well. Its power plant has a capacity of 6000 kva, but averages only half that in output because of lack of storage capacity and the uneven runoff of the river. The plant under construction with Soviet assistance is supposed to produce 9000 kva when complete, but will suffer from the same handicaps. Since the recently-enlarged textile mill, the Kar Kar coal mine, the new Czech-built cement plant, and the town of Pul-i-Khumri will all rely upon these two power plants, it is doubtful that the problem can be solved this easily.²³ The same is true with respect to use of Kunduz River water for irrigation. The old Siemens barrage at Pul-i-Khumri serves as the intake structure for two small irrigation canals, one on either bank. The new Soviet-built structure will serve to divert water to the west, into the Ghorī area of cotton and sugar-beet cultivation. All these canals, and half a dozen others downstream, suffer from the wide variations in run-off. In flood seasons, usually June, the canals overflow and wash out their banks, flooding and often ruining the young crops they are supposed to water. In autumn, winter, and even early spring, they may run completely dry.

It is difficult to understand why the Afghan Government has not been willing, even eager, to build storage facilities on the Kunduz River or on its major upstream tributaries. Several excellent dam-sites exist on the Kunduz, Surkhab, or Darre-yi-Anderab.²⁴ Perhaps political considerations once ruled out heavy investment in the north, but now that Afghanistan has opened its doors to Soviet technicians, it would appear to be highly advantageous to request them to assist with the construction of at least one major storage-dam and hydroelectric plant in this, the most fertile and the most industrialized watershed of Afghanistan. Probably no region in the nation could repay the construction costs so rapidly, in terms of increased agricultural output and in sales of electric power to factories, villages, and towns.

Five other rivers of northern and northwestern Afghanistan should be mentioned in this survey of water resources. All were left-bank tributaries of the Amu Darya in early postglacial times; none reach it today. These are the Balkh-Ab, which rises in the magnificent Band-i-Amir lakes of the Hazarajat and which waters the Mazar-i-Sharif oasis and, via the Iskhabad Canal, that of Aq Chah; the Ab-i-Safid which feeds the Shibarghan oasis; the Ram-Gul-Tagao (also called the Andkhui or Sangalik) which terminates in the oasis of Andkhui but whose tributaries water such towns as Kaisar, Maimana, and Daulatabad; the Bala Murghab, which flows past the town of Murghab into the USSR where it receives the Kushk and eventually terminates in the ancient oasis of Merv, now Mary; and, finally, the Hari Rud, which flows west past Herat, then turns north to form part of the Afghan-Iranian boundary, then crosses the desert to water the Soviet city of Tedzhen. None of these rivers is comparable in importance to the Helmand, Kabul, or Kunduz, but all of them make possible irrigated agriculture in the oases mentioned, of which Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif are the largest. Each of these streams has a minor hydroelectric potential, and all of them could support more agriculture if funds were available

23. Michel, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

24. *Ibid.*, maps 3 and 4.

to build storage reservoirs and modern distribution systems. But only the Balkh-Ab is now receiving any attention, and probably only it and the Hari Rud offer possibilities for large-scale development in the future.

As for the remaining streams of western Afghanistan, there has been occasional discussion of expanding irrigation from the Farah Rud and the other streams which, like the Helmand, flow into the Chakansur basin. But none of the rivers between the Helmand and the Hari Rud has much hydroelectric potential.

IV. Agricultural and Pastoral Resources

What we have said above about water resources is directly relevant to crop-raising and animal husbandry in Afghanistan. To some extent, the two are mutually exclusive activities, but this feature tends to be overly emphasized, ignoring the complementary aspects and the possibilities of mixed farming. Generally speaking, of course, sheep and goat herding is carried out on lands too dry for agriculture. But the pastoral flocks can never be far removed from water, and the most ancient quarrel in the world is that between farmer and herder. In Afghanistan, the nomadic herder has historically had the upper hand, particularly south of the Hindu Kush where the Abdalis and Ghilzais still roam with their flocks. Both here and in the northwest, the settled agriculturalist has had to stand by while flocks trampled down his grain and armed shepherds led their animals to watercourses and canals. Now this is changing. Settlement of the nomads is a policy of the government and was one of the motives behind the Helmand Valley project. The government believes that greater political and economic benefits, including taxation, are to be derived from settled agriculture than from nomadism. But this is only partly true, and there are regions where a combination of the two, i.e., ranching within fixed preserves or the raising of fodder crops for sheep, goats, and cattle, would provide much better use of the land than either farming or herding exclusively. To see how this is true, we must examine the resource bases in soils, field crops, tree crops, grazing lands, and domesticated animals.

A. Soils

The soils of Afghanistan have many common characteristics. All are high in mineral content and low in humus, a direct reflection of the low rainfall of the country. The soils of the north, which consist of alluvial deposits plus wind-borne loess, are probably the most fertile. Those of the southwest vary considerably, the best being those of old river terraces and floodplains which are high enough above the present water table and permeable enough to be well-drained. Where the soil surface is close to the water table, either because the site is low or because of impermeable rock substrata, waterlogging and severe salinization or alkalinization of the soil results. Such conditions exist in the north as well, but generally the wind-borne and water-laid deposits are thick enough there so that drainage is good. The same holds true for most of the intermontane valleys of eastern Afghanistan, where Pleistocene glaciation and glacial melt-waters played a major role in the deposition of soil parent materials.

Because there has been very little leaching by rainfall, and because evaporation and capillary action of soil water bring dissolved minerals close to the surface, most Afghan soils are alkaline in reaction and contain relatively large amounts of salts, some desirable, others definitely not. For example, salts of potassium, one of the elements required by most plants, are abundant in most Afghan soils, eliminating the need for potassic fertilizers. On the other hand, some soils have an excess of boron compounds, which may poison plants and animals living on those plants. Soluble phosphates, which make phosphorous available to plants, are generally deficient, and such "hungry" crops as cotton or corn quickly deplete the soils of this element. Hence the desirability of locating phosphate deposits and preparing superphosphate fertilizers which can greatly increase crop yields if properly applied.

The third element essential for plant growth is nitrogen, which is deficient in almost all Afghan soils. The amount of available nitrogen in a soil is directly related to the amount of humus, that is, to the amount of decayed plant and animal matter accumulated in the upper horizons of the soil. The accumulation of humus, in turn, depends upon the amount of water and upon the cultivation practices. Since all of Afghanistan is sub-humid, there is not enough rainfall to support the continuous cover of natural grass which produces the humus-rich soils (chestnuts and chernozems) of the world. Since few Afghan farmers can afford to plow under a "green manure" crop of clover or alfalfa, and since many crops and even desert plants are pulled out by the roots to provide fuel, the soil is continually robbed of the natural humus which is its due. Furthermore, it is the common practice to graze animals on stubble, a practice not harmful in itself, but bad if carried to excess. The manure, rich in nitrogen, is generally not left to the soil but collected, dried, and burnt for fuel. Thus the nitrogen content of the soil continually decreases, and fertility drops with continued cropping. Fallowing for one or more years between crops, a practice which most Afghan farmers have been forced to adopt, returns a small amount of nitrates to the soil in the form of atmospheric nitrogen "fixed" by soil bacteria, but this process is also retarded by aridity.

Experiments have shown that crop yields can be greatly increased by plowing under a crop such as alfalfa or clover which improves both the nitrogen content and the structure ("tilth") of the soil. But this procedure is too expensive for farmers who are living a "field-to-mouth" existence and who cannot afford thus to invest their capital for greater returns in the future. The same low income level prohibits the use of artificial fertilizers, though one of the best uses which could be made of surplus hydroelectric capacity anywhere in Afghanistan would be in a plant for artificial fixation of atmospheric nitrogen. The problem is certainly not one restricted to Afghanistan, but is rather characteristic of arid zone agriculture throughout Asia and North Africa. Since solution of the problem depends, in large measure, upon providing substitute fuels for straw, stubble, and manure, there is a real vicious circle to be broken. As Gunnar Myrdal points out in Rich Lands and Poor, paradoxically, such farmers are poor because they are poor.

A final problem related to Afghan soils is that of salinity and alkalinity, the problem which has set at nought so much of the work in the Helmand project. A saline soil is one in which accumulations of soluble salts have reached such proportions in the upper horizons as to interfere seriously with plant metabolism, i.e., to poison most economically useful crops. An alkaline soil also contains excess salts, but these are not soluble, i.e., cannot be removed by flushing with an excess of pure water. The alkaline soils must be

reclaimed by chemical amendments, usually gypsum to replace the exchangeable sodium ion with calcium, or by following long and tedious cropping patterns in which alkali-tolerant plants, usually of little economic value, gradually remove the sodium from the soil. In both cases, good drainage is essential to remove soluble sodium from the soil and to prevent recurrence of the salinity or alkalinity. Providing good drainage on soils which do not have it is a very expensive proposition, as experience in the Helmand has shown.²⁵

In summary, then, we may state that the soil resources of Afghanistan are good only in the north, and there only where water can be brought to deep loessal-alluviums with good drainage characteristics. In the east, and particularly in the south, soils are generally fair to poor, although many high valleys and some low terraces exist where drainage is good and saline-alkaline problems not serious. The main problems are proper soil and water management and the proper selection of crops and rotational patterns. The Afghan farmer has learned a great deal about his soils through centuries of experience. There is very little that anyone could teach him about techniques of bringing water to his land; most Afghans are excellent hydraulic engineers. But many Afghan farmers need to be shown that too much water can do more permanent harm to their soils than too little. They need to be convinced of the benefits of night irrigation as opposed to letting the water stand in distributary canals from which it seeps into the water table. In the new irrigation projects, the farmers must be persuaded that a season-long water supply is now assured and that they do not have to flood their fields for fear that there will be a shortage later. The farmers must be shown that row irrigation is much more economical of water, and better for many crops, than basin irrigation. Finally, the farmers--especially the newly-settled nomads--have to be shown the benefits of proper rotations, replacing fallow with green manure crops. They must be given the financial security to allow them to plan for future years, not just for the next harvest.

B. Field Crops

Until the 1930's, practically no industrial field crops were grown in Afghanistan. Most farmers grew only grain, fruits, and vegetables for their own consumption or for sale to the towns. Then the draining of the Khanabad marshes and the establishment of the Consolidated Cotton Company of Kunduz, the Afghan Sugar Manufacturing Company of Baghlan, and the Textile Company at Pul-i-Khumri (there was an older, small plant at Jabal al-Seraj) opened the door to production for sale rather than for local consumption. Even then, it was difficult to persuade farmers to grow sugar beets or cotton if they feared a shortage of grain. But the system caught on, and after World War II received increased Government support. Since 1950, and particularly since 1953, the Government has nationalized most of the industry based on agricultural raw materials, and has attempted to "guide" the entire Afghan economy. With foreign technical assistance, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Mines and Industries have promoted and expanded the production of

25. Much more detailed knowledge of Afghan soils is needed. Technical assistance financed by the United Nations Special Fund has been sought for a program of soils classification beginning with Kataghan Province. (Survey of Progress, 1959, vol. ii, p. 3.)

industrial crops, while also stimulating the cultivation of staples.

This is a hopeful and fully justifiable course of action. Afghanistan has no memory of serious famines, as do India and Pakistan. Although there have been grain imports in recent years, these stem more from a slowly rising living standard, and devotion of more land to technical crops, than from any serious domestic shortages. Wheat is grown wherever there is water to irrigate it, and by dryfarming on the high plateaus. It accounts for about 63 per cent of the sown area of Afghanistan. Herat and Kandahar Provinces occasionally produce small surpluses, which are sent to Kabul for sale. Rice is grown in Kataghan and Nangarhar (Mashriqi), as well as in Kabul and Parwan Provinces. ^{Handwritten: + Kunduz} Corn is common in the lower valleys of eastern Afghanistan. Grapes are produced in the oases of the north and northwest, in the Kuh-i-Daman Valley north of Kabul and the Logar Valley to the south, and intensively around Kandahar. Melons occupy land too dry for grapes or grain. The profusion of vegetables is too great to detail, but the good quality of most root and leaf vegetables is noteworthy. The production of these crops, and the skills of their producers, must rank high among the resources of Afghanistan.

Table III
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION OF MAJOR FIELD CROPS - 1955-56^a

	Area Cultivated (Thousand Hectares)	Yield (Thousand Metric Tons)
Wheat	2225	2225
Barley	350	280
Corn	405	729
Rice	210	316
Cotton, lint	63	22
Sugar beets	4	40
Sugar cane	0.5	59
Grapes and Raisins	7	30
Vegetables	100	100

The most valuable aspect of Afghan field crop agriculture, however, is its capacity to expand. The greatest benefit of such irrigation projects as the Helmand is not the net addition of new lands to those cropped, but the assurance of a firm water supply, which may mean two crops a year, to lands formerly in production. Not only can areas be enlarged, but the intensivity of production can greatly be increased through better production methods, better seed selection, disease control, improved implements, and better rotational practices. Applying these techniques, Afghan agriculture can not only provide a food supply increasing much more rapidly than population, but can expand the production of technical crops as well. And technical crops, particularly sugar beets and cotton, offer Afghanistan the way to self-sufficiency in items which are among the major

^aSurvey of Progress, 1959, vol. ii, p. 5 (Table iii). These estimates are just that. Yields of wheat and vegetables are not exactly one metric ton per hectare.

imports and to producing a surplus of high quality cotton which can be exported to pay for other, manufactured imports. Furthermore, the domestic processing of agricultural and pastoral raw materials--sugar beets and cane, cotton, silk, fruits, wool, hides and skins--offers to Afghanistan the soundest road to industrialization. Here are products for which a great domestic demand already exists, and many of which can be exported to nearby markets in India, Pakistan, and even the USSR.

C. Tree Crops

In recent years, fresh and dried fruits have become Afghanistan's leading export in value terms. Of course, most of them go to India and Pakistan and so bring in only rupees rather than the dollars, pounds or marks earned by karakul exports or the rubles earned (or offset) by exports of cotton to the USSR. But these fruit exports offer a great opportunity for strengthening Afghan trade relations with the countries of the sub-continent which will increasingly be in a position to supply manufactures at low prices, and, equally important, at low transportation cost. And the production of fruits and nuts is one of the easiest areas for expansion in Afghan agriculture. A large part of the increase in recent years has come from the Kandahar-Arghandab area of the Helmand Valley Project where the water supply in the old canals has been reinforced and assured by the storage dam and South Canal. In the Kuh-i-Daman Valley north of Kabul, tons of fruit are wasted each year through insect damage or blight, failure to harvest in time, or simply careless handling and packaging. The same is true to a lesser extent in the citrus areas near Jalalabad. The solution here, as in the case of irrigation techniques, is more government attention to production methods. The processing and marketing of fruit has been largely in private hands; Itehadie in Kabul and Pushtun Industries in Kandahar are the main packers. Both of these concerns need more capital, and perhaps more competition. Now the Government is building, with Czech assistance, a new factory in Kandahar with the capacity to handle 30,000 m.t. of fruit per year.

Better methods of drying tree fruits, currants, and raisins, better packing, and more processing so that fruits can be sold in the more valuable forms of preserves, syrups and candies are among the possibilities. Refrigerated storage and transport has yet to be investigated. In any event, the soon-to-be paved roads from Kabul and Kandahar to the Pakistan border should greatly reduce both the delays and the damage incurred in exports of fresh fruits. Dried fruits and nuts from the south and east are also exported to India and Pakistan, while the Soviet Union is apparently beginning to take some from the north, including the excellent wild pistachios. The Ministry of Agriculture, assisted by the Wyoming University ICA Contract Team, has begun importing superior fruit stock from a number of countries and is establishing new horticultural stations near Kabul, for deciduous fruit, in Jalalabad, for citrus, and in Khost, for olives and carobs. While the proposition to graft Mediterranean olive fruitwood onto the wild olive stock in Pactya (Junobi) Province may prove wide of the mark without an established market for olive oil, it shows the type of imaginative thinking which is now current and the broad range of possibilities for the future.

Natural silk production may conveniently be listed among tree crops, since the worms are fed on the young leaves of the mulberry, a tree very common in the

oases of eastern and northern Afghanistan. Most of the experimental work has been done at the sugar refinery in Baghlan, and two United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization technicians have helped with the project. Kabul has another breeding center, and Jalalabad, Herat, and the Panjshir area are to get them. Superior silkworms and tree stock have been imported, and there seems to be a promising future for this "cottage" industry, especially as it allows the work to be done by women, children, and old men. Afghanistan can hardly expect to export raw silk, but it may become self-sufficient in this material which is much in demand for fine raiment, turbans, etc. Silk weaving has been practiced for centuries in northern Afghanistan, and at present seems to be concentrated at Herat.²⁶

D. Grazing Lands

Much of Afghanistan which is too high or too dry for agriculture is well suited for extensive grazing of sheep and goats. The patterns of long-range and short-range nomadism are being worked out for southern Afghanistan by Dr. Klaus Ferdinand of Denmark.²⁷ We are fairly familiar with the routes of the long-range Abdali and Ghilzai tribes who spend the summers in the southern and central Hindu Kush and the winters down in "Pushtunistan" and along the Indus. The problems caused by this international migration have been accentuated since the establishment of Pakistan and the development of the "Pushtunistan" issue. Afghan Government attempts at settlement were among the reasons for the Helmand Project, but have not met with conspicuous success. Actually, there is no reason why a limited form of nomadic grazing, on defined ranges, should not be made a permanent feature of the economy of southern Afghanistan. Winter temperatures are not too severe for the animals; rather, the question is one of forage. If the less arable portions of the Helmand region were devoted to irrigated pastures or to the raising of fodder crops, some of which are fairly tolerant of alkalinity and would be most beneficial to soils, the region could provide winter grazing or feed for the flocks which would continue to summer in the mountains. A pastoral economy has often been suggested for the Helmand, but the only efforts to date have been those with dairy cattle (Brown Swiss from the U.S.A. or Sahiwal from India). Since the Afghan nomad is more interested in sheep and goats, and knows much more about them, experiments should be made. The main obstacle appears to be bureaucratic inflexibility, reinforced by the fear of admitting that any false starts have been made.

In northern Afghanistan, which has the proper sedge-meadowgrass vegetation and centuries of experience, the karakul sheep is the most important grazing animal, flocks numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of five million. There used to be long-range nomadism here, too, but since the Afghan-Soviet boundary took on meaning in the 1920's and 1930's, the Turkomen and Uzbek herders have had to stay on one side or the other of the border. Now the grazing is a short-range affair, into the mountains in the summer, down to the foothills or oases (and along the Amu Darya) in winter. The conscientious herders often gather the natural scrub and pile it up for winter fodder, the piles forming sheep-folds which afford the animals some protection from the cold winds and

26. Michel, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-109; and Survey of Progress, 1959, Vol. ii, p.8.

27. Humlum, ch. xix.

blizzards. While there is here, as throughout Afghanistan, a problem of overgrazing, the major difficulty in the karakul region seems to be securing an adequate supply of drinking water. Breeders' cooperatives have been formed to provide more water holes and wells, to help improve the breeds, and to organize grading and marketing. All exported karakul must pass through Kabul, where the agencies have their main warehouses and where the Central Customs administration is able to check on the quantities. Better grading of the pelts would enable them to command better prices in New York or London and put them in a stronger position with respect to Russian and Southwest African competition. Now that the former governor of a major karakul raising province, Gholam Haider Adalat of Maimana, has become Minister of Agriculture, we may expect more attention from that ministry to problems of karakul raising and marketing. The Food and Agriculture Organization has provided some assistance with reference to karakul grading and in the formation of cooperatives, and the University of Wyoming Team is also in a position to help improve grazing and breeding practices.

E. Domesticated Animals

The general outlines of sheep and goat raising in Afghanistan have been given in the previous section on grazing lands. There are probably some 14 million sheep, exclusive of karakul, and 6 to 8 million goats in Afghanistan.²⁸ Although various breeds such as the Arabi, Baluchi, Gadici, Ghilzai, Hazaraji, Kandahari, and Turki have been recognized,²⁹ the great majority of Afghan sheep are of the fat-tailed varieties, raised for their meat and fat (made into roghan as a substitute for butter or ghee) as well as for the coarse carpet wool, some of which is exported. The karakul are, of course, a special breed confined to northern Afghanistan and numbering around 5 million. The karakul herds are almost entirely females since the males are killed from one to three days after birth to supply the tightly-curved pelts for the export market. Afghan goats are raised for their meat, which is generally preferred to mutton, and for milk and cheese. Goat hair and mohair are of little economic significance.

Efforts have been made to improve the breeds of Afghan sheep, principally with higher wool yields in mind. The Ghilzai and Kandahari breeds of fat-tailed sheep produce only 5 or 6 pounds of wool per animal per year. Merino sheep imported by the Ministry of Agriculture, which has experimental herds near Kabul and Kandahar, produce twice as much. The Ministry is interested both in crossing the Merino with the Ghilzai and in upbreeding the latter for wool. Columbia sheep, brought to the Helmand by the International Cooperation Administration, may produce 15 pounds of wool apiece. This Columbia breed does quite well on alkali or salt ranges, though it cannot travel as far to water as some of the tough Afghan breeds. The main advantages of the Columbia sheep are the heavy clip of medium-grade wool and the high rate of lamb production, since twinning is common and even triplets are frequent.

If the Ministry of Agriculture continues its emphasis upon introduction of

28. Survey of Progress, 1959, vol. ii, p.9, and Michel, op. cit., p.326.

29. A. S. Demiruren, Map: "A Sample Sheep and Wool Survey of Afghanistan," Kabul, F.A.O. Office, December 1957.

new breeds and upgrading of existing stock, the domestic production and export of wool in Afghanistan could greatly be increased. At present, only 8000 or 9000 tons enter the commercial side of the economy, though a minimum estimate of the annual wool clip gives 25,000 tons.³⁰ Thus, the bulk of the wool is used locally, and probably a high percentage is wasted through inefficient clipping and poor handling.

There are two wool-processing plants in Afghanistan, at Kabul and Kandahar. Efforts are underway, with Polish assistance, to improve production of woollen cloth at both plants, and production at Kandahar has already begun to rise thanks to new equipment.³¹ Attention is also being given to better facilities for grading, washing, and baling wool for exports, which amount to about 6000 or 7000 metric tons per year. In 1955, a Wool Exporting Syndicate financed by the Commercial Bank was established to improve the quality and quantity of wool exports, and thereby the revenue obtained.

Afghanistan's cattle are estimated at about two million head plus or minus a few thousand water buffalo in the lowest areas of Nangarhar (Mashriqi) and Pactya (Junabi) Provinces. Most of the cattle are scrawny and milk yields of the cows incredibly low. Whether this is a cause or result of the Afghan's indifference to cattle products would be hard to say. The fact is that the Afghan is much more interested in sheep and goat meat than he is in beef, and the roghan is apparently preferred to butter, if only because it keeps better. Still, yoghurt and some cheese from cow's milk are fairly common, and it would certainly be advantageous to improve the quality of Afghan milch cattle. Attempts are being made both by introducing the Brown Swiss, which will be maintained as a separate breed restricted to irrigated pastures in the Helmand, and by bringing in Shival and Tharparka bulls from India to upgrade the Kandahar breed. Some progress has been made in castrating inferior bulls, artificial insemination, and inoculation against bovine diseases.

"Milk output of dairy animals is being experimentally increased at the Government farms at Aliabad, Kabul, Beni Hissar, Marezimir and Baghlan by improved grass management and feed. Progressive breeding stations are being established at Kabul, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Katagh, Mazar and Jalalabad."³²

Still, cattle breeding in Afghanistan has a long way to go, if only because the demand for beef and milk products is not very great. What will be of great help, however, is an improvement in the strength of draft bullocks³³ which are needed to pull heavier plows, especially if green manure practices are to be encouraged. (Present plows and bullocks are too weak to overturn and plow under heavy grass and legume crops.)

Finally, there is no excuse for Afghanistan's continual imports of leather,

30. Michel, *op.cit.*, p. 343.

31. *Afghanistan News*, iii, no. 30, February 1960, p. 8; but see also Michel, *op.cit.*, pp. 232-233.

32. *Survey of Progress*, 1959, vol. ii, p. 10.

33. A program for breeding mules has also been started in the Helmand Valley.

since all but the heaviest grades could be produced within the country if flaying were done more carefully and the normal number of hides reached the market. Although the low demand for beef reduces the number of slaughterings, there are at least 200,000 cattle deaths each year.³⁴ Of these, only 40,000 hides reach the market, and the Iqbal Tannery at Kabul operates far below its 120,000 hide annual capacity. There are, of course, scores of small, crude tanneries operating throughout the country, especially for sheep and goatskins. But a program of price incentives to farmers and herders, combined with strict quality control and grading, could not only make Afghanistan self-sufficient in almost all leather grades but could increase by several times the sums received for exports of sheep- and goatskins. A small, modern tannery is supposed to be included in the Kandahar Industrial District, and a West German tanning expert has worked with the Iqbal Tannery in Kabul. But the leather, hides and skins program must be nationwide in scope, and will require the close cooperation of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Mines and Industries. As matters stand, the livestock population of Afghanistan represents, in many ways, an underutilized national resource.

A few words may be added about the beasts of burden and poultry of Afghanistan. The country has about 290,000 camels and about 195,000 horses and mules. (These are estimates for 1953-54 and 1954-55 from the Ministry of Finance, based on animal tax receipts; hence they are probably too low.) The distinction between dromedary camels south of the Hindu Kush and Bactrian to the north is largely fictional, since the two have interbred and the two-humped variety being recessional almost all the camels in northern Afghanistan are "dromedaries" in appearance. Horses are bred mostly by the minority groups in the north, and are used for both riding and cart-pulling. But the draft animal par excellence is the donkey, the unsung hero of Afghan labor. Some 700,000 donkeys, throughout the country, bear most of the burdens not yet taken over by trucks. Their usefulness, especially on mountain trails, cannot be overestimated.

As for poultry, Afghanistan may have some 40 million chickens--scrawny, tough, and producing only about 70 eggs per year per hen.³⁵ Much could be done to improve the quality of these scavengers, who serve a very useful function in a country where the hog is outlawed. Both meat and egg production could be vastly increased if and when funds and personnel are available.

V. Population and Labor Force

No account of national resources is complete without some description of the most important resource of all, the human one. Unfortunately, this is one of the areas concerning which we have the least quantitative data. Most estimates place the population of Afghanistan at 12 or 13 millions, of who 2 or 2 1/2 millions are said to be long-range nomads. There has never been a real census, although preparations are now being made to take one.

34. Michel, *op.cit.*, p. 327.

35. Survey of Progress, 1959, vol. ii, p. 9.

Two departments have been established within the Ministry of Planning to collect information relating to the labor force. The Directorate of Manpower is to ascertain the needs and resources of urban areas and in industry. "Our need at the moment is not only to know the quantitative requirements of the additional job opportunities that should be created or will be created, but we wish to know also the qualitative improvements which need to be brought about to lead to a better job performance and higher earnings."³⁶ The manpower commission will provide information on the rural areas: "It is essential for us to know the sizes of individual agricultural holdings and their relation to the sizes of agricultural households. Furthermore, we would like to obtain more reliable knowledge about the average earning of an individual farmer and that of an average family."³⁷ Eventually, an employment service is to be established.

One of the most interesting facts which a census and the above-mentioned surveys are likely to demonstrate is that Afghanistan is actually underpopulated with respect to developable resources. This fact has already shown up in labor shortages at harvest time, particularly in the Kunduz Valley. It is also related to the campaign against purdah instituted in 1959, one result of which is the first factory employment of women in Kabul's new Omar rayon-weaving plant. As Afghanistan pushes still further along the road to industrialization, she will find it necessary to utilize to the utmost the talents of both sexes, and to provide them with every opportunity to increase their skills and knowledge--a program of education which is already well under way.

VI. Conclusions

The Afghan economy is based upon agriculture and grazing, and it is safe to say that no new discoveries in the mineral field are likely to change that pattern in the near future. This fact has generally been recognized by the planners of Afghanistan's "guided economy," and it is no disservice to Afghanistan to reassert a conclusion of such fundamental importance. Afghanistan has so far avoided the "economic chauvinism" which characterizes so many ambitious but underdeveloped nations which insist on having metallurgical or advanced chemical industries before either the resource bases or the markets have been established. Of course, many of these nations were formerly colonies and look upon the rapid establishment of basic industries as a sign of complete emancipation. Afghanistan has never been any nation's colony, politically or economically, and it is profoundly to be hoped that she never will become one. So long as she is able to maintain trade relations with both East and West, in an economic extension of her traditional policy of neutrality, it will be advantageous for her to import most manufactured goods and to concentrate on the production and processing of those commodities in which she possesses genuine advantages, either of natural resources or proximity to the market.

Such commodities are predominantly agricultural and pastoral--fruits and nuts, cotton, sugar beets and cane, wool, karakul fur, hides and skins, and other products

36. Afghanistan News, iii, no. 31, March 1960, p. 13.

37. Idem.

which are in considerable demand at home or which can be exported either to nearby or to will-paying markets (karakul). Concentration upon such commodities means producing things which the Afghan farmer or herder can use or sell almost immediately. It takes full advantage of skills which are known or comparatively easily learned. The technology involved is fairly simple and inexpensive, yet it has provided in other countries the basis for more elaborate industrialization as capital is accumulated. Furthermore, the processing of the above agricultural and pastoral commodities, combined with the development of those mineral resources which are most promising--coal, perhaps petroleum, and the non-metallics--will serve to build up the power and transportation (see Appendix) industries of Afghanistan. Without this infrastructure, no modern industrial economy can come into being or persist.

The above remarks may sound patronizing or self-serving, coming as they do from a Westerner. They are not. No conscientious analyst could examine the resource base of Afghanistan and come up with the conclusion that the nation was ready for a "Great Leap Forward" or to "overtake and surpass" any of its neighbors. The variety and quality of resources--particularly of mineral resources--simply are not there, or have not yet been found. But neither can one deny that the progress in the last ten years has been astounding, or doubt that it will be continued under the Second Five Year Plan. The resource base of Afghanistan has proven sufficient so far, and it will continue to do so unless impossible demands are made of it. So long as the planning is realistic, and properly balanced, Afghanistan's resources will sustain her progress. And, as we have pointed out, most of them should improve with time and proper nurturing. That is a statement many "advanced" nations can no longer make.

APPENDIX

TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN^a

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TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN

A satisfactory transportation system for Afghanistan must fulfill three basic requirements: 1) to strengthen the political and economic unity of a nation whose central mountainous core gives to its provinces a centrifugal orientation, aggravated by ethnic divergencies; 2) to provide commercial connections for this landlocked state with foreign nations; and 3) to employ the most efficient means of transportation while overcoming the construction difficulties posed by the natural conditions of the country. We shall discuss each of these problems in turn.

Political and Economic Unity

The modern nation-state of Afghanistan dates only from 1747 when it was founded near Kandahar by "true Afghan" or "Pushtun" tribesmen. Thirty years later, the capital was transferred to Kabul for reasons which included transportation considerations. Kabul commands the routes leading from the Indus plains to the passes of the eastern Hindu Kush. In the late eighteenth century, the Afghans controlled Peshawar, the Indus Valley, parts of Baluchistan and Seistan, Farah and Herat in the west, and the banks of the Amu Darya in the north.

In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan lost the areas beyond the Durand Line to British India and the Sikhs. Baluchistan too had to be abandoned, while the western and northern provinces were at times lost to Persia or to Bukhara. But the capital remained at Kabul. Although British intervention cost the Afghans territory in the south and east, it was largely thanks to the Anglo-Afghan agreement of 1880 that the Kabul government was able to secure and have demarcated its present western and northern boundaries.

Britain's de facto guarantee of Afghanistan's boundaries, which lasted until 1921, was no solution to problems of internal unity. The true Afghans or Pushtuns remain a minority of Afghanistan's twelve or thirteen million inhabitants, including nomads. The ethnic Afghans are concentrated south and east of the Hindu Kush. To the north are Turkic peoples: Uzbeks and Turkmens. In the central mountains are the Hazara Mongols. In the northeast, and around Kabul, are large numbers of Tajiks. Even prior to 1900, population transfers were employed to reduce ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity. But in this century the government at Kabul has put more emphasis upon the development of better transportation and communications facilities to unify its provinces.

Unfortunately, both the rugged topography of central Afghanistan and a certain similarity in regional economies have handicapped this work. With the exception of Kabul, the major cities of Afghanistan lie on the flanks of the central uplands, usually where large streams emerge from the mountains to irrigate large oases. The ancient caravan routes skirted these uplands, connecting the oases and passing on northeast to Inner Asia, southeast to India, and west to Persia. The main exception was the trail from Peshawar via Kabul and Bamian to Balkh, the route by which Buddhism reached ancient Bactria. This route, which included the 4280 m. Unai Pass and the 3125 m. Ak Robot Pass, was in use until the early 1930s when the Afghan government constructed the first motor road through

the Hindu Kush. The "Great North Road," as it was termed, still involves the use of a circuitous route to the north over the 2990 m. Shibar Pass which is often snowbound in winter. All-weather road transportation through the Hindu Kush will be possible only upon completion of the more direct road now under construction, including a 2.5 km. tunnel under the 3660 m. Salang Pass.

Connections with Foreign Nations

The road system of Afghanistan may best be described as a huge circle, penetrating the Hindu Kush north of Kabul, but otherwise merely encompassing the central highlands, with feeder routes diverging outwards rather than towards the interior. These divergent roads cross gentler terrain and are superior in condition to the main circle of roads. Thus, Afghanistan's major cities are better connected to borders and beyond than to each other, a feature underscoring the outward orientation of the ethnic groups towards their cousins beyond the borders.

Six railheads touch the Afghan boundaries, each of them linked by a feeder road to a large "entrepot" city. From the Soviet railhead at Kushka a road leads south to Herat.¹ At Khelif and Termez on the Amu Darya are ferrying facilities to the Afghan bank, whence roads lead to Mazar-i-Sharif. Soviet economic and technical assistance has been used to improve these roads as well as to install petroleum storage and pumping facilities. At Qizil Qala the Russians have helped build a modern river port complete with cranes and a pumping station to unload oil barges. The road from Qizil Qala to Kunduz, and from there up the Kunduz Valley to Doshi, has been greatly improved with Soviet aid. When the Salang Pass route is completed, travel from Qizil Qala to Kabul will be as convenient or more so than the present journey from Kabul to Kandahar.

Kabul also has a new connection with Torkham on the Afghan side of the Khyber Pass and thereby with the North Western Railway of Pakistan. To avoid the 2130 m. Lataband Pass, the upper portion of this road was built through the very difficult gorges of the Kabul River. The Kabul-Torkham road is now being paved with American assistance. The United States government has proposed that Pakistan allow use of the military railroad through the Khyber Pass to the actual railhead at the border where a new freight terminal would be constructed to replace the present commercial railhead facilities at Peshawar. In a transit compact signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan in May, 1958, provision was made for construction of such a facility, as well as for the extension of the Quetta branch of the North Western Railway from its present terminus at Chaman across the border to Spin Baldak where a second freight-transfer facility would be built. The Chaman railhead is already connected by a new, high-speed highway with Kandahar, the principal

¹Herat is also the entrepot for trade with Iran, via the road to Meshed, but this trade is a negligible part of Afghanistan's total foreign commerce. In 1960, Soviet engineers began work on improving the road south from Herat through Farah to Kandahar, a project which will increase the importance of Herat as an entrepot for southwestern Afghanistan and improve the position of Soviet goods in competition with those imported via West Pakistan.

city of southern Afghanistan and the economic center of the Helmand Valley region. From Kandahar it is possible to reach Kabul without crossing any difficult passes, but the 500 km. highway is in very poor condition.

The original American proposal was to rebuild and pave one lane of the Kandahar-Kabul road so that the bulk of traffic between Karachi and Kabul might be re-routed over the Quetta Branch of the North Western Railway, thus relieving congestion on the main line in the Indus Valley and via Multan to Peshawar. But Afghanistan insisted on first paving the Kabul-Torkham highway and appears to be reluctant to divert traffic from this road to that via Kandahar. Although overall transportation costs on the Kandahar-Quetta route would be lower than those on the Torkham-Peshawar route, Afghan government prestige is tied to the Kabul-Torkham road which was constructed through difficult terrain with little foreign assistance. An engineering study¹ made prior to the transit negotiations estimated that the cost of shipping a short ton of merchandise from Karachi to Kabul via Kandahar could be cut from \$110 to \$61 if improvements were made at Karachi, at Spin Baldak, and to the roads. My own calculations indicate that similar improvements might bring costs on the Torkham-Peshawar route as low as \$69 per short ton. The savings in time might not be as great, but most of the present delays are incurred at Karachi or at the border stations.

In the past, the Kabul-Torkham route has been much more important than that from Kabul via Kandahar to Spin Baldak. In 1956-57, the former carried 1.5 times the total traffic of the latter, and about 3.5 times as much import-export traffic.² There may be some reluctance on the part of the Afghan government to improving the position of Kandahar as an inland entrepot at the expense of Kabul.

Means of Transportation

It has been mentioned that no less than six railroads reach the borders of Afghanistan. Why not extend them deep into the country, at least as far as the entrepot cities at the foot of the mountains? While the gradients in the Kabul River gorges are unfeasible for railroads, there would be no serious difficulties between Torkham and Jalalabad. From the engineering standpoint, a railroad could reach Kabul via Kandahar, and it would also be feasible to extend the railheads from Kushka to Herat or across the Amu Darya to Mazar-i-Sharif and up the Kunduz Valley.

In the past, the political exigencies of the "buffer state" concept prevented the British in India and the Russians in Central Asia from promoting railroad construction in Afghanistan. Today, however, the barriers to railroad building are more economic in nature. Even the shortest and most easily constructed of the suggested lines, a 108 km. stretch from Chaman to Kandahar, would cost \$13,364,000 excluding equipment.³

¹Koebig and Koebig, Consulting Engineers, Report on Transportation Facilities of Afghanistan and Pakistan, prepared for the International Cooperation Administration (Los Angeles: 1957).

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

The cost of extending this railroad from Kandahar to Kabul would be an additional \$95,984,000, excluding equipment. The total cost is more than five times that of paving the existing good road from Chaman to Kandahar and of improving the poor road from Kandahar to Kabul. These estimates do not include the cost of expanding the present Afghan truck fleet of approximately 5000 vehicles since much of this cost would be borne privately rather than by the Afghan government.

Such comparisons of the costs of highway and railroad construction in Afghanistan take cognizance of the fact that preparation of roadbeds in this semi-arid to arid country is a costly undertaking. While rock and gravel are never far away, they must be properly crushed and screened. The one cement plant in Afghanistan produces only 100 metric tons per day, so that most of the cement as well as all of the asphalt must be imported. Paradoxical as it seems, water is the worst enemy of construction, for on these barren soils runoff is rapid, unpredictable and destructive. To carry a roadbed across alluvial fans or over wadis which may be dry 300 days of the year means providing bridges, culverts and diversionary structures to protect it from the shifting outwash. Flash floods move boulders with sufficient force to demolish almost any type of bridge pier. Complete protection is economically impracticable; it is cheaper to repair occasional damage than to try to build against all eventualities. To carry roads across small wadis, both American and Russian engineers have resorted to concrete dips which can be forded at low water and bulldozed clear of rubble after flash floods have subsided. Occasional delays due to floods, frost damage, or snowdrifts must be accepted as inevitable in Afghan transportation.

These difficulties apply to the construction and maintenance of airfields as well as roads, and they would apply to any railroads built within Afghanistan. But since a railroad right of way is essentially a more expensive undertaking than a highway, the need to provide against or to repair damage from the elements militates against the former more than the latter.

An equally serious deterrent to railroad operations in Afghanistan is the lack of bulk commodities to support lines once built. In the Afghan year 1336 (March, 1957, to March, 1958) Afghanistan's bulk exports included less than 60,000 metric tons of fresh and dried fruits, most of which went to Pakistan or India, plus 17,700 metric tons of ginned cotton and less than 7000 metric tons of raw wool, most of which moved to or through the Soviet Union. In addition, there were some 2.9 million karakul pelts, usually flown as far as Beirut, and some 1.4 million hides and skins, sent to India and the U.S.S.R. Afghanistan has no known deposits of ores or mineral fuels which could be exported in bulk quantities on a sustaining basis.

Turning to Afghan imports, the major bulk commodity is petroleum products. 17,700 metric tons of gasoline and kerosene, plus 1,500 metric tons of lubricants were imported in 1956-57, half from the U.S.S.R. and half via West Pakistan. Though the expansion of vehicular and plane transportation, as well as of industrial and domestic consumption, can be expected substantially to increase Afghanistan's petroleum needs, tanker trucks and pipelines would be far more economical means of transportation than railroads. The same considerations would apply to the internal transportation of petroleum if and when

exploitable quantities are found in the vicinity of Sar-i-Pul, in northern Afghanistan, where prospecting is in progress.

None of the other bulk imports in 1956-57 -- 19,926 metric tons of sugar, 5,075 metric tons of building materials, plus a total of 11,732 metric tons of ironware, cotton and rayon piece goods, and tea -- would come close to supporting even a single railroad were they concentrated upon one route rather than spread among six as is the case.

Nor can it be urged that the internal traffic of Afghanistan is, or would become, sufficient to justify railroad construction. Figures provided by the Ministry of Planning for the Kabul-Torkham, Kabul-Kandahar, and Kandahar-Spin Baldak roads indicate that in 1956-57 a total of 224,850 metric tons was transported by vehicle over all three routes, of which 153,850 metric tons or over 68 per cent consisted of imports and exports in about equal shares. While no figures are available for the northern roads, it is a fair assumption that approximately the same proportion applied.

The only bulk commodities of any present importance in Afghanistan's internal traffic are salt, coal, cotton and sugar. Salt production amounts to only 25,000 metric tons annually. Coal production has yet to reach 50,000 metric tons per year, and the Ministry of Mines and Industries already possesses more than 100 coal trucks to haul it from the mines north of the Hindu Kush to the main consuming centers in the Kunduz Valley and near Kabul. The Kunduz industries can easily be supplied with coal by truck from the mine at Kar Kar. Not even the most enthusiastic railroad advocates suggest a line across the Hindu Kush to the Kabul area!

Trucks are also best-suited for the present needs of collecting some 60,000 metric tons of seed cotton in northern Afghanistan, bringing it to the ginning centers, and carrying up to 10,000 metric tons of the non-exported product to the two existing textile mills. The same considerations apply to collecting up to 45,000 metric tons of sugar beets grown near the refinery at Baghlan and distributing the 6000 metric tons of refined sugar produced there. No foreseeable expansion of cotton or sugar production seems likely to produce enough concentrated bulk traffic to sustain railroad as opposed to truck transportation.

The transportation geographer must never overlook the traffic-generating capacities of an efficient transportation system. But we are dealing here only with the choice of means, and I believe we are justified in concluding that for the foreseeable future a railroad would not constitute an efficient means of transportation along any internal section or external feeder of the Afghan transportation system. For both freight and passenger movement, the motor vehicle augmented by the airplane seems to provide the most satisfactory means.

Passenger transportation is of growing importance. The true Afghan and many of his fellow-nationals are still influenced by nomadic ways. Travel by horse in the north, by camel and donkey both north and south of the mountains, and by shank's mare everywhere is a common aspect of Afghan life. While the autobus is replacing the animal just as the truck convoy is replacing the caravan, the popular propensity to travel is enhanced thereby

since fares are quite low. There are only a few hundred private automobiles in Afghanistan, but the number of public busses in service within and between cities is constantly increasing. Uncomfortable, sometimes unsafe, and always overcrowded, these busses are nevertheless the emergent means of passenger transportation within Afghanistan.

For long-range internal travel, the four DC-3s¹ of Afghan Ariana Airlines carry the well-to-do passenger between Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kunduz. Commercial airfields at Jalalabad, which has a military airport, and in the Baghlan - Pul-i-Khumri area will soon be added. As is true of Afghan highway improvement, both the Soviet Union and the United States are extending assistance to air transport development. Russian engineers and Afghan crews have completed work on a military jet airfield at Mazar-i-Sharif and a commercial jet airfield at Bagram, north of Kabul. They are now enlarging and paving the runways at Kabul itself to accommodate jets. These projects come under the \$100 million Soviet loan made to Afghanistan in 1956.

The United States has made grants totaling \$9.56 million and loans totaling \$5.0 million for the construction and equipping of the new international jet airfield at Kandahar, which may be ready this year; for the improvement of the older airfields at Kandahar, Herat, and Kunduz; for the construction of new airfields at Baghlan or Pul-i-Khumri and Jalalabad; and for the installation of communications and navigational aids at these airports and at Kabul. In addition, this American aid includes organization and training of the Afghan Department of Civil Aviation and assistance to Ariana Airlines. When the present programs of air transport development are completed, Afghanistan should be adequately served by both domestic and foreign air transportation for passengers, high priority imports, and karakul furs, the only export which justifies air freight.

Abroad, Ariana's two DC-4s fly to New Delhi, Karachi, Teheran, Beirut, Bahrein, and, during the Hajj, to Jidda. Service to Prague and Frankfurt was inaugurated in September, 1959. Foreign carriers serving Afghanistan include Aeroflot, Air India, Pakistan International Airlines, and Iranian Airlines, while others are negotiating for terminal space at the Kandahar International Airport. Compared with the present route via Karachi, the new Kandahar facility will save 900 km. on flights between Teheran and New Delhi, e.g., but in my opinion may nevertheless experience difficulties in competition. Pakistan may prove reluctant to allow unrestricted shipments of fuel and supplies to an airport competing directly with Karachi's. In this case, will the Soviet Union be willing to provide extra fuel for Kandahar, essentially an American project, after devoting its own efforts to the Bagram airfield? In either case, the high costs of transporting fuel to Kandahar, whether by tanker truck or pipeline, will have to be borne by users of the field. Would carriers then rearrange schedules so as to avoid both Kandahar and Karachi, neither of which generates traffic?

Transit Privileges

Only future experience can answer these questions, but they serve to

¹Ariana got one DC-6 on May 8, 1960 (Afghanistan News, July, 1960, p. 14).

emphasize a final problem underlying those we have discussed. - Landlocked Afghanistan must rely upon the good graces of its neighbors for transit privileges. Since much of eastern Iran and of southwestern Afghanistan consists of unrelieved desert, most goods must move across Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The port of Karachi is the logical locus for bulk shipment to or from Afghanistan. But because the Kabul government promotes independence for the Pushtun tribesmen of the former North West Frontier Provinces -- perhaps hoping for a federation that would restore the eighteenth century boundaries of the Afghan state -- Pakistan has at times retaliated by closing the border. A blockade by Pakistan led to the Afghan-Soviet trade agreement of July, 1950. A six-month blockade in 1955 produced a new Afghan-Soviet trade accord (August 27, 1955) and a transit agreement providing mutual customs immunity (June 28, 1955). By 1956-57, the share of the Soviet Union in Afghan foreign trade had risen to 32 per cent as compared with 17 per cent in 1951-52. Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Federal Republic (sic) have barter agreements with Afghanistan, and much of their trade is routed via the U.S.S.R.

• Since the Kushka and Amu Darya railheads can supply at least northern Afghanistan almost as well as Peshawar and Chaman, the old dilemma of the Afghan government reasserts itself in modern form. The economy of the northern provinces is increasingly being bound to that of the Soviet Union by both trade and transportation links. American projects are designed to tie southern Afghanistan to Karachi. Both the Soviet Union and the United States, acting through Pakistan, are reaching deep into Afghanistan with road and airfield construction projects. Kabul itself finds its links to the Amu Darya and to Peshawar being simultaneously strengthened by foreign aid. •

But neither the Amu Darya nor the Durand Line is an economic or ethnological boundary; both are political and comparatively recent. The Turkic and Tajik peoples of northern Afghanistan have cousins in the Soviet Union; the true "Afghans" or Pushtuns have cousins in West Pakistan. The more dependent the Kabul government becomes on the Soviet Union, the weaker grows its control over the economy of northern Afghanistan. On the other hand, Kabul cannot achieve full rapprochement with Pakistan without abandoning the cause of Pushtun independence. Afghanistan cannot stand alone and advance, yet she cannot choose one side or the other. Thus, the nation seems bound to persist in its present course in which the transportation system is, paradoxically, both the cause and effect of national disunity rather than the reverse.

THE POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN IN ASIA

Henry A. Byroade

At the outset, I want to say how glad I am that Princeton is devoting this Conference to Afghanistan. The news that the Conference was to address itself to the problems that we in Kabul are so intimately connected with comes as an encouragement to all of us stationed in Afghanistan. To us it is sometimes a source of embarrassment that the literature of a country as large and influential as ours is so barren of work on Afghanistan. I hope this Conference will serve both as a symbol of growing American interest and as a stimulus to further scholarly effort.

In a way, the lack of American literature on Afghanistan is partly a reflection of the peculiar history behind the present Afghan situation. For many years isolated behind geographical and political barriers, surrounded by the imperial Russians and British, and at an earlier stage by the Persians and Moghuls, Afghanistan was known only to those whose expanding empires brought them into direct contact with it. At the same time this isolation wrought a curious insularity into the minds of the Afghans themselves, with the result that they saw little reason to express themselves in writing to the world. Now the circumstances of those bygone days have altered and change is underway. There are Afghans who today are pioneering in scholarly work: for example, Professor Mohammed Ali of Kabul University, Ahmad Ali Kohzad and his brother Mohammed Nabi Kohzad, and his Excellency Sayyid Qasim Rishtiya, the Afghan Ambassador to Prague. In other ways, this movement is supported and encouraged by Ambassador Maiwandwal, a writer in his own right, whom I am particularly glad to see here today. Others include Ambassador Pazhwak, His Royal Highness Prince Zalmai Mahmud, and Dr. Tooryalay Etemadi who only recently arrived in the United States as Educational Attache to the Afghan Embassy.

My subject today is a large and complex one, and as always, the time available is inadequate. This makes it particularly difficult for someone like myself, who is intimately concerned, on a day-to-day basis, with Afghanistan's problems. I probably suffer from the weakness of those who are too close to their subject. For example, I have many concrete thoughts about some of the specific practical problems which face Afghanistan today and about the part the United States can play in helping Afghanistan to solve these problems. Before turning to these, however, I would like to draw back from the immediate problems of today and reflect a bit on the changing position of Afghanistan in Asia. To do this, I am going to cut some corners in order to set the stage or, as the scholars say, the conceptual framework based on a broad interpretation of Afghanistan's emergence into the 20th Century.

Although the Cold War is generally understood to typify the rivalry between the Communist and free worlds, in fact the cold war assumes different aspects in different parts of the world. In Europe, for example, it is a relatively closely defined frontier separating the open from the closed societies. Not surprisingly, many Americans and, rather curiously, many Asians tend to force the same conceptual framework on the cold

war in Asia. My own belief is that the cold war as seen from Afghanistan, is only a metamorphosis of an older pattern of conflict. Think of Afghanistan in the 18th and 19th centuries, surrounded by the advancing forces of Russia and Britain. In the exact center, Afghanistan remained relatively untouched, while the great imperial forces of the century whirled around her, one coming up through India, on the flanks through Iran, Kashmir, and even Tibet, while the other steadily and ruthlessly subjugated the Muslim states of Central Asia. The Russians moved from Orenburg to Termez and Khushka and the British from Madras to Peshawar and Quetta, squeezing, always squeezing, but leaving the core more or less intact. Perhaps a more accurate figure of speech would be to compare Afghanistan with the eye of a storm or the vortex or a whirlpool.

Although the progress of the British northward is well known and well chronicled, we are more apt to forget the progress of Russia through central Asia, perhaps because the old Russian empire shared one trait with the Soviet empire today - namely, a pathological obsession with secrecy. Although its authenticity has never been proved, I cannot forbear a reference to the alleged testament of Peter the Great, who epitomized the object of the Russian push by counselling his successors "to approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Advance as far as India which is the depot of the world. Arrived at this point we shall have no longer need for England's gold." Whatever the validity of Peter's will, it is a fact that, after taking the Caucasian peninsula early in the 19th century, the Russians moved by force to take Samarkand, Tashkent, and Turkistan in the 1860's, Khiva in 1873, and by the turn of the century had extended their influence to the Oxus opposite Afghanistan. Although the Russians occasionally sought to extend their influence into Afghanistan, and fluctuating British home policy resulted in two aberrational thrusts into Afghanistan, that country was generally squeezed but not swallowed.

Finally, in 1907, the Afghan position in the eye of the storm was formalized in the Anglo-Russian convention which sought, in the face of a rising German militarism, to stabilize the Russian and British spheres of influence in Asia. Persia was divided into spheres of influence, Tibet was neutralized under titular Chinese suzerainty and, in the middle, Russia declared Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of influence while Britain agreed not to annex or occupy Afghanistan.

After World War I, the first sign of a changing pattern appeared when Britain returned to Afghanistan control over its own foreign relations, thereby withdrawing British influence southward. At the same time, however, Russia - far from withdrawing - was advancing under the new Soviet leadership to consolidate its control over the Asian Muslim states, the last of which, Bokhara, was finally subjugated in 1922, just at the time the Soviet-sponsored Congress of the Peoples of the East, in Baku, was proclaiming the end of imperialism. In the face of overwhelming Soviet power, Afghanistan was compelled to abandon its support of Bokhara.

Finally, in 1947, the old pattern was broken up with the withdrawal of Britain from the subcontinent, the independence of India and Pakistan and the rivalry between these two. With this change, the old rules of the game were outmoded. Since 1947 Afghanistan has been seeking to cope with the changed circumstances. These changes are great.

The old bilateral pattern was simple. The Afghans may have resented the restriction it imposed, but could rely on Britain and Russia to restrain each other. Now the pattern is complex and requires more vigilance. Now there are the United States, the USSR, as well as Britain in a different and less omnipresent role, plus Iran, India and Pakistan, not to mention Communist China hovering in the wings. The point is that the alternatives in a six or eight-handed game of poker are more difficult to calculate than in a two-handed game of chess.

But not only is the new pattern more complex, the old area balance was upset. Whereas the southern flank became weaker by a massive devolution of power, the northern flank, monopolized by the totalitarian military power of the USSR, remained intact. Afghan neutrality before 1947 rested on the balance of British and Russian power, manifested right up to the frontiers of Afghanistan. The balance now has to be maintained, if Afghanistan is to remain neutral, by a combination of neighboring states and the power of the United States, admittedly great in Afghan eyes but also very, very far away by comparison.

One way of righting the balance would have been to encourage the military strengthening and political orientation toward the West of the countries south of the Soviet Union. Indeed, from 1949 to 1954, Afghanistan seemed inclined in that direction and sought both military aid and protection from the United States. However, contrary to the Communist legend that the United States is always busy forcing military aid and pacts on smaller nations, the U. S. was not yet prepared to undertake the organization of a military counterforce in the area. By 1954, therefore, lacking either military support or security ties with the United States, Afghanistan began casting about for another formula and, as we know, Mr. Khrushchev came along and provided it by offering military aid. In the same general period, Iran and Pakistan and Turkey took the initiative to create an alliance which sought and eventually received United States support. SEATO and CENTO are manifestations of this effort to restore balance.

Superficially, the organization of SEATO and CENTO might seem partially to restore the pre-war pattern, if not a precise balance, leaving Afghanistan in a position similar to the one it occupied before the war. Unfortunately this is not the case. The most pertinent fact in this connection is that, while Afghan relations with the USSR since 1954 have become progressively closer and more deeply intertwined, some rather broad gulfs separate Afghanistan from her Muslim neighbors on the West, South and East. Afghan-Iranian relations are cordial enough but rather distant in view of the wide desolate wastes which separate the main political and economic centers of the two countries. Relations also are marred by the fact that in the one area where the two countries have a common interest which could and should be cooperatively developed, they are unable to come to agreement. I refer, of course, to the lower Helmand Valley and the lack of agreement between Afghanistan and Iran on the proper division of the waters of the Helmand River. It is not my purpose to take any stand on how this dispute might be best resolved. I am here interested in the larger question -- how these two interdependent areas can be rationally developed and ties between two Muslim neighbors can be strengthened.

On the other side of Afghanistan, relations with Pakistan have become exceedingly chilly because of a dispute over the future of Pushtun tribes living outside of

Afghanistan and across a frontier which has been internationally recognized for nearly 70 years. Clearly there are many problems in the administration of these tribes straddling the border and there is ample room for cooperation between the two countries in the economic, social and cultural fields of development. Indeed, ironically enough, in some respects Afghanistan and Pakistan daily face identical problems in the tribal areas on their respective sides of the frontier and might well benefit from cooperation. However, my point again in raising the question here is not to analyze or judge the issue which is, after all, a bilateral one, but rather to point out how this gulf between Afghanistan and Pakistan affects the overall position of Afghanistan.

Another indigenous Afghan factor which changes the situation from pre-war days is the Afghan determination to force the rate of national economic and social development as rapidly as possible. The historical origin and significance of Afghanistan's underdevelopment may be illustrated by changing the former analogy of a storm to that of a lamb roasting on a spit over a hot fire. The outside of the meat may be seared and blackened by the flames while the center remains raw. Thus did Asia revolve slowly through the political fires of the 18th and 19th centuries while Afghanistan was left raw and undeveloped in the center. Turkistan, Bokhara, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia all suffered deeply from the fires of the last two centuries while the Arab states, Iran, Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia were sorely tried but they all also profited as well in military, economic, social and educational development, leaving Afghanistan at a relative disadvantage.

From one point of view this is the price Afghanistan paid for the insulated hermit-like freedom it maintained during the earlier centuries, a freedom which was dependent as much on the balance of two world forces as it was upon Afghanistan's own policies. Some might say that the price was worth paying and some of the more traditionalist Afghans probably would be willing to go on paying the price of underdevelopment in return for a kind of cocoon-like independence behind mountainous barriers. It is a least doubtful that this would be possible. In any event it is not the policy of the Afghan government which, on the contrary, feels almost obsessively the need to catch up with its neighbors. Afghans realize that this underdevelopment dangerously exposes their country precisely at the time when it has suddenly been swept into the changing pattern of world forces. As they see it, Afghanistan is today surrounded by dynamic forces on every side. The rapid Russianization of the Muslim Central Asian states to the north and the menacing posture of the beehive state, Communist China; the herculean efforts of India toward industrialization and the rapid development of Pakistan on the east and south and the expanding economy of Iran on the west -- all symbolize the great distance Afghanistan must still run if she is to catch up. Situated in the middle of these dynamic forces, the people of Afghanistan can no longer accept the role of an underdeveloped trough between two great powers in rough balance, particularly since the old balance no longer exists, from a regional point of view at least, in the face of the devolution of power in south Asia as contrasted with the accelerated aggrandizement of power in the north.

This, then, is the framework within which it is useful to consider Afghanistan today. I suggest that now we narrow the focus and look briefly at what is occurring

within the country itself.

Over the past five years Afghanistan has made a dramatic response to the challenges presented by the great political and economic changes occurring in Asia. I believe that it can safely be said that the country has already emerged as an active element in the Middle-East-South Asia complex of nation states.

The basis of this transformation has been the adoption of a program of forced draft economic development, for which large-scale foreign aid was obtained. Another fundamental departure was the re-equipping and modernization of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the government encouraged far-reaching social changes, symbolized by the recently publicized lifting of the veil, and undertook the expansion and modernization of educational facilities, both in the general and technical fields. Modern techniques of public administration are gradually being introduced in the highly centralized bureaucracy which governs the country.

These changes add up to revolution -- in the case of Afghanistan, revolution from above, for it has been the leaders of the present government who have provided the impulse and set the course and speed on which the country has embarked. Of necessity, so sweeping a program of economic and social change has been accompanied by a campaign to build up national unity. Press and radio stress the cultural and military heritage shared in common by the Afghan peoples, despite their diversity of languages and their multiple ethnic and tribal origins. While much is made of the past, at least equal or greater emphasis is placed on the present and future needs of a developing state: education, technical training, hard work, and the cooperation of all ages and sexes in the tasks of development. Using the Pushtu-speaking tribes as the basis, the government is endeavoring to impart a Pushtu character to this modern national state it is in the process of creating, replacing the Persian cast which had been deeply etched into it.

While much attention is understandably focused on Afghanistan's relations with her neighbors, I believe it instructive to note the manner in which the Afghans are establishing a place in the broader international arena.

Over the past few years one or another of the emerging nation's top leaders have paid official visits to a long list of the world's capitals. King Zahir only recently completed state visits to the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, while during the past year President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Nehru, and the Prime Minister of Iran, West German Vice Chancellor Erhard, as well as Premier Khrushchev and other Communist bloc leaders have been in Kabul. This partial list is indicative of the spreading range of diplomatic contacts which the Afghan government now maintains. In increasing numbers, lower level officials are complementing these top level trips with technical and study missions abroad, while comparatively large numbers of Afghan students, a substantial proportion in the United States, are pursuing full courses of instruction in overseas universities.

In my opinion these broadening contacts are not only indicative of the internal changes which have begun to shape Afghanistan into a modern state. They also

underline the Afghan passion for independence and the continuing sense of self-identity which so sharply marks the Afghan character.

Just as Afghanistan's political role in the world is changing in accordance with post-war rearrangements of world forces, so is its economic role. Afghanistan's foreign trade has experienced a significant growth in the last ten years. Its principal exports are fresh and dried fruits; furs, principally karakul or the so-called Persian lamb; raw cotton, wool, including some very fine cashmere; and carpets. Imports cover a wider range. Tea and sugar loom large among imported foodstuffs. The largest import, however, has been textiles although this commodity will decrease in importance with increasing domestic production. Motor vehicles and spares and petroleum products are large items. Miscellaneous manufactures and consumer goods make up the balance.

This increase in total foreign trade has not occurred in equal proportions for all of Afghanistan's trading partners. Since 1954, especially, the share of the Soviet Union and its satellites has increased more than that of the free world. To an extent this trend is natural. In fact, prior to 1954 trade with the Soviet Union itself was surprisingly low when geographic and economic factors are considered. Afghanistan's other two neighbors have basic economies which are more or less paralleled to Afghanistan's while the economy of the Soviet Union is more nearly complementary. Pakistan, for instance, is Afghanistan's seventh most important trading partner and trade with Iran has been minimal.

Trade with and through Pakistan in recent years has been hampered, occasionally by the general state of unsatisfactory political relationships existing between the two countries and more generally by the inadequacy of Pakistan's port facilities and transportation system severely over-taxed by its own development program. Thus the traditional route of outlet to the sea is slow and at times uncertain. Under these circumstances concessions, apparent or real, by the Soviet Union are attractive to Afghanistan. However, Soviet barter transactions have many flaws such as blocked accounts, limited range of selection of goods, low quality, and the ever-present danger that the Soviets may dump imported Asian products in the regular markets of the Asian countries.

Considering only pure economic and geographical factors it would appear natural for the Soviet Union to be one of Afghanistan's principal trading partners, yet we must never lose sight of the fact that in the Soviet Union foreign trade is merely an adjunct of foreign policy. Mr. Khrushchev himself said they value trade more for its political aspects than its economic importance. So far there is no evidence that the USSR has used its economic position to exert direct political pressure on Afghanistan. On the contrary it has made its offers more attractive with such devices as seemingly low prices arrived at through artificial exchange rates, and by offering consumer goods on a consignment basis.

An Afghanistan excessively dependent on the USSR as a source of supply and as a market for its exports would be highly vulnerable to a shift in Soviet foreign economic policy. For instance, Afghanistan already relies on the Soviet Union for an estimated 75% of its petroleum requirements, almost all of its imported sugar and matches, as well as a goodly proportion of its metallic building materials. On the export side the USSR takes

over 70% of Afghanistan's cotton exports and over 75%, by quantity, of wool exports. A shift in Soviet foreign economic policy could even now cause a serious temporary economic maladjustment in Afghanistan at a time in which it is deeply committed to an all-out program of economic development.

The Soviet Union has chosen to make Afghanistan a battleground in the economic cold war. The free world faces a commercial challenge in this situation. The United States in particular, engaged in a vigorous export promotion program, cannot afford to ignore the market potential of Afghanistan as it has in the past. Not only do the smaller, less developed, nations of the world collectively constitute an important market for American exports but these same countries are all developing and will in time individually provide significant markets. American private business should begin to recognize Afghanistan as a distinct market area and attempt to promote sales. The U.S. Trade Mission last summer was a good step in this direction. The fact that American-made products already enjoy a good, if limited, market in Afghanistan indicates acceptability. There is much evidence that Afghan importers prefer US quality even on slightly stiffer terms. Afghanistan is not lost to the free world as a trading partner but more vigorous sales activity is needed to maintain and strengthen our position. While the Soviet Union's totalitarian state trading system has some tactical political advantages, the American free enterprise system is in the long run a better and more reliable trading partner for Afghanistan.

Let me turn now to the keystone of the arch supporting the new Afghanistan now a-building -- foreign aid.

First, American aid. The U.S. interest in Afghanistan is not limited by cold war considerations. Our record shows a continuing basic interest in helping Afghanistan along with other developing countries. We have not succeeded as well as I would like in convincing the Afghans that our real interest is to assist them as a nation and as a people for their own sake and I hope that we can find more effective ways to convince them that this is the case.

Let us look at the record. U.S. aid to Afghanistan actually began in 1950 with the first Export-Import Bank loan for Helmand Valley development. In 1952 the U.S. began a modest technical assistance program. While these were small beginnings, I think they must be interpreted against the background of the times in which they occurred. From 1946 until 1952 U.S. aid had generally to be concentrated, because of the great need and danger to world peace, in areas and countries actually defending themselves against active Communist expansionism as revealed by Soviet efforts to absorb Azerbaijan in 1946, the Soviet-sponsored military coups d'etat in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1947, the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950.

United States aid to Afghanistan has come from several sources. Before World War II, the Afghan government decided to embark upon a long-range irrigation and land reclamation project in the Helmand Valley and it employed Japanese engineers to design and supervise the original plans. During World War II work in the Helmand Valley ceased and after the war, the government, using its own funds, employed Morrison-Knudsen to expand and carry out the original project. The cost of the Helmand Valley development

greatly exceeded the original estimates and in 1950 on the application of the Afghan government the Export-Import Bank made a loan of \$21 million to permit the Afghans to continue with the development of the Valley. In 1954 another loan of \$18.5 million was made for the same purpose. Later, when we extended aid to Afghanistan under the Mutual Security Program, a part of our assistance was allocated to the Helmand Valley -- to help the Afghans complete the project and realize adequate returns from it by assisting with the solution of drainage problems, combatting salinity, and teaching the farmers how to use irrigation processes properly. While the concept of the Helmand Valley Development is basically Afghan, United States financing and the employment of an American contractor by the Afghans has tended to identify the United States closely with it.

In fiscal year 1952 we began very limited technical assistance in Afghanistan by granting \$100,000 for an education program. Our technical assistance has gradually grown from that small beginning until in fiscal year 1960, \$4.9 million was allocated, and in the current year we are providing \$4 million for these programs. While we have aided the Afghans in a variety of fields, the technical assistance program has concentrated on education, agriculture, and public administration. I am personally very pleased that we have selected these fields. English has become the most important foreign language in Afghanistan and a good part of our funds have been used to finance English-language teacher training. Technical assistance has also been given to Kabul University and to the Agricultural High School and Afghan Institute of Technology. As 80 to 90% of the people in Afghanistan are dependent on agriculture for a livelihood, our aid in agricultural research, improvement, and extension should, over a longer period help achieve a better standard of living for the people. And as a result of the introduction of new budgeting and accounting procedures by the public administration team financed by our program, the government of Afghanistan has modernized its fiscal and accounting processes and in 1959-60 presented its first modern budget.

In fiscal year 1956, the United States government extended its first "special assistance," that is, development assistance, to Afghanistan amounting to \$15.3 million. This was allocated principally to the air transportation project through which we assisted the Afghans to establish their own air line, Ariana, and are helping them construct an international airport at Kandahar. While the air strip has been completed and is being used, work on the secondary installations is continuing and I hope that Kandahar's international airport will be in full operation in 1962. Since then one of the principal fields in which we have helped the Afghans with special assistance funds has been in aiding them to build an adequate internal road system. This is an essential part of their development program as there is no rail or water transportation in the country. We are helping them pave the road from Kabul to the Pakistan border via Jalalabad. We have undertaken to design and will construct and pave the road from Kabul to Kandahar and then pave the existing road built by Morrison Knudsen from Kandahar to the Pakistan border at Spin Baldak, thereby improving Afghanistan's links with the port of Karachi. We have also given some special assistance to the Helmand Valley project about which I have already spoken, and in the fields of industry, mining and education.

In 1953 the United States government financed the purchase of wheat by

Afghanistan by making it a loan of \$1.5 million. In both 1956 and 1957 we granted the Afghans 40,000 tons of wheat under Title II of Public Law 480. In 1959 we granted them 50 thousand tons of wheat under Title II valued at about \$7 million a year. The funds derived from the sale of the wheat were used to meet local currency costs of United States supported projects in the country's development program, but this was accomplished only by receiving special permission from Washington to handle the wheat grants in this manner. The latest agreement, signed in November 1960, provided for a grant of 50,000 tons of wheat under new legislation which permits the United States government to help land-locked countries by paying freight on to the point of entry into the country rather than to the nearest seaport, and also under a second provision which permits surplus commodities to be sold within the country with the local currency derived therefrom to be used in the economic development program of the country. This second provision is a temporary one, but I hope that the Congress in its next session will extend this permission.

Without going into any more detail, our aid commitments from all sources to Afghanistan from 1949 to June 30, 1960 amounted to approximately \$168 million. Our fiscal 1961 program envisages the expenditure of \$4 million in technical assistance and approximately \$9 million in special assistance. The size of the bill is an indication of the magnitude of our activities in the country.

Of lesser financial proportions, but of considerable importance, has been the contribution of the Asia Foundation, an American philanthropic foundation, which, on a limited budget, supplies advisors for various ministries in the Afghan government and supports several small technical assistance programs.

CARE is just beginning to operate a fairly substantial program which, I believe, will have great impact throughout Afghanistan once it gets into full operation. And in November, Dr. Tom Dooley came to Kabul. In the course of his brief visit, he, on behalf of Medico, entered into an agreement with the government of Afghanistan under which Medico will help equip and support a hospital in Kabul and will send doctors and nurses to assist in its management and to train Afghans to carry on the work thus started.

Although our aid program has suffered at times from delays of various kinds -- for some of which we are responsible, and for others the Afghans -- I think our aid has really helped the Afghans, under the direction of their own government, to help themselves.

However, we are not alone in the field. The Soviets also granted aid to Afghanistan in 1954 when they made the government a relatively modest low-interest long-term loan of \$3.5 million. These funds were used to finance construction of grain elevators at Kabul and at Pul-i-Khumri, a flour mill and bakery in Kabul, and paving some streets in the city of Kabul. Incidentally, the Western press usually gives the Soviets credit for actually paving the streets in Kabul. The Afghans resent this, stating that the municipality of Kabul did use Soviet loan funds to buy paving equipment, and to pay two or three Soviet technicians to teach them how to use this equipment, but they insist -- and they are correct -- that the streets were actually paved by the Afghans.

In the same year the Czechs extended the Afghans a credit which was used to build a cement plant.

When Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Afghanistan in December 1955, the scope of Soviet aid quickly changed. At that time they agreed to extend a \$100 million line of credit to the Afghans to help them with the construction of several large scale projects. Under this credit the Afghans have financed, or are financing, the Bagram military air field some 40 miles north of Kabul; the Naghlu Hydroelectric project to generate electricity for Kabul and the industries developing in the area; the Darunta irrigation and hydroelectric project near Jalalabad which will irrigate some 60 to 75 thousand acres and generate 10,000 kilowatt hours of electricity. Part of the \$100 million was used to import consumer goods to generate local currency to support these various projects. In 1959 the Soviets agreed to construct a heavy duty road from Kushka on the Soviet border to Kandahar, through Herat, reportedly on a grant basis. It is estimated that this road will cost about \$80 million. In addition the Soviets are helping the Afghans to construct the road from Kabul northward through the Salang pass to the port of Qizil Qala on the Oxus river. This road, when completed, will give the Afghans an all weather access road to the north and will cut off some 120 miles in distance. The Soviets have successfully assisted with petroleum exploration as deposits of crude oil and natural gas have been found in the north near Andkhui although the magnitude of their discoveries has not been revealed. They have also made two grants of 50 thousand tons of wheat to the Afghans.

The value and terms of grants or loans for military equipment to the government of Afghanistan by both the Soviets and the Czechs are kept secret. However, estimates of their aid, exclusive of military, is \$217 million in credits and grants from the Soviet bloc, including \$5 million in credits from Czechoslovakia; and \$1.5 million in credits from Poland.

The other large contributor to the economic development of Afghanistan has been the United Nations including its Special Fund, The Children's Fund, The World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Since the United Nations began aiding Afghanistan it has made \$8 million available for its programs in the country and it currently has about 70 technicians on the job. Their activities are related to Afghanistan's over-all development program, and cover a wide range in scope -- for example, teaching in Afghan schools and special training centers, making basic surveys of natural resources, assistance in strengthening institutions required for the provision of government services, vocational training in technical fields, and malaria eradication.

The German government has also made available to Afghanistan grants of \$1.5 million and credits of \$50 million. These funds have been used in carrying out geological and hydrological surveys and in assisting the Afghans with technical assistance in mechanical training. German private loans have helped to establish the Gulbahar Textile Mill. Various other nations have made small contributions to the Afghan development program including France, Japan, and Communist China.

It should also be remembered that the Afghans themselves have contributed relatively large sums to their own development especially when compared to the limited

revenue of the government. During the past five years, through the budgets of the various ministries and through expansion programs of independent agencies the government has spent over \$165 million. When I use the term independent and quasi-independent agencies, I refer to investments made by organizations such as the Electricity Supply Board in developing sources of electricity, and the Bank-i-Milli which has made large investments in the model Gulbahar Textile Mills.

Observers often try to compare and contrast the United States and Soviet aid programs in Afghanistan. Most of these sources have tended to credit the Soviet Union with having achieved a greater impact by the magnitude and method of execution of their program. This may be true in the short run but I am not personally convinced that it need be, or in fact will be, in the long run.

In the field of military aid, of course, the contrast is total and complete. The USSR has furnished military equipment to Afghanistan while the United States has not. This fact has undoubtedly affected our total position in that country. Particularly so when one recalls that the government of Afghanistan made repeated requests upon the United States in the early 1950's for a military aid program and only turned to the USSR for supply in this field after becoming convinced that such a program would not be forthcoming from the United States. At the same time, the Soviet military aid program, unlike American military aid generally, is based on credits not grants and therefore creates an economic burden on Afghanistan which will someday have to be borne by the economic development program.

The United States found it impossible to meet Afghanistan's military assistance requests for reasons which seemed logical enough in the early 1950's and entirely consistent with Afghan neutrality. This was a most complex problem involving regional and global considerations which cannot be adequately covered here. For one thing the United States had no desire to extend the area of the cold war. Afghanistan had no obligations to meet toward any regional defense system. Military aid outside some area defense framework might have been misunderstood and had the effect of exacerbating existing intra-area differences. However, far from wanting to belabor the past I simply want to call attention to the fact that whatever its logic, this bit of history has had an important bearing on the total position of Afghanistan in the world, and upon the development of general Afghan-American relations.

In all other forms of aid the picture is more even. It is true that the total foreign currency value of Soviet aid is greater than that of the United States. It is also generally true that their projects, largely through their greater visibility, have made a greater initial impact than have many of ours. I do not feel, however, that this is necessarily to be a long term evaluation. As in Russia, the Soviets seem to stress quantity rather than quality in work. In construction, for instance, the standards employed by us will leave Afghanistan with a much lesser maintenance problem than will the quicker methods employed by the Soviet technicians. Also, long range projects such as development of the Helmand Valley would be bound to go through a period of disappointment and criticism in any country that was in a hurry. Only after years of work have some of our more difficult reclamation programs in the United States borne fruit. The Helmand Valley project is a long range one and I believe that the time is not far off when the real merits of this project will be more and more noticeable and appreciated by the Afghans. Then consider the vital

field of education. Assisting in the education of the youth of Afghanistan may not be as dramatic as building quickly a grain silo for everyone to see. But is it far more important in assisting in the advancement and well-being of the people of Afghanistan.

The greatest criticism has been on the slowness of the United States programs. In many fields this criticism is not justified and in some cases I am certain that Afghan officials would not hesitate to confirm that the causes for some of the delays could be laid at their own doorstep. But we must admit that in some fields criticism is fully justified. Our construction projects have in general been so noticeably slow in getting underway that they have obscured from public attention the other work which was going along in an entirely satisfactory manner. While projects such as the education program, and the general technical assistance program, were proceeding on schedule, all attention became focused on our construction projects which were woefully behind schedule.

The delays in these projects have been such as to cause many an Afghan to question the general United States policy towards their country. They could not believe that America was unable to meet commitments on construction projects such as Kabul University, and on roads and airports. The delays of course had nothing to do with policy motivations or any lack of desire to assist the Afghan nation. Nor were they the responsibility of any individual or groups of individuals. In fact a great deal of personal effort on the part of a great many people was expended in trying to get these projects underway. Basically, the blame should lie, I believe, on organizational and bureaucratic difficulties inherent in trying to operate in such a remote country using our normal peacetime methods which are so ~~replete~~, and normally properly so, of private-enterprise competitive processes encumbered with all the checks and balances that such a system implies.

I am happy to report that our construction projects are now in much better shape and that our total aid program is on the move. The Corps of Engineers has agreed to take responsibility, as the agent of The International Cooperation Administration, to construct the Kabul-Kandahar-Spin Baldak Road. The Corps of Engineers is now on the job, is pushing the completion of design to match their own high standards, and will soon be in a position to let contracts to private firms for the construction of this huge project, which they themselves will supervise. The contracts will actually be let in the field and the whole process will be greatly simplified. I do not believe that we could be better organized than we are at present on this project.

Similarly the remaining portions of the airport construction program have been awarded to a recognized and capable American firm. Kandahar International Airport is in use and construction has begun on the first country airport in Herat. Also Kabul University, the first large modern university in Afghanistan, is now under construction. The Bureau of Reclamation has been engaged by The International Cooperation Administration to carry out our responsibilities in the Helmand Valley. They are now on the job, with several much needed and highly qualified men arriving there this month. I could give other examples, but I do wish to emphasize that our long delayed programs in Afghanistan are now on the move. As we progress from the planning to the construction stage the people of Afghanistan will, I feel certain, develop a new attitude of confidence in United States intentions and abilities.

Even though I am able to report a significant increase in the effectiveness of our aid program in Afghanistan, I would be less than honest if I did not say that I feel further improvement is needed. In the process of trying to analyze the difficulties we have experienced there I have naturally thought much about the over-all concepts and administration of our foreign aid program. Afghanistan may not be truly typical, but it is typical enough of vast areas in the world in which we are - and will be - working to give me the belief that some of my conclusions would apply to many other countries. In my immediately following remarks I shall address myself more to these over-all concepts than to problems relating strictly to Afghanistan.

The first great need that I see is for our government so to organize itself as to be able to make longer term commitments to newly developing nations. The problems the national planners for these countries encounter in trying to plan over-all coordinated development are no less than staggering. In some cases they even need help in planning and organizing national planning bodies themselves. Their own resources are either limited or so underdeveloped that they literally can hardly get started. Under these circumstances they want to know more exactly where they stand with us. Will we, for instance, associate ourselves with, and provide some of the necessary foreign capital for, a two-, three-, or five-year development plan? Will we help advise them in over-all economic planning and assist them in obtaining foreign know-how and capital for their greatest needs?

Our present approach of channelling our aid on an annual basis only into specific and previously thoroughly worked-out projects, approved in detail in Washington, is often not designed to meet the most urgent needs of these countries. In order to allocate their own meager resources, they need to know more of the total that might be expected from external assistance for any given period. Our assistance to these countries should start at the planning level and not be confined only to participation in one or more projects as isolated instances and with relative lack of knowledge of over-all and dovetailed development.

The case of Afghanistan at present is a very good example of this need. Afghanistan will enter the period of its second five year plan in September of 1961. Her planners hope to have the Plan drawn up by February or March of next year. They have been hoping to obtain at least a general understanding of the quantities of aid that might be available from various sources. The Soviet Union is able to move with despatch in such situations. The German government, I am happy to report, has recently - during the visit of Dr. Erhardt - associated itself with the Plan and has agreed to assume a proportion thereof. The United States, because of budgetary and statutory limitations - and bureaucratic practice - has been unable to give the government of Afghanistan any such assurance. This is particularly unfortunate when, on the basis of past experience, we know that the United States will, in all probability, be the source of considerable assistance, but on a piecemeal basis. The difference in approach is of major significance. I believe that our country should be able to give such long-term assurances, and that this long-range concept of technical assistance and development should be adopted as quickly as possible by our new Administration. In addition to its desirability from the recipient country's point of view, it would have the advantage of encouraging, if not forcing, more

effective forward planning within our own bureaucracy. Incidentally, if we could adopt such an approach, not only would the recipient country know better where it stood with us, but also our own budgetary officials, and the Congress, would have a more certain knowledge of the total demand upon us than under our present approach.

However we may perfect the theory of our aid program abroad, the problems of effective administration would remain, and would deserve the attention of the most capable men in America. I know this subject has been constantly restudied, but I believe that too often the study has been limited to internal administrative methodology for making our present organization and methods more effective. I believe that a broader approach is necessary and one which questions our whole philosophy of foreign aid, as well as the organizational set up for the administration of such aid.

I believe that our Foreign Aid organization, regardless of what it is called, should be primarily a coordinating and financing agency, and not an operational one. I say "primarily" because I am aware that exceptions would be necessary, particularly in the technical assistance field. However, as foreign aid has become more complex and diverse, and indeed as criticism of its administration has increased, the tendency has been for The International Cooperation Administration to become more and more of a self-sufficient agency undertaking direct supervision and implementation of the various overseas projects. Criticism, congressional and otherwise, has tended to increase the need for centralization, so that those responsible in Washington could be in a position to take specific decisions themselves which they can personally defend with all pertinent facts readily available.

I do not believe a separate organization in Washington can efficiently assume such an operating role over our total foreign aid activities on a world-wide basis. There are many reasons for this, but as I am not strictly within my assigned subject, I shall not take the time to dwell on them. For one thing, however, I do not believe such a temporary organization can attract sufficiently qualified men to run such a huge and difficult operation. We can depend, I feel certain, on the government being able in the future, as in the past, to obtain the services of some highly qualified and devoted people to hold key positions in such an organization, but the total numbers needed for effective operational direction would run into many thousands. Obtaining this quantity of this type of personnel for this type of governmental organization, by the very nature of things, just cannot be done.

What would seem necessary would be the enlistment and coordinated use of all existing institutions of our land that can lend a hand in the administration of foreign aid. I believe that two brief examples will illustrate my point.

Let us take the field of major construction projects abroad, which has been the subject of much criticism. Certainly there are highly qualified governmental agencies already in existence who have had long experience in construction activities, both at home and abroad. I would list the Bureau of Public Roads, the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department, as examples. If agencies such as these are used to the utmost overseas the results could hardly be other than beneficial. They can more readily assemble professionals and delegate the necessary authority to the field to get the job done, and in the process they can become

stronger agencies of the United States government for use in any possible future emergency.

Another example - less direct but perhaps more interesting - is in the field of education abroad. We now turn to American universities for assistance but not in a manner calculated to develop a feeling of direct responsibility. Too often we are placed in the position of begging for qualified professors for work abroad. If they can be obtained they are placed in a status roughly equivalent to sabbatical leave. Surely there must be some way to obtain the full participation of our American universities in our programs abroad, and I am convinced that this can be done provided they are approached properly by government and are given more responsibility. Before this could be done a basic decision would have to be made that we would be engaged in the field of education abroad, particularly in underdeveloped countries, over a long period of years. Surely, all of us here tonight think that this will be the case, yet such a simple decision has not been made - at least not in a manner sufficiently specific for government agencies to operate on. If a university were convinced that, barring major unforeseen developments, it would be called upon to run an effective program abroad for a period of, say, ten years, it could expand its faculty and plan its programs so that both the university and the foreign project would benefit. Once embarked upon such a venture only general guidance and finance should be needed from the United States government. Left reasonably alone, I am convinced that our universities could develop and administer more imaginative and responsive programs than any government organization could possibly do.

It seems to me that a longer-range commitment to work in a given country, such as Afghanistan, would also make it possible for our universities to expand and deepen their own scholarly studies of the country and its people. Such an evidence of interest by our academic institutions would in itself make a valuable contribution to increased mutual understanding and respect, as well as providing a sounder basis for the work that the university is engaged in abroad. In Afghanistan the limited quantity of American research and writing on that country is noticed and regretted - even if understood. The appreciation shown for the work of Dr. Donald Wilber, who spoke to you this afternoon, and Dr. Penzel, who is warmly regarded as "The American" concerned with the Pushtu language, indicates how much you in the universities can do to help. The newly established course in Pushtu at the University of Michigan, supported in part by the United States Office of Education, is in my opinion a constructive step toward better preparation of our own people and demonstrating our genuine interest in the people of Afghanistan.

There are other examples equally interesting. It seems to me, therefore, that a prime necessity facing our government is to enlist the support of all of our governmental and private organizations that can effectively operate abroad, and inspire them with the fact that our national interest calls for their acceptance of the challenge and responsibility to assist whole-heartedly. And, following that, we should set up the minimum coordinating and financing agency to back-stop and give general supervision over their work abroad. It would only be workable if the Congress would accept the spirit of such a shift of organization and place enough faith in our own institutions not to insist upon prior approval of each detail of these operations in Washington. American institutions thus managed can certainly function efficiently providing they are made to feel their responsibility.

We often refer proudly to our belief that private institutions can do the job abroad. If we mean this let us put more responsibility on them and free them from interference so as to give them a chance. At the same time, I do not believe this concept of decentralized operations is inconsistent with the concept of more effective over-all coordination of all aspects of our total aid program under one single roof at the top level, which certainly seems a clear and urgent necessity.

Lastly, I believe we should participate in more of the small variegated projects within a developing country. In Afghanistan, we are looking for ways to assist enterprises at the very base of the country's economic struggle. Some of these enterprises could usefully absorb assistance in loan form. The Development Loan Fund should, in my opinion, have more flexibility in its concept of operations and place its operation on a basis which will make it recognizable as primarily an aid organization. If this can be done, I am certain that there are many worthwhile and sound projects that can be helped by the DLF in Afghanistan through local banking facilities -- projects which are essential to balanced development and which would spread the benefits of our assistance to more people and to a wider geographical area. Private enterprise needs help in Afghanistan and even relatively small loans would often serve to guarantee the future of an enterprise that can play an increasingly important role in the over-all development of the country.

When one considers all these things together -- trade trends, the foreign aid picture reflecting an obsessive conviction of the absolute necessity for development, and the delicate position of Afghanistan as I have described it, confronted by a strong monolith to the north and intra-area difficulties to the south, one sees the magnitude of the problems facing Afghanistan today -- as well as the problems facing the free world as it considers its own interests in the future of Afghanistan. The steering of the course and the final destination depend partly on the policies followed by Afghanistan itself, and there will be many critical decisions in the future that only Afghanistan itself can make. Our policies must necessarily be continually reviewed in the light of decisions taken by Afghanistan, based upon her own sovereign right to guide her own destiny. But, in part at least, the outcome will depend upon forces outside Afghanistan, including not only the Russians but the United States and our friends and allies. I think we should realize that Afghanistan is a sort of "economic Korea" and a prime example of the change in the nature of the present world struggle which has been mislabeled "peaceful competition." The dangers faced in this new type of struggle may be as great as the ones faced in Korea itself -- in some ways, more dangerous, since the process is deceptive because of its slow and non-dramatic nature and more difficult for the peoples of free societies to understand.

In conclusion -- and I apologize for this very long address -- I wish to express my hope that my Afghan friends, here tonight and in far away Afghanistan, will not be concerned that I have spoken so freely about their own country -- its history, its problems, its aspirations. I feel that America and Afghanistan must come to know one another better and that open and frank conferences such as this are a prime necessity in that direction.

And of Americans I would ask that they try to understand the complexities of the position of Afghanistan in Asia. Let us not become misled by over-simplification of a situation as complex as this one. Let us not remember only one catchy and spectacular

adjective - from superficial press treatment which is too often inclined to treat as all black or all white situation which cannot, even remotely, be described accurately by such clichés. Let us rather see the present day Afghanistan in the light of the challenge faced by the Afghans themselves - and by us, as we try to assist in insuring that that country can in fact succeed in her development effort, which seems such an absolute necessity, and at the same time retain her neutrality and her proud independence.

THE DURAND LINE OF 1893: A CASE STUDY IN ARTIFICIAL POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND CULTURE AREAS

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We live in an era of artificial political boundaries which cut through culture areas. Although politically expedient in a temporal sense, the boundaries offer only temporary solutions to permanent problems, and almost invariably increase political tensions, stimulated by either internal or external forces. Historically, all political boundaries are artificial, but we shall concern ourselves generally with the jigsaw, hodgepodge boundaries drawn during the 19th century apogee of European imperialist expansion into Afro-Asia and the 20th century decline following the post-World War I breakup of the Ottoman Empire. The old processes of political fusion and fission continue today.

Asia contains a long list of troublesome boundaries: North-South Korea; Viet Nam-Viet Minh - Laos-Cambodia; the two Bengals; the two Punjabs; the Durand Line; the MacMahon Line; Kashmir; the Arab-Israeli boundaries. In North Africa this modern mixture of fission and fusion includes: Nasser's dream of 'Umma al-Arabi and the formation of the United Arab Republic; the three divergent provinces of Libya tossed together by the United Nations to solve a complicated trustee dilemma. Currently, Somalia and Ethiopia pause for boundary identification. At this writing, all Congo (ex-Belgian) is divided into six parts. Even post-World War II Europe is not immune: East-West Germany, Poland's redefined boundaries, and the German-speaking areas of the Italian Tyrol, recently the subject of United Nations consideration.¹ Periodic boundary flare-ups still occur in Latin America.² Other examples could be cited, but these suffice to show the magnitude of the problem.

The 19th century European colonial powers had a genius for drawing lines on paper at conferences without consulting the people most directly concerned - those who lived in the areas divided. Modern nationalism's rise freed many colonial peoples in the 20th century but did not solve the problems left by these artificially drawn, politically expedient boundaries. An elderly Punjabi once told me, "The British are a just, balanced, and fair-minded people. They found India in chaos and after 200 years of occupation left her in the same plight."

I wish to examine with as much objectivity as possible one of the boundaries mentioned above, the Durand Line, which cuts through the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and West Pakistan.

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1. New York Times, October 24, 25, 1960. Part of this research was sponsored by a grant from the Wener Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
 2. New York Times, October 27, 1960, for recent Ecuador-Peru squabble.

Pushtun origins are obscured by legend, but at least two possibilities exist: (1) the Pushtuns were part of the great nomadic, conquering, Indo-European outburst of the mid-2nd millenium B.C.; or (2) they developed in the southern hills of Afghanistan and northwest West Pakistan relatively independent of the early central Asian and south Russian Indo-European centers. Basically, they have long been a mountain people with permissive individual orientation within a framework of group responsibility and independence.

These mountain people, often operating as independent tribal groups, sometimes as tribal confederacies, resisted in turn the Achaemenian Persians, Alexandrian Greeks and Macedonians, Mauryan Hindus, Kushans, White Huns, Muslim Arabs, Central Asian Turks, Mongols, Moghuls, Persian Safavids, Victorian Britons, and Czarist Russians.

Seldom did the Pushtuns fight or cooperate as a united people. The few pre-1880 attempts to unite Pushtuns shaped Afghan empires, not Pushtun nations; i.e., the Ghaznavid Empire (11th and 12th centuries) which extended from the Arabian Sea to the Gangetic Plain, and the empire of Ahmed Shah Durani (1747-1773 A.D.), extending from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. Internal dynastic struggles and outside assaults by the emergent Sikhs led by Ranjit Singh crumbled Ahmed Shah's empire. The Sikhs seized Peshawar in the early 19th century (1818), last date of effective Afghan rule on the southern side of the modern Durand Line. Neither of these empires consolidated the Pushtuns, who supported the foreign campaigns of the ruling dynasties, but remained independent in their own tribal areas. Although the Pushtuns followed the empire builders of Ghazna and Kandahar (Timur Shah, son of Ahmed Shah Durani, moved the capital to Kabul), they almost never supported rulers from the Punjab or North India.

The development of the modern Afghan state began with the accession of Abdul Rahman to the throne in 1880. Political fission and fusion dominated the Afghan scene until then. Several previous attempts by the able Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohammed (who reigned intermittently from 1834-63), and others to unite the major amirates of Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar met with failure because of tribal wars and two Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880).

The second British invasion of Afghanistan (1878-1880) occurred in response to the threat of continued Czarist expansion into Central Asia. Just before the end of the second Anglo-Afghan war the British government seriously considered proposals to maintain an Afghanistan divided into separate tribal kingdoms, the independence of each guaranteed by Britain, a policy similar to that the British extended to tribal Pushtuns south and east of the Khayber Pass. The continued partition of Afghanistan into tribal confederacies would have prevented the consolidation of Afghan tribes against British India, and opened the loosely-organized states to possible Russian penetration in spite of British guarantees.⁴

3. Pushtun, preferred in Afghanistan, is used here. Pathan (a Hinduization), Paktun, Pushtoon, all refer to the same group.

4. Such penetration did take place in 1885, and the Afghans looked to the British for promised help. None came, and the Afghans lost Panjdeh Oasis in Turkistan after a battle with Czarist troops; the British re-drew their line of commitment to defend Herat.

Into the 1880 confusion rode Abdul Rahman, who had been exiled to Russia twelve years before by his brother Shir Ali (former Amir of Kabul). Accompanied by several supporters and dressed in Russian uniform, Abdul Rahman seemed least likely to suit the British of all Afghan candidates for Amir of Kabul. The British decided to gamble, Afghan fashion, that Abdul Rahman would resist any Russian encroachments as fiercely as his forefathers had fought the British. Abdul Rahman, recognized as Amir of Kabul on August 10, 1880, established patterns still recognized, but not completed, today: independence and neutrality became keystones of his foreign policy, although the British controlled all Afghanistan's relations with foreign powers until after World War I. Afghanistan's boundaries, drawn by non-Afghans (British, Russians, Persians), were completed during Abdul Rahman's reign (1880-1901). Internally, Abdul Rahman's attempts to unite Afghanistan under central government control continues under the present government.

THE DURAND LINE OF 1893.

Let us now look closely at our main bone of contention: the Durand Line. Why and how did it come into being? The British in India, happy at creating a no-man's land between themselves and Czarist ambitions, faced other problems. The Pushtuns, almost genetically expert at guerilla warfare after centuries of resisting all comers and fighting among themselves when no comers were available, plagued attempts to expand Pax Britannica into their mountain homeland. Many raids into the plains, supposedly protected by the British Indian Army, originated outside the range of effective punitive action. As early as 1877, the British began their consolidation of a forward wall of protective outposts by outright bludgeoning of local Pathan rulers. In 1877 they simply informed Shir Ali, Amir of Kabul, that he had no claims to Dir, Swat, Chitral and Bajaur.⁵ At the beginning of the second Anglo-Afghan war, the British forced the Amir Yaqub, son of Shir Ali, to sign the Treaty of Gandumak (the Afghans call this the "Condemned Treaty"), under which "the British government will retain in its own hands control of the Khaiber Pass and Michni Pass . . . and of all relations with the independent tribes, territory directly connected with the passes."⁶

Therefore, the treaty ceded large stretches of land in the districts of Loralai, Zhob, Pishin, Quetta, and Nushki, giving legal justification for as much as the British could occupy and hold. In his illuminating Autobiography, Abdul Rahman repeatedly states he never considered these or any Pushtun areas as permanently ceded to the British. To delineate once and for all British and Afghan responsibilities in the Pushtun area a boundary commission under Mortimer Durand journeyed to Kabul in September, 1893. Abdul Rahman, beset by continuing tribal revolts in the Pushtun area, and worried by British road and railway construction which pointed toward Kandahar and Kabul "just like

5. Wilber, D., Afghanistan, New Haven, 1956, p. 143.

6. Aitchison, C. B., Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries, Delhi, 1933, vol. 13, p. 242. Also quoted by Dorethea Seelye Franck, "Pukhtunistan - Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land," Middle East Journal, vol. VI, no. 1, 1952, pp. 49-68.

pushing a knife into my vitals",⁷ seemed to welcome the proposed divisions.

Before Durand left Kabul on November 14, 1893, both sides agreed on a boundary from "Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Siyah in this way that Wakhan, Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan (i.e., Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway station of New Chaman, Chagai, the rest of Waziri, Biland Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Bruner, Dir, Chilas, and Chitral."⁸

This last sentence tends to confirm Afghan acceptance of the Treaty of Gandumak no matter how distasteful it may have been. One might suppose from reading the above that the Afghan Amir found the 1893 agreement satisfactory, but further examination of the Autobiography and his papers indicates his opposition to the Durand Line as a permanent boundary. He insisted the boundary delineated zones of responsibility - and did not draw an international boundary. Even Durand did not anticipate annexation: "Durand...did not propose to move forward the administrative border of India, but merely push for political control."⁹ Numerous British writers, such as Barton and Holdich have commented on the Amir's antagonism to the Durand Line and the lengths to which Durand had to go to get Abdul Rahman's signature on the 1893 agreement. For example, the Amir's subsidy jumped from 1.2 to 1.8 million rupees, plus increased arms and ammunition quotas, and Durand found it necessary to aim several veiled threats at the Amir.

The last paragraph in the final agreement of November 12, 1893, is vague and inconclusive:

Article I, Paragraph 2: "The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territory lying beyond this line on the side of India."¹⁰

"It is true that the agreement did not describe the line as a boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir's dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir's authority from the territory east and south of the line. In the international aspect this was of no account, for the Amir had renounced¹¹ sovereignty beyond this line."¹²

The Kabul negotiations were peaceful, however, compared to the experiences

7. Abdul Rahman, Life of Abdul Rahman, 2 vols., London, 1900. The author discussed the Persian text of this work with Professor Ahmad Ali Kohzad, president of the historical society of Afghanistan, in Kabul.

8. Ibid.

9. Sir Percy Sykes, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand, London, 1926, p. 219.

10. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 B.C. - 1957 A.D., New York, 1958, p. 382.

11. Voluntarily? At what point does coercion cease to be legal?

12. Caroe, op. cit., p. 463.

of the commission assigned to fix the boundary in the field. Antagonism greeted the commission in most areas, and tribesmen, especially in Waziristan, several times attacked the group. Local mullahs, some probably in the pay of Kabul, spread the word that the faranghi (British) planned to annex and occupy Pushtun lands on both sides of the line.

At other times the Commission treated its job as a pleasant hunting trip. When a village council could not decide on which side of the line it wished to fall, the British commissioners shouldered their Wesley-Richards bird guns and "went shooting," asking that the villagers please make up their minds before they returned.¹³ Split village loyalties resulted in several instances. On the other hand, several tribes were arbitrarily divided between Afghanistan and British India.

The Durand Line, designed to bring stability to the frontier regions, failed. The Line proved politically, geographically, and strategically untenable. Both Afghan and British Indian troops fought many bloody engagements with the fiercely independent border mountaineers.

Abdul Rahman and his son and successor, Habibullah, attempted to integrate the Afghan Pushtuns into the Durani kingdom; the British divided the cis-Durand Line Pushtuns of the North-West Frontier Province, founded in 1901, into the Settled Districts of the plains, and the Tribal Agencies of the mountains. Troops moved into garrisons in the Five Agencies (Malakand, Khayber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan). They built roads, set up telegraph lines, and tried to maintain order. Warfare continually erupted, because the Pushtuns resented each new move, from either government, as a link in the chain of eventual slavery.

The only relatively peaceful years on the North-West Frontier, and particularly in the Tribal Agencies, between 1893 and 1947, were during the two world wars, when Afghan neutrality from foreign wars penetrated across the Durand Line, emphasizing again that the pre-partition Pushtuns of the tribal agencies looked to Kabul rather than the plains of India for guidance, although they were tied to the British Raj by treaties - written and unwritten - and received annual subsidies from Delhi.

13. Pushtun informant in Peshawar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE PARTITION OF THE INDIAN

SUB-CONTINENT AND THE "PUSHTUNISTAN" ISSUE

Several times before the 1947 partition, Afghan governments in power re-affirmed their treaty obligations with the British. Habibullah signed, not without personal misgivings and outside threats, the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, which contained the following: "His said Majesty does hereby agree to this, that in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the engagements which His Highness my late father concluded and acted upon with the exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, and will act upon the same agreements and compacts, and I will not contravene them in any dealing." ¹⁴

The first mention of the Durand Line as a "frontier" occurs in the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed at the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Paragraph 5 states: "The Afghan Government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontiers accepted by the late Amir." ¹⁵ The "late Amir" was Habibullah; his son Amanullah, who came to power in a coup d'etat after his father's assassination, signed the 1919 treaty. Incidentally, an avowed Afghan purpose in the third Anglo-Afghan war was to secure independence for the Indian Pushtuns. ¹⁶ The 1919 treaty also slightly adjusted the Durand Line in the Khyber area. More importantly the British agreed to let the Afghans handle their own foreign affairs, and the Afghans consider 1919 as their true date of independence.

Two paragraphs of the subsequent Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 refer to the Durand Line. Paragraph 2 reads: "The two high contracting parties having mutually satisfied themselves regarding the good will of the other and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operations which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres before the commencement of such operations." ¹⁷ Article XIV in the 1921 treaty provides that this treaty "shall remain in force for three years" and "in case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said three years the intention to terminate it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from that day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it."

The Afghans questioned the responsibilities of both governments toward the Pushtun areas, and asked that Afghan interests there be recognized. A supplementary 1921 letter from the British representatives to the Afghan Foreign Minister continues the vagueness which has plagued the vague mountainous frontier: "As the conditions of the frontier tribes of the two governments are of interest to the government of Afghanistan I inform you that the British Government entertains feelings of good will towards all the frontier tribes

14. Quoted in Caroe, op. cit., p. 464.

15. Ibid., p. 464.

16. See D. S. Franck, op. cit., p. 54.

17. Reported in Aitchison, op. cit., p. 293.

and has every intention of treating them generously, providing they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India. I hope that this letter will cause you satisfaction." 18

The Afghans overthrew King Amanullah in 1929, and a Tajik folk hero-bandit, Baché-yi-Saqqaw, sat on the Kabul throne for nine months. With Pushtun lashkars from both sides of the Durand Line, General Mohammed Nadir Khan, a distant cousin of Amanullah, and his brothers overthrew the Tajik king and re-established the Durani monarchy. Immediately after accession to the throne, King Mohammed Nadir Shah re-affirmed "the validity of the treaty concluded at Kabul on November 22, 1921." 19

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Let us now turn to developments in the Pushtun region on the British side of the Durand Line. The formation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901 separated the Pushtun country from the Punjab, and the province itself was divided into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies, sowing the seeds of independence movements among British Indian Pushtuns. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 which launched the rest of India on an experiment in provincial democracy did not affect the Pushtun country. The dynamic, dogmatic, conservative Sir George Roos-Keppel, who ruled the North-West Frontier Province from 1908-1919, convinced the British Raj the Pushtuns had no use for the formal legislative mechanisms provided for in the reforms. He insisted the Pushtun jirgah (tribal council) system was democracy in action. Simultaneously he created Islamia College, which mushroomed into the modern University of Peshawar, threatening tribal traditions but leaving nothing to replace them. The opinions of Roos-Keppel remained in force, although the Frontier Inquiry Committee of 1922 recommended a provincial legislature for the North-West Frontier Province. The Simon Commission (Royal Stationary Commission of 1928), after consultation with many North-West Frontier Pushtuns and their khans at Peshawar, had even more drastic recommendations.

The khans reputedly reported: "The contiguity of the province with independent territory and Afghanistan, the free intercourse between the people on both sides of the borderline, the simplicity of their ideals, customs, and mode of life, and specially their descent from the common stock, strongly distinguish the people of our province from those of the rest of India." 20

Pertinent quotes from the Simon Commission report supposedly include:

"The situation of the province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian advance are such that special arrangements are required."

"British India stops at the boundary 21 of the administered area."

18. A. R. Pazhwak, Paktunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Paktunistan, Afghanistan Information Bureau, London, 1953, p. 86.

19. Caroe, op. cit., p. 465.

20. Pazhwak, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

21. The boundary referred to is between the Tribal and Settled Districts of British India.

Denied the right to develop constitutionally with the rest of British India, the Pushtun intelligentsia of the North-West Frontier Province cooperated with the Hindu-controlled Congress Party, and actively participated in the Civil Disobedience Movements of the 1930's. The official Frontier Party and its unofficial arm, the "Red Shirts" (called so because of the color of their clothing, also called Khuda-yl-Khidmatgaran, or Servants of God) organized chiefly by Dr. Khan Sahib and his younger brother, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, emerged as powerful political forces. In the tribal agencies such men as the Faqir of Ipi and Hajji Turanzai caused depredations by lashkars from the mountains and forced the British to send annual punitive expeditions to the frontier region.

The Frontier Congress organized the North-West Frontier Province Settled Districts so effectively that in 1932 the British Indian Government replaced the Chief Commissioner with a Provincial Governor, and allotted all the rights and obligations of provincial self-government to the Settled Districts. The 1935 Government of India Act included the North-West Frontier Province and increased participation in self-government resulted.

The 1893-1939 patterns in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and British India can be outlined as follows:

1. Afghanistan: intra-tribal wars and attempts at pacification by the central government; forced migration of several dissident Pushtun groups to north Afghanistan; few attempts at development of socio-economic-political institutions.

2. British India: separation of Pushtun region from Punjab Province to form North-West Frontier Province; Settled Districts at first ignored in legislative reforms, then placed in mainstream of political life in 1932; independent tribal agencies maintain independence, have separate treaties with British government; tribal raids force British to keep large outposts and participate in almost annual fights with raiders.

When it became obvious during World War II that the Indian sub-continent would become independent shortly after the defeat of the axis powers, the Afghan government reminded the government of India of its interest in the fate of the Pushtuns on the Indian side of the Durand Line. The British observed that since the Durand Line was an international boundary it should not concern the Afghans. Lord Louis Mountbatten, last British Viceroy in India, did concede vaguely: "Agreements with the tribes on the North-West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated with the appropriate successor authority."²²

Mountbatten's statement encouraged the Afghans, but in June, 1947, the Congress Party Cabinet of the North-West Frontier province voted to go with India.²³

21. The boundary referred to is between the Tribal and Settled Districts of British India.

22. Paragraph 17 of the Partition Agreement, made public on June 3, 1947, by Mountbatten.

23. Several Pushtun (and Indian) friends of mine have indicated that Gandhi and Nehru promised the Khan brothers total autonomy in the North-West Frontier Province if they would support the Congress Party's efforts to keep the Indian sub-continent together. When Pakistan's birth could not be aborted, the Red Shirts and their leaders opted for independence, or at least autonomy within Pakistan.

This galled the Pushtuns of the Settled Districts, with their over 90% Muslim population. Few Pushtuns would agree to be ruled by Hind, so a British-sponsored referendum, held in July, voted to join Pakistan. The referendum offered the Settled Districts two choices: (1) join India; (2) join Pakistan, in keeping with the Partition Agreement referring to British-administered provinces. The 500-odd native or princely states had three alternatives: (1) join India; (2) join Pakistan; (3) remain independent for a specified period until a decision could be made as to whether to join India or Pakistan. Several tried independence for varying periods of time (Kashmir, Hyderabad, Kalat) none succeeded for very long.

The Khan brothers advocated independence for the Pushtun areas of North-west India, a claim which Afghanistan officially supported. Both parties declared the proposed boycott of the British referendum successful, although some observers disagreed, including the close friend of the Khan brothers, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.²⁴

In view of the following election results, the boycott seems to have been partly successful:

1946 Provincial Elections ²⁵

Percentage of Eligible Voters
Who Voted: 68%

1947 Referendum ²⁶

Percentage of Eligible Voters
Who Voted: 55.5%

Of those Voting:
For India, .5%
For Pakistan, 55%

The British sponsored jirgahs in the Five Tribal Agencies, and all the tribal groups agreed to go with Pakistan. The Afghans objected to the procedures used in these jirgahs. Only two choices were presented: join Pakistan or join India. The Afghans insist the Tribal Agencies should have been equated with the princely states and permitted to select initial independence if they so desired. After all, argue the Afghans, each tribe had a separate treaty with the British government, and therefore functioned as an independent nation.

Since the reality of Pakistan, several events on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line have strengthened Pakistan's standing among the majority of her Pushtuns:

1. In December 1947, the Pakistanis removed almost all regular army units from the Tribal Agencies, leaving behind only five battalions of the Frontier Corps to maintain order. The British usually had at least 48 battalions in this area.

24. See his India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative, Longmans, Green, New York, 1960.

25. According to an official Pakistan publication (The Pukhtunistan Stunt, Karachi, 1956), 68% voted in 1946; 51% in 1947 - a sizeable drop of 17%.

26. Data derived from Azad, op. cit.; Pazhwak, op. cit.; The Pukhtunistan Stunt, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1956.

2. The Pakistanis created a sixth Tribal Agency, among the Mohmands, to handle the peculiar problems of this dissident area. Also, a general amnesty was declared for raiders (e.g., for Waziristan, in October 1947).

3. Pakistan permitted Tribal Agency groups to maintain virtual autonomy, in spite of the One Unit Move which made all West Pakistan one province.

4. In the Settled Districts (now a part of the province of West Pakistan) and in the areas where the Tribal Agencies demand them, education, hospitals, and welfare activities have been appreciably expanded.

5. Economic developments such as the Warsak Dam are proceeding rapidly to diversify the economic base of the northwest region of modern West Pakistan.

6. Subsidies in the tribal areas have been continued, and in some cases, increased.

Several Pakistani moves, however, created sympathy for the independence aspirations of some Pakistani Pushtuns:

1. Suppression of pro-"Pushtunistan" press organs and arrests, for security reasons, of "Pushtunistan" independence leaders, some of whom have been reportedly executed.

2. Occasional Pakistan Air Force strikes to quell expected or actual uprisings along the frontier. In June, 1949, during one of these attacks, a Pakistani aircraft (inadvertently, according to the Pakistanis; deliberately, according to the Afghans) bombed a village 2100 yards inside the Afghan border. The Pakistanis paid restitution but continue to deny intentional bombing.

3. Since 1955, the Damoclean One-Unit Declaration hangs over the Tribal Agencies, and the government of Pakistan eventually hopes to integrate its Pushtuns into the mainstream of Pakistani life, a situation not yet desired by most frontier Pushtuns.

According to the majority of neutral observers, all things considered, the Pakistani Pushtuns with the exception of several tribal groups included in border salients (i.e., Tirah, Bajaur, etc.) are content, for the present at least, with Pakistani rule.

* * * *

The Afghans, for their part, have consistently championed the independence of the Pakistani Pushtuns - insisting a free, supervised plebiscite be held, preferably under United Nations auspices. This policy flavors all Afghan foreign relations and is directly responsible for Afghan acceptance of Soviet aid in 1950, date of the first Pakistani retaliatory "blockade" of goods in transit to Afghanistan.²⁷

27. The 1950, 1955, 1959 "blockades" were basically slowdowns, easy to accomplish in the Pakistani adaptation of a British-oriented law and order bureaucracy.

The land area constituting "Pushtunistan" has varied from the Tribal Agencies alone to the present claim: all land between the Durand Line and the Indus River, including Chitral, Swat, Dir, Kalat, Baluchistan, and most of the Makran coast. This region embraces several non-Pushtun groups, such as the Baluchi, the Brahui (who speak a Dravidian, not an Indo-European Language), and the varied ethnic groups of the Makran Badlands. Afghanistan's desire for free access to a warm-water ocean port is reflected in these demands.

Afghanistan, reportedly encouraged by India, intensified its demands for an independent Pushtunistan in 1949. The Afghan Loe Jirgah (Great Tribal Assembly) met in Kabul and repudiated all treaties with Great Britain, specifically those referring to the Durand Line of 1893. The Afghans, at this time, with some justification, believed Pakistan would soon collapse, and until General Mohammed Ayub Khan (himself a Pakistani Pushtun) seized power in 1958, the possibility did exist.

Feeling secure in their external legal position, but insecure internally, the Pakistanis largely ignored Afghan demands for a plebiscite and even denied the problem of "Pushtunistan" existed. However, with increased stability developing under the firm hand of President Ayub, the propaganda war, carried on through press, radio, and word of mouth, has increased. Vile accusations, charges and countercharges occur daily. The mildest of these charges finds Pakistan calling Afghanistan "communist dominated" and the Afghans labeling Pakistan as a "lackey of imperialism." Several times in the last decade Pakistani troops have fought Afghan irregulars who crossed the Durand Line. Periodically Pakistan reports massing of Afghan troops on the frontier (most recently in October, 1960). Both countries realize war is impractical, if not impossible; yet the volatile, emotionally-oriented "Pushtunistan" issue could explode with world-wide significance unless some suitable solution is negotiated.

* * * *

The United States government, through its embassies in Kabul and Karachi, suggested in 1950 that negotiations be undertaken. Nothing resulted, although the Afghans did agree to negotiate "on the basis of national policy." I can find no record of a Pakistani reply. Several subsequent mediation attempts also failed.

The latest effort occurred when Prince Mohammed Naim, Afghan Foreign Minister, journeyed to Rawalpindi early in 1960 after President Eisenhower's visits to Kabul and Karachi in December, 1959. Prince Naim proposed to discuss problems of mutual interest with President Ayub of Pakistan. Afghan reports indicate that Ayub airily dismissed "Pushtunistan" as an unimportant problem, and the talks produced nothing but additional ill will. Pakistani sources, however, insist Prince Naim came unprepared to negotiate on any issue.

The Pakistanis insist the Durand Line is an internationally recognized frontier, and more importantly, they occupy the area and administer it. For all practical purposes having lost Kashmir, Pakistan is in no mood to see all West Pakistan from the Durand Line to the Indus River and down to the Arabian Sea disappear, leaving only a toothpaste squeeze of territory within its borders.

The 1950 Pakistani "blockade" of Afghan in-transit goods introduced a new element into the "Pushtunistan" issue: the cold war. Neutral Afghanistan accepted Soviet offers of aid and trade. Intercourse with the Soviet Union increased after Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO (ex-Baghdad Pact), and accepted United States arms aid. The Afghans requested arms aid from the United States to restore the "balance of power" in Central Asia; the Soviets gladly armed the Afghans following American refusals.

In December, 1955, Bulganin and Krushchev amazed the world with their offer of a \$100 million, low interest development loan to Afghanistan, and announced official Soviet support of Afghan demands for a plebiscite among Pakistani Pushtuns. Interestingly enough, neither Afghanistan nor the USSR have determinedly pushed the issue in the United Nations.

The entrance of the USSR into the "Pushtunistan" arena caused - and still causes - the United States much embarrassment. Officially military allies of the Pakistanis, the Americans cannot afford to affront the neutral Afghans, whom we aid economically. United States policy straddles a slowly rusting, but dull, razor blade - a common predicament for post-World War II American foreign policy. Too many Americans view the "Pushtunistan" problem (along with Kashmir, the Congo, etc.) as a Graustarkian comedy. Such naiveté can have disastrous consequences.

Current Patterns

Attempting coldly, objectively to sum up the dynamics of a situation such as "Pushtunistan" is difficult, especially when one wishes to avoid emotional involvement. Briefly, the patterns are listed below.

1. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan appears ready to budge from their announced positions: Afghanistan officially wants an independent "Pushtunistan" established among the Pakistani Pushtuns (and other ethnic groups extending to the Arabian Sea). Unofficially, the Afghans would not object to a union with an independent "Pushtunistan," which would break Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for in-transit trade facilities.

2. Misunderstanding exists on both sides and propaganda from all sources tends to increase the difficulties. Afghans generally believe the West is converting Pakistan into an armed camp, aimed at Afghanistan. Pakistanis believe the Soviets are rapidly gaining political and economic control of Afghanistan, and that the Durani government in Kabul attempts forcibly to modernize Afghanistan, i.e., ripping the veils off the women, destroying the ritual aspects of Islam. Neither extreme view is correct, but again, emotion clouds the facts.

3. Attempts to Pushtunize all Afghans causes resentment among the non-Pushtun Afghans such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. In addition, some members of the

Afghan royal family and bureaucracy cannot speak Pushtu, and many speak Persian by choice. Contrary to propaganda widely circulated and believed in Pakistan, however, Prime Minister Daud does speak Pushtu.

4. Afghan attempts to extend more and more government control (in the form of roads, schools, and announced extension of the army draft to Paktia Province) creates resentment in the Afghan mountain Pushtun areas. Local autonomy is prized on both sides of the Durand Line.

5. In Pakistan, the six Tribal Agencies are largely autonomous units, just as in British days, and the political officers who represent Pakistan are responsible only to the central government, not to the provincial government.

6. With the appearance of the Soviets on the scene, a peaceful solution of the "Pushtunistan" problems seems unlikely. Nothing would displease the Russians more than a rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some reports indicate the Soviets have advised Afghans to stir up a small-scale guerilla war to call international attention to the problem. So far, the Afghans have wisely resisted such a temptation.

7. Like so many artificial historical boundaries, the Durand Line will probably continue a trouble spot, a festering sore to be lived with - a sideshow of the greater cold war, which may, at any time, move to the main arena. Increased propaganda on both sides only increases tensions in an area where fighting is like breathing. The question seems to be: given certain external pressures, can Pakistan and Afghanistan live for long in peace with the "Pushtunistan" problem? The quiescent Kashmir problem seems to show the way, but after all, the United Nations is in Kashmir.

CONCLUSIONS

No definite conclusions are possible, only an additional summing-up of the arguments and possibilities.

Historical

Bluntly, historical arguments over political boundaries have lost much significance in fact. Former control of an area often has little to do with current control. In the United States, the American government would never give the Indians back their land, no matter how loudly they protested or how our consciences may groan. Also, the Pushtuns, except for brief periods of empire - not nationhood - have always been a divided, tribally independent people.

Legal²⁸

The legal arguments on both sides are complex. They involve two basic

28. I am no lawyer, and have depended on legal friends for suggestions.

questions: (1) the validity of the Durand Line as an international boundary; (2) the responsibility of emergent colonial nations for treaties signed before independence by colonial powers. Successive Afghan governments since Abdul Rahman accepted the Durand Line as a frontier, but the term "frontier" can mean either a "zone" or a "boundary," admittedly a nicety of definition, but much law interpretation seems to be based upon such niceties. The United Kingdom and Pakistan contend the Durand Line is a permanent boundary, and if this is true, no further arguments exist, because transfers of sovereignty do not affect accepted international boundaries.²⁹

But boundaries drawn under duress remain moral issues, and quite often morality and current mores become involved in legal interpretations, e.g., the segregation issue in the United States. Another point to remember is that the Afghans did abrogate all treaties with Britain. Of course, only a powerful nation or a nation with powerful outside support can back up such unilateral acts, and make them legally acceptable on the international scene; e.g., Nasser's Suez Canal seizure, backed by the United Nations, and later by Russia's rocket threats and United States-led U.N. condemnation of the United Kingdom-French-Israeli Suez invasion.

The question of the responsibility of new countries for old treaties relates to the first. In the 1921 treaty letter addition³⁰ to the Treaty of Rawalpindi the British recognized Afghan interest in the frontier Pushtuns and agreed that either side would inform the other of troop movements near the Durand Line. Therefore, should the British have negotiated with the Afghans on the basis of this agreement before they left India? One of the tragedies of the "Pushtunistan" problem is that the issue seemingly should have been between the British and the Afghans, not the Pakistanis and the Afghans.

None of the above points has been specifically tested in international law with the Durand Line in mind. Probably the most important facts are that Pakistan is powerful enough to refuse to negotiate on the subject, and that Pakistan believes in the legal right of her position. In spite of this, a minority of Pakistani Pushtuns still agitate for a truly independent "Pushtunistan."

Emotional

Logically considered, the "Pushtunistan" problem could be solved almost immediately between Pakistan and Afghanistan but since when has mankind been known for its logic in politics? Emotion quickly enters the picture and replaces calm discussion. Today, "Pushtunistan" seems to exist more as a state of mind and spirit than as a logically argued entity. This does not detract from the coldly objective statement that Afghanistan does have an interest in the area and its people, and that consultation on its change of status was denied to Kabul. In addition, the present rulers of Afghanistan are direct

29. Sir W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia, 2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1953, quoting Oppenheim's International Law, ed. by Lauterpacht, vol. I, ch. 1, s. 82(b).

30. In addition to re-affirming the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi, the 1921 treaty letter provided for the exchange of British and Afghan envoys.

descendants of the Peshawar Sardars and have emotional, homeland ties there. (As does Mr. Nehru as a Kashmiri Brahmin in the Kashmir dispute.)

Emotion plays great roles in the lives of men and nations. It probably achieves more decisions than logic. Therefore, the emotional issues cannot be discounted, especially when we see the Pushtuns of both countries are overwhelmingly illiterate and religiously conservative. On neither side of the Durand Line do the mountain Pushtuns have a tradition of loyalty to a central government. On the whole, loyalty still comes to the tribe before the national government. In such a tradition-ridden situation, propaganda-fed emotion can explode to violence almost instantaneously.

* * * *

Several possible solutions and/or results come to mind: Further partition of the Pushtuns between Afghanistan and West Pakistan; federation with either Pakistan or Afghanistan; independence of the Pushtuns; or continued status quo.

The popular way to solve modern boundary disputes is partition, a temporary deferment of the problem. An ethnic and geographic straightening of the Durand Line would not solve the greater issue of the disposition of the Pushtun people, who, incidentally, have always been divided.

A federation in which all Pushtuns would be inside either Afghan or Pakistani borders is practically an impossibility. Neither country would permit such a one-sided solution.

An independent "Pushtunistan" created from within West Pakistan's borders is also inconceivable. For one thing, the Pakistanis would not permit it, and further, they are convinced their Pushtuns are content. If this is true, why not hold a plebiscite under United Nations auspices and settle the issue of their contentment once and for all? Afghanistan has indicated she would abide by such a decision. However, Pakistan counters, why not hold a similar plebiscite among Afghan Pushtuns to determine whether they wish to be independent - to join their Pakistani Pushtun brothers in the creation of an independent Pushtunistan? Afghanistan, the Pakistanis continue, is an artificial country itself, created by the British and the Russians, which must constantly maintain vigilance over its own Pushtuns. Probably neither nation will ever permit a plebiscite, for both would consider it an infringement on their internal sovereignty.

Unless outside forces interfere, an uneasy status quo will probably continue, much like Kashmir, North-South Korea, East-West Germany, and the Arab-Israeli situation, and everyone will have to learn to live with it.

A final plausible alternative should be considered: a federation of Afghanistan and West Pakistan. News reports and diplomatic rumors occasionally hint at such a possibility. Obviously many problems would arise in the initial stages of such a federation. Witness the problem of Egypt and Syria at the birth of the United Arab Republic. An Afghan-Pakistani federation is historically, culturally, politically, and economically more desirable and logical than the Egyptian-Syrian union. And are not both Afghanistan and

Pakistan currently governed by Pushtun Leaders? But again, how often in history has mankind been logical in such matters?

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

by

LEON B. POUILLADA

I. Introduction.

The problems of recent social development in Afghanistan have not received sufficient study by sociologists and anthropologists in whose primary field such a study would logically rest. In the absence of an analysis in depth conducted by trained academicians, the present paper will attempt to outline broadly some of the problems which are evident to any reasonably alert observer residing in Afghanistan for a period of time. The writer quite naturally had a certain bias in observing social phenomena since he was primarily interested in the effects of social change on Afghanistan's domestic and foreign policies.

Observers who have looked into the problem agree that Afghan society is in a stage of transition. Although on the surface there appears to be great placidity and even stability in the Afghan social order, beneath the surface, significant changes are taking place. These changes, indeed, are fracturing the old social order in Afghanistan and bringing into play forces which may, in due course, result in profound alterations in Afghan social, economic, and perhaps even political institutions. The intensity of the changes taking place has been materially increased by the fact that for many years, indeed centuries, Afghanistan remained to a large extent isolated from the currents of world change. This paper cannot go into the reasons for this isolation other than to say that Afghanistan, traditionally jealous of its independence and caught between the upper millstone of a militant, Czarist Russia and the nether one of the expanding British Empire in India, tended to withdraw into its shell and to exclude foreign influence from its borders. Afghanistan therefore, for better or for worse, was largely free of the transforming experience of colonial rule and administration.

If we accept that the Afghan social order is in transition, the question naturally arises--transition from what to what? It is of course easier to describe what a society has been than to analyze what it is now or to predict what it may become.

II. Traditional Afghan Social Structure.

Until recent times Afghan society has been principally organized along vertical rather than horizontal lines. Social, economic, and even political affiliations were determined by the tribe, the clan, and the family of the individual rather than by loyalties to, or connections with, horizontal non-kinship groups with common economic or ideological interests.

The principal vertical groups in the total estimated population of 10 to 12

million were largely determined by ethnic and linguistic differentiation as follows:

Pushtuns	-	4 - 5 million
Tajiks	-	2 - 3 million
Uzbeks	-	1 million
Hazaras	-	1 million
Turkomen	-	.5 million
Others	-	1.5 million
Total	-	10 - 12 million

It will be noted that the Pushtuns were, and still are, numerically the predominant cultural group. This numerical preponderance has been reinforced by Pushtun personal and cultural characteristics which have traditionally emphasized courage, vigor and warlike prowess. These factors have tended to impart to Afghan society, as a whole, a distinctively Pushtun flavor, (albeit seasoned by a long tradition of tolerance for other ethnic and linguistic groups in the country.)

Let us now examine briefly the horizontal composition of present-day Afghan society. We can then attempt some comparison of the values and trends which characterize the old and the new.

III. Present-Day Afghan Society.

As could be expected of a society in transition, many present-day social groups in Afghanistan are a mixture of old and new affiliations. Although there is a clearly discernible trend toward the formation of "economic classes," such as professional, skilled labor, intelligentsia, etc., the individuals within any given "class" often find their personal loyalties pulled in different directions because of the persistence of strong attachments to family, clan, or tribal affiliations.

Many Afghans are themselves not aware of this inner conflict to which they are being subjected by the changing nature of their society. Those who sense a certain social malaise tend to ascribe this to inherent conflicts between oriental cultural values and occidental "modern" concepts. This feeling is justified only insofar as western technological factors reinforce the pull and attractiveness of a new society organized more along economic than kinship lines.

It is sometimes thought that stratification along economic lines is unique to "modern western" societies whereas, in fact, the structure of many older societies was rooted in economics. A classical example of this pattern is the traditional society of India which was based on horizontal economic classes. These classes eventually became frozen into castes by religious sanction. The important thing to remember, therefore, is that the stresses and strains within present-day Afghan society are not necessarily caused by a clash between "oriental traditionalism" and "western modernism" but are basically the product of indigenous social forces which tend to reinforce horizontal class divisions and

gradually to de-emphasize vertical kinship and ethnic affiliations. This trend tends to fracture tribal, clan, and family loyalties in favor of ties with horizontal economic or political groupings. In other words, a carpenter's main interest, for example, gradually shifts from close loyalties to the family or clan and becomes more identified with the fate and interests of other carpenters. This process is just getting under way in Afghanistan and specific horizontal class divisions have not as yet completely jelled. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is possible to identify certain principal horizontal class divisions within Afghanistan which are gradually emerging and becoming more marked and definite. These are set forth in the following chart:

HORIZONTAL SOCIAL GROUP IN AFGHANISTAN

<u>Horizontal Group</u>	<u>Number of Individuals</u>	<u>Who are Members</u>	<u>Vertical Elements Included In Horizontal Group</u>
1. Elite	2-3 thousand	King - royal family and top government officials - wealthy merchants - large landowners - tribal chiefs.	Pushtuns - Sunnis
2. Intelligentsia	8-10 thousand	Higher ranks of government employees - professional men - teachers - students - literati - top religious leaders - army officers.	Mostly Pushtun but substantial Tajik; predominantly Sunni but some Shiah, e.g., Qizilbash.
3. Urban Middle Class	800,000 to 1 million	Lower civil servants - shopkeepers - scribes, accountants - artisans - literate religious leaders, etc.	Predominantly Tajik but many Uzbeks and Pushtuns; some Turkomen and even Hazaras.
4. Lower Classes	8 million		
a. <u>Urban</u>			
(1) Proletariat	20,000	Factory and semiskilled workers	Tajiks, Hazaras, and Pushtuns
(2) Military, police, etc.	40,000	Enlisted Men in armed forces, police, and gendarmerie	Tajiks, Hazaras, Pushtuns; some Turkomen
b. <u>Rural</u>			
(1) Cultivators	7 million	Small landowners, peasants, and seminomads	Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras
(2) Nomads	200,000	Pure nomads, noncultivators	Pushtuns, some Turkomen

* Note: All population figures are estimates--no census ever taken.

Examination of the above chart confirms that, in the present stage of Afghan social evolution, horizontal and vertical groups tend to overlap and criss-cross. An example of this is the marked preponderance of Pushtun (vertical) ethnic elements in the horizontal groups comprising the elite and the intelligentsia. The persistence of vertical elements in the horizontal class structure is reinforced by the relatively slow mobility between ethnic and linguistic groups. Assimilation by inter-marriage is not frequent between Pushtuns and Tajiks. It is probably highest within Turkic groups, i.e., Turkomen and Uzbeks, and probably lowest between Hazaras and other elements of the population. These conclusions are, of course, tentative since they are based not on statistical studies (which have never been made) but on observation and direct questioning of knowledgeable Afghans. In general, however, it can be safely asserted that low mobility between vertical elements of the Afghan population is a retarding factor in the formation of new polyethnic horizontal groups.

The structure of present-day Afghan society which we have just examined is generating changes in traditional social and cultural values which may have far reaching implications for the future of Afghanistan. It would therefore be useful at this time to examine and compare the two value systems involved.

IV. Traditional Social and Cultural Values.

In traditional Afghan society the individual is surrounded, as it were, by concentric rings consisting of the family, extended family, clan, sub-tribe, tribe, and major ethnic or linguistic group. From his earliest years these successive social layers determine his personal habits, his tastes, loyalties, and actions. To the kinship or ethnic group he gives loyalty, cooperation, personal service and, in times of danger, perhaps his very life. From these groups he derives protection, a livelihood and, above all, a sense of comfortable "belonging." These concentric rings confine him in bonds forged of custom and habit. On the other hand, they free him from the terrors of social "aloneness" and economic destitution. This arrangement makes for a fairly satisfied individual within a reasonably stable, albeit somewhat stagnant, society.

Within this society the individual is expected to adhere strictly to orthodox Islamic tenets. If he encounters problems of a personal, political, or economic nature, he looks for their solution to his kinship or ethnic group. His status in the community depends largely on his family connections enhanced, of course, by personal attributes such as his reputation for wisdom or piety. Formal education is not highly prized per se whereas learning and knowledge, however acquired, add to a man's stature. His prestige usually rises with advancing age and is increased by family wealth and direct or indirect political power.

Traditional society tends to be rural in outlook with its roots in the land. It is characterized by a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. Class distinctions are not sharp and relations between superior and subordinate are characterized by paternalistic concern for the less fortunate and corresponding deference and respect of the latter for the patron.

In this type of society {cultural emphasis is on historic and heroic themes, especially those which glorify the kinship or ethnic group. "National" feelings and loyalties are filtered through the successive layers surrounding the individual and tend to become meaningful to him only to the extent they happen to coincide with the interests of the sub-national groups. [Literary and other artistic accomplishments are highly regarded. The tendency is to stress mysticism and romanticism, particularly in poetry and in song.]

V. "Modern" Social and Cultural Values.

Since Afghan society is in transition, old and new values coexist, and it is sometimes difficult to sort them out. Certain trends and features, however, stand out in bold relief. One obvious characteristic is the {urban outlook of the new social forces.} While ties to the land or village are often preserved, these bonds tend to become attenuated and less binding on the individual. [He finds himself imperceptibly more and more part of the horizontal occupational class, and his loyalties to the vertical kinship and ethnic group become correspondingly less pronounced. The rugged self-sufficiency of the vertical group ? gradually gives way to the interdependence which is so necessary in relations between horizontal classes.]

In this urban-oriented environment the individual tends to develop a broader outlook on religious matters. Dogma becomes subject to exegesis and interpretation. Religion becomes more intellectualized and less dependent on revelation as the sole source of authority. Formal education assumes greater importance and with it comes an emphasis on factual knowledge, scientific and technical accomplishments, and on the "real" and "practical" as opposed to the "mystical" and the "romantic." The status and prestige of the individual in this type of society is enhanced by his formal school education, especially higher degrees from foreign universities. He can increase his stature further by engaging in the "status" occupations, preferably government service.

This "modern" society is {competitive rather than cooperative.} [Within his own economic group, the individual must struggle to acquire wealth and power. At the same time he must support his group in its struggle for recognition and supremacy over other economic classes.] This makes for a restless, dynamic society in constant flux. It is full of uncertainties, problems, movement, change. The individual, having divested himself wholly or partially of the protective coloration of the traditional society, feels exposed, insecure, rootless, and disoriented. At this stage he {may be attracted to extremist causes which offer the comforts of ideological orthodoxy and make him feel that he again "belongs."}

The contrasting values of the traditional and the "modern" societies are summarized in the following chart:

COMPARISON OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES

Afghan Traditional Society

1. Primary loyalty to vertical group.
2. Strict adherence to orthodox religion.
3. Look inward for solution of problems to family, clan, or tribe.
4. Status depends on ancestors, wisdom, piety, age, wealth, power.
5. Class distinctions are not very sharp.
6. Outlook is rural and self-sufficient.
7. Cultural emphasis is on national historic and heroic themes, mysticism, poetry, romanticism, informal education.
8. Social order tends to be safe, static, orderly.
9. Individual is center of concentric kinship rings and feels secure.
10. Emphasis is on cooperation with family, clan, tribe, etc.

Afghan "Modern" Society

1. Growing loyalty to horizontal group.
2. Broader, interpretative attitude toward religion.
3. Look outward to government authority for solution of problems.
4. Status depends more on education (degrees), occupation, position in government.
5. Class distinctions become more pronounced.
6. Outlook is urban and interdependent.
7. Cultural emphasis is on knowledge of world, science, technical accomplishments, formal education.
8. Society is in flux, characterized by uncertainty, movement, change.
9. Individual on his own, feels rootless, insecure.
10. Emphasis is on competition between and among economic groups.

A transitional society, with conflicting cultural and social values such as now exists in Afghanistan, inevitably brings in its wake a host of problems. (For one thing, significant dichotomies are created--urban vs. rural--modern vs. traditional, etc.--and as time passes, these gaps tend to become wider and less susceptible to compromise. These dualisms are only now becoming apparent in Afghanistan because the country is still predominantly rural (it is estimated that only about 1 million of the 10-12 million population live in towns of 10,000 or more). "Modernism" is still, of course, a largely urban phenomenon since the rural areas which comprise most of the country continue to be tradition-oriented.

Judging from history it seems fair to conclude that with the growing cleavage between urban and rural groups, or to put it another way, between "traditionalist" and "progressive" forces, a certain amount of friction will be generated. Points of difference will probably revolve around conflicting viewpoints regarding strict religious practices, literature, education, political attitudes, and economic policies. (The trend against such things as rugged individualism, tribalism, and nomadism is likely to cause social malaise and a feeling of personal insecurity.) These developments may well be reflected in the dissatisfaction of certain groups with government policies, such as relaxing the seclusion of women and the sponsoring of liberal, scientific education, which appear to threaten traditional values.

The growing power of the central government, backed up by a loyal army, and its laudable efforts to unite the country along national lines may be viewed by some as a threat to tribalism and regional autonomy.) A period of social transition is usually a difficult one for political stability. The problem is to provide suitable conditions under which there can be an orderly transfer of individual and group loyalties from vertical kinship-ethnic relationships to broader horizontal class structures and ultimately to the national government. (The danger point in this process occurs during the period when citizens have largely relinquished their traditional loyalties but have not as yet formed new national ones.) It is in this critical period that the individual, finding himself without an anchor, is most susceptible to having his loyalties subverted by antinational doctrines.

The basic problem, therefore, which the Afghan Government is already facing, is whether, in the midst of the social and economic transformation which is under way, it can direct the orderly assimilation of vertical kinship-ethnic groups into a plural society, predominantly Pushtun in character but with "modern" values of tolerance, mutual respect, and equal opportunity for all its citizens. (It will not be a simple problem to de-tribalize the militant semiautonomous Pushtun tribes and incorporate them into the body politic. The Turkic and Hazara tribes present a somewhat simpler problem and, indeed, under the impact of economic forces, are already largely sedentary and to an extent urbanized.) Another significant problem for the nation is that of harnessing the talents and enlisting the loyalties of the rising powers of the middle classes and of the intellectuals. These groups may generate pressures for economic progress and political reforms which the government could find difficult to satisfy or suppress.)

Along with the socio-political problems generated by a transitional society, there come also special economic burdens. Growing urbanization brings with it problems such as housing, schools, sanitation, taxation, etc. (At the same time, significant population shifts from the land to the cities may threaten food supplies and export crops which, in Afghanistan, are both crucial and marginal). These and many more related problems call for sophisticated management of the economy by substantial numbers of highly trained personnel. But one of the unpleasant realities which underdeveloped countries face is the fact that economic programs and planning can be accelerated, but (it still takes a fairly fixed number of years to educate an individual to any given degree of competence). The basic problem then is that social change and economic progress feed on each other often creating a rising spiral of demands which may have grave implications for political stability. Unless the economic pace can keep ahead of needs, the "revolution of rising expectations" may become the expectation of rising revolutions.

VII. Summary Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show that Afghan society is in the beginning stages of a transition from traditional to "modern." The traditional society is characterized by vertical organization, along kinship-ethnic lines, while "modern" society follows horizontal economic lines. At present these organizational lines overlap and crisscross. The traditional and the "modern" have differing and often conflicting cultural values which tend to generate social friction. In this fluid environment the individual, having given up old loyalties and not as yet having acquired new ones, tends to feel rootless and disoriented. This is the danger point which the Afghan government must capture and turn to national advantage in order to insure a smooth transition toward constructive national goals.

EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN

by

W. H. Griffin

Education as it is known today in Afghanistan was initiated over fifty years ago when the first lycee (secondary academic school) was opened in Kabul. In the 1920's three other lycees were opened in the capital following the Afghan War for Independence. During this period, under the leadership of King Amanullah, a system of compulsory elementary schools was attempted. Since 1930 there has been steady educational development, accelerated somewhat during the past ten years.

Prior to the initiation of the present western-type school system Afghanistan shared with the whole Islamic world a type of school known as the kuttab, a mosque school taught by a Mullah and emphasizing memorization of the Koran, reading, writing and some simple arithmetic. During the peak of Islamic civilization the area now known as Afghanistan had its share of leading universities at such centers as Herat, Balkh, and Ghazna and contributed more than its share of outstanding scholars including the Persian poet Firdausi, the scientist Avicenna (Ibn Sina), the philosopher-poet Sanai Ghaznavi, and others. Later, after centuries of Islamic decay and gradual dominance by western civilization it was Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who made the first attempt to arouse the Islamic world from its lethargy, an attempt which helped to set in motion forces still at work today.

This paper will not try to deal with the history of education in Islam or in Afghanistan. Rather there will be an attempt to describe briefly the status of education today in Afghanistan.

In a recent book entitled Others Schools and Ours^{*} Michael King of Oxford University presented a comparative analysis of education in six countries -- France, Russia, India, Denmark, the United States, and England. His comparisons among the educational systems of these countries were conditioned by the sage observation that it is most difficult to make meaningful comparisons when education, like any other aspect of a society or culture, derives from premises, values, purposes, economic factors, cultural factors, and historical roots often peculiar to each country. This fact makes it difficult to understand the educational system of another country or culture particularly if criteria for comparisons and bases for understanding derive largely from conscious or unconscious values learned from a single cultural experience, from having been born, reared and taught in a society quite different from that about which understanding is attempted. Further hindrances to understanding result when the outer appearances of a school system of a given country, as an outgrowth of historical precedents, resembles that of another country or culture.

^{*} Michael King, Others Schools and Ours, New York, 1958, 234 pp.

In a short paper of this kind, words, phrases, and educational terms must be used which have a rather generally accepted meaning to Americans but which may communicate ideas only partially correct or lacking in overtones essential to even an approximation of truth when applied to Afghanistan. The terms classroom, examinations, school, learning, and educational materials are terms we must use, yet it should be realized that they carry somewhat different meanings than when they are applied to American education. An attempt will be made to indicate what some of these differences are and why they must be recognized. In this paper a brief description of the educational setting will be followed by a discussion of major problems, promising developments, and a concluding challenge.

The Educational Setting

Other papers presented in this conference have dealt with characteristics of Afghan society today. Reference will be made to many of those characteristics pertinent to an understanding of the educational system. To begin with a brief sketch of the organizational pattern for education is in order.

The educational system of education is centralized with major leadership and authority vested in the Ministry of Education. The ministry is composed of the following departments: elementary, secondary, vocational (including teacher training at the secondary level), inspection, and publications. Curriculum, teaching methods, teaching materials, supplies, budget, inspection procedures, teacher certification, promotions and demotions are largely decided by the Ministry. In each of the 14 provinces there is a Provincial Director of Education who takes his orders directly from the ministry in supervising secondary, elementary and village schools. Each provincial director is authorized a staff of inspectors who inspect elementary schools, one inspector to each ten schools. The inspector's job is to make sure schools are following the prescribed curriculum, administration of budget and supplies and to rate the teachers for purposes of promotion, rewards and punishments. Recently the inspector's responsibility has been broadened to include supervisory duties including encouraging teachers and helping with their problems. In each school there is a headmaster or director and an assistant headmaster or assistant director if the school is of a certain size, plus a staff of clerks, a storekeeper, a janitor, and sweepers.

Elementary level schools

Elementary education is provided by two kinds of schools, village schools and elementary schools. Village schools are found throughout the country in the small rural communities whose livelihood is largely based on agriculture. They are one-teacher institutions, often taught by a religious leader (mullah) or some other literate person and the curriculum centers on reading, writing, arithmetic, and religious instruction. These schools are outgrowths of the kuttabs mentioned earlier. Most of the teachers have sixth class education and practically none have had any training in teaching. Of the more than 400 village schools in Afghanistan more than 90% are for boys with coeducational schools existing in a few places. In recent years the ministry has opened increasing numbers of schools for girls. Interest in education throughout the country is growing faster than adequate buildings, teaching materials and trained teachers can be supplied. Each year

fewer teachers are graduated than are necessary to replace those retiring, dying or otherwise leaving teaching, to say nothing of staffing the new schools that are opened each year. At present the pupil-teacher ratio in village schools is between 40 and 50 to 1. Only approximately 10% of the graduates of village schools enter the fourth grade of an elementary school for further education.

Elementary schools include grades 1 to 6 and are found in the larger villages and urban centers. The curriculum is composed of religion, Pashtu, Persian, arithmetic, natural science, history, geography, writing, physical training, drawing, handicrafts, and practical agriculture (school gardens). The main purpose of the elementary school program is to prepare for secondary level education with university entrance as the ultimate goal. The rather recent introduction of handicrafts and agriculture represents a beginning recognition of other purposes. Elementary school teachers are variously graduates of the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, a part of which have had some training for teaching as graduates of the Kabul secondary level teacher training school (Dar al-mu'allamin) and/or the winter session initiated five years ago by the Institute of Education.

There are more than 325 elementary schools for boys and approximately 30 elementary schools for girls. Although elementary education is made compulsory in Afghanistan by the constitution, probably less than 10% of the children eligible to enter first grade are actually enrolled in school. To the best of my knowledge no attempt has been made to provide schools for the children of the two million nomads who move from one part of the country to another as the seasons change. Of each 1000 students entering the first grade less than half remain to finish the sixth grade and less than a quarter go on to the middle school.

Middle schools

The middle school is made up of grades 7, 8, and 9 with a curriculum of Pushtu, Persian, Arabic, a foreign language, history, geography, economics, civics, chemistry, physics, biology, mathematics, religion, drawing, handicrafts, and sports. Fourteen of these subjects are studied each year with hours per week for each subject ranging from one hour for sports and drawing to six for the foreign language. Class attendance in these subjects occupies the full day, there being no free periods or study periods. The main purpose of the middle school is to prepare students for admission to secondary academic schools (Lycees), vocational schools, and certain government positions. Only 20% of the students who enter the seventh grade remain in the ninth, the drop-out being due largely to the examination procedures used. On the other hand, a majority of those graduating from the ninth grade are accepted into secondary level schools and a high percentage of the graduates of secondary level academic schools are accepted into the university. It is thought by many that middle schools should be expanded to provide for an expansion of secondary level schools and the possibility of greater selectivity for entrance to the university.

Secondary schools

Secondary schools of the academic type (vocational schools will be dealt with separately) exist largely for the purpose of preparing students for the University of Kabul.

The curriculum for grades 10, 11 and 12 is for the most part a continuation of the middle school curriculum with the addition of Logic. Only 3% of the students beginning the first grade reach secondary schools. Less than 25% of those who enter the secondary schools graduate and most of the graduates enter the University even though many may not be capable of university level work. The greatest development of secondary schools has been in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and many of the students of these schools come from the provinces where there are no secondary schools and live in dormitories in Kabul. In the secondary schools of the provinces English is the accepted foreign language. In Kabul the 4 secondary schools have traditionally been supported by England, the United States, France, and Germany; hence the foreign languages taught include English, French, and German. No secondary level schools exist for girls in the provinces and in Kabul there are three. Teachers in the secondary schools are for the most part graduates of the University of Kabul, Faculties of Letters and Sciences, with no particular training in teaching. In the city of Kabul a number of foreign teachers are teaching, particularly foreign languages.

Vocational schools

Vocational schools include those in arts, crafts, mechanics, commercial, agriculture, civil aviation, schools for the blind, schools for the training of religious leaders, and teacher training. Some of these enroll students from the sixth grade with programs through the ninth grade; others enroll students from the middle schools and have programs through the twelfth grade. Graduates from the School of Theology are admitted directly into the Faculty of Theology of the University of Kabul; graduates from the Vocational Agriculture School and the Afghan Institute of Technology are admitted directly into the Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering respectively. Recently it was decided to admit limited numbers of graduates from the Kabul Teacher Training School (Dar al-mu'allamin) into the Faculties of Letters and Science. Secondary schools in Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad are in the process of conversion into provincial teacher training schools and there is a night school in Kabul for teacher training. Outside the Ministry of Education several thousands of young people are engaged in training programs in civil aviation, finance, village work, accountancy, radio operation, nursing, and, of course, military training.

The University of Kabul

A single university exists in Afghanistan, the University of Kabul. The university is separate from the Ministry of Education; however the President of the university is responsible to the Minister of Education. Beginning in 1932 with the founding of the Faculty of Medicine and including the recently established Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering, Medicine for Women, Economics and Finance, and Pharmacy there are ten Faculties and an Institute of Education founded in 1955. The other Faculties are: Law and Political Science, Theology, Science, Letters, and the Women Faculty of Science and Letters. During 1959 over 1500 students were enrolled in the university (including over 100 women), an increase of approximately 100% over the previous five years. During its history the university (until 1959) has graduated 1142 students.

The curriculum for each faculty is entirely specialized with no general education program. For instance, in the Faculty of Science a student specializing in

physical sciences will take courses only in mathematics and physical sciences. He will have no courses in the biological sciences nor will he have work in any aspect of the liberal arts. A student studying in a given faculty generally takes all his courses in that faculty, there being few cooperative offerings among faculties. The amount of time spent in classes varies widely from faculty to faculty but is generally between 30 and 35 hours per week.

At the present time most of the graduates of secondary academic schools are admitted to the university. The Faculties of Medicine and Law and Political Science enjoy the greatest prestige partly because of their age and partly because graduates from these faculties are likely to achieve prestige roles in Afghan society; hence there is great competition for entrance to these two Faculties and students are often assigned to other faculties against their will.

Due to a farsighted policy of the government beginning many years ago the university staff is composed of a significant number of Afghans educated in several of the leading universities of the world. These professors are supplemented by a number of foreign professors, hired by the Afghan government or supplied by the United Nations and individual western governments, who teach largely through translation except in the newer Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering where the language of instruction is English. Under the leadership of the present president an up-graded salary scale and code of academic behavior are intended to encourage professors to spend full time in academic pursuits -- teaching, research and writing. Economic factors, lack of library facilities and of contact with scholarly developments in other countries, and a lack of an atmosphere supporting academic freedom and creative initiative all tend to discourage imaginative teaching and viable research activities.

During the past five years assistance has been given to the establishment and development of the new Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering by the University of Wyoming. This assistance has been composed of guidance in planning, scholarships for study in the United States, American staff members for teaching and research, and certain equipment and supplies. Since 1955 Teachers College, Columbia University, has assisted in the development of the Institute of Education established for the purpose of providing leadership in the planning and initiating of improved teacher-education programs, educational research, curriculum experimentation, development of teaching supplies and programs of in-service education for Afghan Teachers and training of Afghans for educational leadership. Also, an English language program has been carried on which has assisted in the establishment of an English department in the Faculty of Letters; curriculum and materials for teaching English in secondary schools and the university, and American teachers of English have been supplied.

Problem Areas

From the foregoing brief sketch of education in Afghanistan a number of problem areas are evident. These and others possibly less evident will be briefly discussed below with no attempt to be all-inclusive.

The development of education in Afghanistan is very much in need of a plan -- a plan that concerns itself not only with the number of schools that will be opened each year but also with the kind of country Afghanistan is trying to become; not only with the printing of additional textbooks but also with the kind of person the textbook is intended to help develop. Efforts are now being made at many levels and by many groups of people, Afghan and foreign assistance groups, to improve schools; yet to a large degree these efforts do not add up because there is no commonly understood, clearly thought out, philosophically sound plan to which these groups can look for guidance. Many major questions are unresolved as to the direction educational development should go. These questions include:

1. What is to be the philosophic base of the new Afghanistan? Is it to be traditional Islam which has in many ways lost its meaning for modern living? Is it to be a revived, rethought, reconstructed Islam which harks back to the basic principles of Muhammad and the early centuries of Islam when the Koran, the traditions of the Prophet, and community consensus provided a dynamic basis for the leading civilization of the time? Is it to be something else?
2. What is to be the role of the educational system in producing citizens whose outlook on life is positive and who can contribute to the rethinking of the social, cultural, spiritual values needed in a society being reconstructed.
3. How is the dilemma to be resolved between using limited resources to open more and more elementary schools in an attempt to keep up with public demand for more educational facilities and the needs of the country for higher quality education to provide greatly needed leadership in all fields?
4. How will existing conflicts be resolved as to purposes of education, educational organizational patterns and teaching methods -- conflicts caused largely by the fact that Afghan educators and foreign advisors received their training in the educational systems of various western countries with somewhat diverse educational systems and resulting from the lack of a comprehensive plan that is neither French, American, German, British, or Russian but is Afghan?
5. What should be the major purposes of education today in Afghanistan? Should education be seen as a way of escape from problems and responsibility for them or as a preparation to help solve the problem of the development of the country? If the latter is accepted, how can the curriculum of the schools better reflect this purpose and how can teachers be taught to use methods of teaching which will produce citizens capable of making a real contribution?

The above are only a few of the major questions which seem not to have been thought through by Afghan educational leaders. It is to be understood that to date there

would have been inadequate planning since planning for social change is a sophisticated process that goes awry in many more advanced countries. It is suggested, however, that with increasing numbers of Afghan leaders becoming trained and experienced in planning the time is ripe for developing a national plan for educational development, making use of the best minds in the country and the best advice that can be obtained.

Better Climate for Learning

At present teaching-learning in Afghanistan is largely a matter of dictation of bare facts by the teacher, note-taking by the student, memorization, and recitation by the students. Examinations are given at the end of major periods in the school year and on the basis of the examinations alone students are passed or failed. Examinations are largely subjective, including oral examinations. Students who fail are given a second chance on the final examination. The average classroom is devoid of teaching materials of any kind, except possibly a single text in some subjects. Whatever resources may be available in the way of teaching materials or library resources are likely to be locked away, the store keeper alone has the key, three persons have to witness the opening of the storeroom, and the store keeper is often not available. A book lost has to be repaid ten-fold by the person responsible. Each student has twelve to fourteen subjects to master at any one time and the school day is almost completely spent in classroom teaching.

Under these conditions learning, whenever it is accomplished at all, is likely to be rote learning devoid of real understanding, lacking in the development of inquisitive minds, problem-solving skills, social consciousness, and leadership abilities. Correction of this situation is largely dependent on improved teacher training programs and a revision in the Ministry's system of maintaining strict control of teaching content and methods. Teachers should be rewarded more often for their ability to apply imagination and creativity to their jobs than for following strictly the prescribed program.

Gradually the Ministry is taking steps to create a more favorable teaching-learning climate. Improved teacher education programs are being developed. A considerable percentage of the budget is being expended on the printing of more attractive textbooks through a contract with Franklin Publications in Tehran. Inspectors are being helped to orient their function away from critical evaluation of teacher performance toward the philosophy of supervision with emphasis on helping teachers with their problems and rewarding creativity.

Improved Selection Procedures Needed

A serious problem exists in the methods used to decide which students shall have the opportunity of further study. It will be many years before large numbers of students will be able to obtain a university education in Afghanistan. It will also be many years before universal secondary education will be possible. It is therefore necessary to decide at the end of the elementary school, the middle school and the secondary school who will be given the opportunity to go on to the next level of education. As indicated earlier the number of drop-outs in the elementary and middle schools is so large that practically all the students who survive the secondary schools are accepted into the university. This will

probably change as more middle and secondary schools are opened, making more necessary the use of improved selection procedures for entrance to the University.

In the past the procedure has been to allow each school in the provinces to send its best students on to middle and secondary schools. "Best" students were selected on the basis of their performance on locally administered "subjective" type examinations. No recognition was given to the fact that student No. 1 in a given school might actually be below student No. 10 in another school in another province in ability and achievement. What is needed is a national system of objective examinations aimed at identifying superior students wherever they may be found. These examinations should endeavor to identify basic ability, achievement and vocational interest and aptitude as a basis for deciding not only which students will "go on" to higher education but also to what kind of higher school they will go.

Language Problems

Another area of considerable concern has to do with questions of language. Afghanistan uses two major languages, Persian (Farsi) and Pushtu. For approximately 50% of the people Pushtu is the first language and for the other 50% Persian is the first language, the majority of adult Afghans being bilingual to a degree in these two languages. For reasons of nationalism Pushtu has received increased emphasis during the past several years, Persian having been the major language of education, commercial activity, and government, and remaining so to date. In some parts of the country another language is the first language -- Uzbek, Turkoman, Baluchi, etc. The Ministry of Education's rule of thumb is that the language of instruction (Persian or Pushtu only) in a given school is to be whichever is the first language of a majority of the students. This may mean that 49% of the students in a school are asked to take instruction in a language they have no knowledge of until entering school. Seventy percent of the elementary schools are taught in Persian. Students attending schools taught in Persian have a much better chance of continuing their education. To a considerable degree this reflects the fact that there are far fewer schools in the Pushtu speaking parts of the country and that educational opportunity is largely dependent on geographical-language factors.

Another type of language problem exists at the university level. The principal feeder institutions for the University of Kabul are the four academic secondary schools in Kabul. For two of these (Habibiya Lycee and Ghazi Lycee) English is the foreign language. For another (Istiqlal Lycee) French is the foreign language and for the fourth (Najat Lycee) German is the foreign language taught. In the provinces English is taught as a foreign language. As a result of the dearth of university level library and instructional materials in Persian (even less in Pushtu) the various foreign language backgrounds have been utilized in the instructional program. Also, the availability of foreign professors who teach in their own language is utilized. Hence, at the present time the University of Kabul has classes taught in at least five languages -- French, German, English, Persian, and Pushtu. To a degree the language background of a student is a determining factor in deciding to which Faculty he will go. For instance a knowledge of French is important in the Faculty of Medicine and English in the Faculty of Engineering. The complexity of this situation is obvious and is accentuated as the university moves toward a more unified program.

A translation program to make existing scholarly and instructional materials continually available in Persian or Pushtu seem impractical. Teaching through translation, as is often the case now, is inefficient. The third alternative has been strongly recommended, that the university adopt one western language as the language of instruction and then work through high schools and special preparatory programs to teach a high degree of skill in this language to all prospective university students. Action has not yet been taken on this recommendation.

Status and Training of Teachers

Teachers in Afghanistan are members of the civil service with certain special considerations. Teachers who graduate from the teacher training school receive a small increase in salary. Service for six years as a teacher leads to exemption from military service. Nevertheless the status of teachers in Afghanistan is low. Monthly salaries are in the neighborhood of from \$10.00 to \$25.00 a month depending on level of education, level at which teaching is done, and longevity of service. (\$10.00 to \$25.00 in Afghanistan is not to be compared to \$10.00 to \$25.00 in the United States because of the great differences in expectancies, costs, and standard of living.) Many teachers teach double sessions to increase their salary and most have another source or sources of income. Teaching is rated low in professional choice and students are more than hesitant to attend the teacher training institutions. Large numbers of persons leave teaching every year.

In recent years the Ministry of Education has taken some steps to improve the status of teachers. Through the winter session initiated by the Institute of Education large numbers of teachers have been encouraged to increase their educational level and thereby receive additional salary. Activities of the Institute to raise standards of expectancy and to help teachers throughout the country have contributed to improved morale. Two years ago the Ministry initiated the national celebration of Teachers Day and just recently pictures have been seen of university professors appearing for the first time in caps and gowns.

Other Problem Areas

The five areas of problems discussed above are not exhaustive but illustrative. Other pressing problems are the need for some measure of decentralization in the administration of education, the building of school buildings in greater quantity and quality, improvement of teaching in certain specific areas such as science, reading and writing and creative abilities, the development of greater community support to the schools to replace present reliance on the government, the emergency development of teacher-training programs and the channeling of potentially able persons into these programs, a more adequate supervisory and educational leadership system, a changed philosophy and a system of evaluation in teaching, and the need for more and better school libraries to be used as libraries should be used. All of these problems are, of course, inter-related and must be seen in perspective and approached in appropriate order; hence the need for more significant planning as indicated earlier.

Promising Factors

It would be a mistake to let the existence of many problems in Afghan education obscure the hopeful signs, promising factors, and encouraging new programs underway. In recent years the government has given considerable attention to educational expansion as reflected in the Five Year Plan. The leadership of the present Minister of Education, Dr. Ali Ahmad Popel, is noteworthy in implementing the Five Year Plan. From 1951 to 1958 the total number of all schools, grades 1 through 12, grew from 372 to 859 and total enrollment from 98,282 to 153,719. Since the removal of the chadari (burkha or veil) in 1959 great interest is shown in creating increased educational facilities for girls, including the planning and opening of the first vocational school for girls. Four secondary schools in the provinces have been administratively converted into teacher training schools and a beginning has been made on actual curriculum changes to meet their new function. As indicated earlier during the past five years the university enrollment has doubled.

These are quantitative advances. There are also some qualitative developments.

The Institute of Education

Mention has already been made of the establishment in 1955 of the Institute of Education, first created as a part of the ministry and then moved to the University of Kabul. This new institute was charged with the responsibility of developing improved programs of teacher training, experimentation in curriculum, educational research, educational materials production, and leadership training. Although there have been many problems in bringing this new and revolutionary kind of institution to maturity, it can now be said that the Institute of Education has reached a measure of acceptance and recognition. More and more the university and ministry are turning to the institute for assistance in developing new ideas and meeting new needs of Afghan education.

A brief summary of the unfinished accomplishments of the institute may be in order:

1. Experimental and demonstration programs have been developed in the Kabul teacher training school (Dar al-mu'allamin), the Ibn Sina Junior High School and two elementary laboratory schools associated with the Dar al-mu'allamin. These demonstration programs have dealt with professional teacher education courses, science, social studies, agriculture, English and mathematics education, and the introduction of a "work experience" course at the middle school level.
2. More than thirty Afghan educators have completed or are undergoing a three-phase leadership training program involving a period as a counterpart in the institute, foreign study, and return for assignment as an associate to the institute. All returnees from foreign study have been appointed to positions of leadership responsibility.

3. Six persons from the leadership training program have been placed in Ministry of Education positions with the responsibility of spreading to other schools those new ideas accepted from the institute experimental program in elementary, secondary, and teacher education.
4. Many experimental teaching materials have been developed and tried out and a number have been accepted for use in the schools of Afghanistan, including science textbooks, English texts, and a set of agriculture education materials as well as teacher education materials.
5. Experimentation has been carried on in developing inexpensive teaching aids and supplies, including locally produced chalk, paper-mache globes, and a sunlight film-strip projector which has received recognition around the world. Mr. Muhammad Karim Towfiq, now studying at New Paltz, New York, is largely responsible for the impetus given to the sunlight projector.
6. Teacher education programs have been introduced into the Faculty of Letters and the Faculty of Science of the university for the training of secondary and middle school teachers.
7. A winter-session in-service program for teachers was introduced, has been thoroughly accepted, and several hundred teachers have been upgraded. A winter-session for women teachers has been introduced and developed over the past two years.
8. English curricula and teaching materials for middle and secondary schools have been developed and are currently under revision and expansion under the leadership of the English Language Program staff furnished as a part of the Teachers College team.
9. Workshops and special conferences have been held for teachers, headmasters, and school inspectors. The Inspectors' Manual of Procedures is under revision to help orient the inspector more in the direction of supervision.
10. A beginning has been made in establishing a place for rural education in agricultural areas and a recognition of the importance of rural life throughout the elementary and secondary curricula.
11. Special work has been done in developing new programs in curriculum and teacher training for girls' schools, including establishing a laboratory for home handicrafts.
12. Achievement and ability tests have been developed and experimented with for use at the 6th, and 9th, and 12th grade levels in deciding which students will receive additional education. Of particular interest is the attention that has been given to the entrance examinations and Faculty assignment procedures for the University of Kabul.

13. Co-education has been introduced in the elementary laboratory schools associated with the institute. Women counterparts were assigned to the institute as one of the first steps following the removal of the veil 18 months ago.

These and other new ideas in Afghan education have resulted from cooperative efforts between the Institute of Education, the Ministry of Education and the University of Kabul. As was indicated earlier, the creation of the institute and its development has been assisted by Teachers College, Columbia University, under contract with the International Cooperation Administration of the United States Government. At the present moment proposals are being discussed for an expansion of the ICA assistance to the development of Afghan education,

Vocational Education

A similar program of development in secondary level vocational education has been assisted by ICA through the work of a team from the University of Wyoming. The Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agriculture School have been greatly enhanced in curriculum, teaching staff, equipment, and teaching materials.

As indicated earlier, the University of Wyoming has also assisted greatly in the establishment of the Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering of the University of Kabul, including the training of Afghans to administer and to teach the newly developed programs in the university and secondary level vocational schools.

Educational Materials

To help to satisfy the growing need for better and more educational materials a number of agencies have taken steps. The Ministry of Education has, at great expense, contracted to have large numbers of school textbooks printed in Tehran by Franklin Publications. The Asia Foundation and UNESCO have assisted the Ministry of Education press in printing more and better educational materials. A major problem is the ministry's policy of giving textbooks to the students for home use after they are used a year in the school. However laudable this policy may be in terms of adult and family education it is questionable when there is such a shortage of textbooks in the schools.

There has also been considerable experimentation and support of audio-visual aids to education, particularly film and filmstrips. The Asia Foundation, ICA and UNESCO have assisted in this field but as yet there is not a comprehensive program of audio-visual service to teachers. It is interesting to note that the sunlight projector, mentioned earlier, is presently being produced in quantity for introduction all over Afghanistan with locally produced film-strips.

University Development

In recent years the University of Kabul has enjoyed capable leadership. President Muhammad Asghar and the deans of the various faculties have given considerably of their interest and intelligence to the improvement of curriculum, facilities, and staff.

Particular commendation should be given to the former Dean of the new Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering, Mr. Tooryalay Etemedi, who is now the Educational and Cultural Attache of the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and Mr. Ghulam Hassan Mujaddidi, who has given consistent leadership to the Institute of Education during the past five years.

At present ICA assistance to the university includes the beginning phase of the building of a new campus to provide more adequate facilities and to make possible physical as well as program unification of the total university program.

Special mention should be made of the new department of English which has been brought into being as a part of the Faculty of Letters of the university. The main purpose of this department is to train Afghan teachers of English. A part of the effort of the Teachers College, Columbia University, team effort has gone into the development of this new unit as well as supplying English teachers in various secondary level schools. The second class of the department of English is about to graduate and Afghanistan is on the way to providing her own English teachers. Within a few years American and British English teachers will be needed only for refinements in the program.

Conclusion

This report and this conference have indicated that Afghanistan is on her way. "On her way where?" is the question. A partial answer is found in such phrases as "Afghanistan is in a hurry for modernization," "Afghanistan wants to leave behind her decadent past and join the present-day world," and "Afghanistan, after centuries of being held back is anxious for progress." "On her way where?" is a question that cannot be answered but superficially in terms of industrialization, standard of living, health, or political forms. It is a question which must be answered largely in terms of the basic principles, values, and ideals which support a civilization, which serve to give progress a direction and a quality. What will be the well-spring of spiritual values for individual Afghans of the future, for the new Afghanistan as a nation?

This question is shared by all nations, all cultures in the present-day world. It is pertinent to all underdeveloped countries in a hurry for progress. This question is of particular concern throughout the Islamic world where the basic underpinning of society has been at once a religion and a total way of life and where any change is viewed by many as a challenge to this accepted way of life.

More young people in the Middle East are being educated, are being introduced to the outside world through communications media, through the presence in each country of foreign advisors, through foreign study tours and other means. Their appetites are being whetted for the obvious material benefits of modernization. In their minds an easy connection can be made between traditional culture and backwardness, between Islam and the underdeveloped state of their country. They tend therefore to turn their back on everything of the past and to identify with the future as indicated by what they see of modern countries.

But such young people cannot easily take on more than the superficialities of a new culture. Not many of them can or will become "westernized" to the point of "thinking" and "feeling" as well as "appearing" western. Hence they are caught in between cultures, not accepted fully by either the "old" or the "new." A youth largely rootless can be and often is the result.

To some degree this type of frustrating experience for youth may be the inevitable concomitant and vehicle of change. This idea seems based, however, on two possible misconceptions. One possible misconception is that fundamental guides to progress cannot be found in traditional culture, in Islam. The other is that answers to the many problems of modernization are to be found in western culture. There is much in today's world to give us pause in feeling we are justified in leading underdeveloped countries unquestioningly in the direction we have gone. A close study of Islam and the way of life it produced in its dynamic historical periods might suggest some of the answers to the deeply rooted problems of modern society.

What is suggested, therefore, is the need for a rethinking, a reconstitution in modern terms, a rebuilding on central tenets of Islam which have been lost to sight in the last several centuries. Time will not be taken here to retrace the history of Islam and to cite the factors which led to a dynamic way of life becoming sterile. This fact is recognized today by leading thinkers within Islam and by western orientalists. It is also recognized in the varying paths that have been and are being followed by such countries as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan in attempting to relate technical and industrial progress to the Islamic way of life.

What should be the role of education in this much needed rethinking of cultural and spiritual guides and principles? An American educator once asked an English educator how the English schools handled the teaching of controversial social and political issues. The reply was that the English have no such problem, that nothing more recent than fifty years is ever discussed in school. This is one answer to the role of education in periods of social stress and change. It may be the wrong answer. It would seem that the best minds of each country in the Islamic world should be at work on (1) evoking a new concept of civilization based on but not limited to the old, and (2) the planning and instituting of educational programs needed to prepare young people for the changes to come, to involve them in appropriate ways in bringing about change, and to educate in a way that will equip youth to carry on a continual rethinking of the roots of society.

This may be a much more important challenge to education in Afghanistan than that of finding a way to accelerate steps toward universal elementary education. Unless thought is given to this challenge there seems at the moment to be no adequate answer to the question of where Afghanistan is going. In some Islamic countries modernization or "westernization" may have gone too far to make possible a rethinking of traditional values as a base for progress. In Afghanistan there may yet be time to rediscover, reconstruct, revive, and reinterpret old values in modern terms before superficial imitation of the West has gone beyond the point of no return.

REMARKS ON THE CONFERENCE THEME

H. E. Mohammed Maiwandwal
Afghan Ambassador to the United States

I am overwhelmed with joy to be a participant in this conference for two reasons. Firstly, I see in this university - this well-known cradle of learning, a conference on the current problems of Afghanistan, opening a new horizon, a new frontier of information, for the American people in their knowledge of Afghanistan. Secondly, I feel that this conference opens for us Afghans a window upon the hearts and minds of our American friends. As an Afghan, I have the distinction of serving in this land as my country's representative, and I feel happy on this occasion for both reasons. Thank you, Professor Young; thank you, Princeton University; and thank you, distinguished scholars.

I do not know whether I will be able to add very much to the scholarly deliberations of this conference, but I will venture to impart a few notes on the different aspects which have been expounded and expanded during our discussions. Since yesterday the conference has discussed the geography, history, economy, education, social problems of Afghanistan, the question of Pushtunistan, and matters related to the foreign policy of Afghanistan.

I will, if I may, refer first to the discussions about our geography. This always seems the best place to begin. It has been asked whether Afghanistan is part of South Asia or part of the Middle East. Thus to describe such divisions of our part of the world seems anachronistic. I believe, if a division must be made, it is better to divide it into East and West Asia. Where does Afghanistan fit? Afghanistan is the central knot of these two parts. In this central position in Asia, it is a world within itself - a complete and perfect entity since the beginning of time. This is the reason that Afghanistan has had such a great role in spreading the impacts of historical civilizations to East and West Asia, and to other adjoining areas. Because of this it was called the cross-roads of Asia.

Any study of East Asia must include Afghanistan, but in the same way, a study of West Asia is not complete without including Afghanistan.

I mention this here because I know Professor Young is listening. I hope that in the future Princeton will give some attention to this in her study program.

Although we have always been tied to these two parts of Asia, in the last few decades because of the shadow of colonialism, Afghanistan was cut off from East Asia and the sea routes to the outside world by the British domination in India and by the problems and repercussions that remained after the British had departed from India. In this way, we have been isolated from East Asia. West Asia then was our bridge to European civilization. Happily for us, there were a few independent countries in West Asia with whom we were in competition for modernization. Thus, the blessings of European civilization have come to Afghanistan through West Asia. Its curse has been encountered in the form of colonialist attempts on our borders with East Asia.

It can easily be seen that our location between these two flanks of Asia is of prime importance. We are as important to either side as they are to each other, and they, in turn, are equally important to us. West Asia is our land link with the outside world, while South Asia is our natural outlet to the high seas.

With the same geographical ties, we are also adjacent to the great central asian region of Soviet Russia and the vast territory of China. With both of them we have continued our historical, cultural, and economic relations.

All this proves that Afghanistan has a solid and integral geographic situation, and that the theories of some writers that Afghanistan is an artificial country, designed as a buffer state, are unfounded and false. How can a country that has existed since the beginning of history be an artificial country.

Now, in my remarks about the history of Afghanistan, I will explore further the idea that Afghanistan is a buffer state. I ask you to back track into the history of Afghanistan, and you will see that, as the solid rocks of our country show, we have been an entity since time began. The idea of Afghanistan being a buffer state has been promoted by colonial writers to profane our history. You can see from our history that Afghanistan existed long before these powers reached our borders, and certainly we existed long before many countries even appeared on a world map. Still some venture to call us a buffer state. How can a buffer state exist before there was a mighty empire to be a buffer for? If we were created, we were created by a divine power who created us all; there was no godfather.

It was the British who first applied the label of "buffer state" to Afghanistan. After three unsuccessful attempts to invade the country, they returned and pronounced that Afghanistan was a buffer country. Their previous actions indicate, however, that this was not so. Many followers of this buffer idea use the Wakhan strip as proof. Unfortunately for them, this evidence is not valid. The corridor was not given to Afghanistan. It was a natural part of the country, but the area to the south of that was carved out of ancient Afghanistan by the colonial powers who were unable to conquer the mountainous area in the more inner ranges of the Pamirs.

In these remarks I must state, however, that it would be presumptuous of us to claim that we were stronger than the two mighty empires who were our neighbors. Your studies of Afghanistan will show that the country was not, nor is now, an easy prey for anyone. However, this idea of a buffer state has retarded Afghanistan's development. We were isolated from the outside world, and this was a great loss.

From history, I would like to pass to the economics of Afghanistan. As I have pointed out, we suffered from the "buffer state" idea, and, consequently, our economic development was non-existent. We now have a chance to remedy the past and to try to catch up with the present. This is no easy task, and Afghanistan faces many handicaps. The terrain of the country is difficult, and we are sadly lacking in communications systems and transportation facilities. These must be developed if we are to improve our internal economy and our external commercial relations. Although it is a small country, Afghanistan has problems of over- and under-consumption. To raise the country's standards of

living, we must have a sound development program. In a land-locked country like Afghanistan we must have good transportation facilities if we are not to remain cut off from the rest of the world. We need airports to improve air transportation to and through Afghanistan. The use of our natural resources is another target of our economic development plan. With the promotion of facilities and production from our resources, we can progress on a sound basis. We cannot expect to achieve our goals overnight, but we feel, having completed our first-five year plan, that we are making progress. The buffer state idea may not have helped our development, but we have now reached a stage where our national resistance has entered the struggle for economic development.

Now may I go to education in Afghanistan. A country so backward and so underdeveloped must be educated. Our people are mostly illiterate and our human resources must be trained to take over the heavy responsibilities that are thrust upon them. Our educational program was formerly blocked by the shadow of colonialism with the idea that Afghanistan was a buffer state, but now this is changing. We have supplied elementary education throughout the entire country, more of our people are being educated at higher levels, and we are sending students abroad for further study. We hope eventually to catch up in this vital field. Only then will our economic development and our national stability be founded on reality.

Social conditions will probably change in Afghanistan. Economic development and improved education will inevitably bring this about. That is why we want to develop and to advance: to be able to adapt to these changes as they come. We have made some steps in that direction already, and we want to continue in our noble purpose of advancing Afghanistan.

In regard to foreign policy, neutrality is the policy adhered to in Afghanistan. Neutrality has its own special connotation for us - it is synonymous with independence. We are determined to remain independent and neutral. We do not take sides in cold war issues. We do not want to add to the problems of the cold war or to aggravate it. Our attitude is to remain aloof and abstain from cold war involvement. We were not neutral toward colonialism, however, and will always side with those fighting for independence. It is logical then that we supported the cause of Indian independence. We are not neutral where national interest or sovereignty are concerned; and we will fight against poverty and for the blessings of life.

Being neutral does not mean that we adopt a negative attitude. Those who think that our neutrality is a continuation of the buffer idea or that we are remaining stagnant, are wrong. Our attitude is positive because we want to be friendly and to promote good will with all nations of the world. We want to maintain our active place and improve life in the present world.

In explaining this neutrality, may I venture a word on the problem of "Pushtunistan" and our relations with our neighbors. We do not have the happy relationship with Pakistan that we would like. Unfortunately it is not possible to have one-sided good will. You have discussed the "Pushtunistan" problem in the conference, and I ask you to do one thing: go back into the history of Afghanistan and try to put yourself in the place of an Afghan. I think you will find that you have much the same feelings as we have on this

matter of such national importance. I would like to say publicly that we are ready to co-operate in any way that will ensure and guarantee the economic, cultural, social, and political aspirations of the people of "Pushtunistan." Of course, a consideration of the political aspirations of these people is of prime importance.

With Iran we have happy relations. It has only been the apportionment of water, which is a problem of a technical nature between ourselves and Iran, that has not been settled. We have always had good will in our attempts to solve this problem. I would like to emphasize the fact that we have a feeling of good will for our neighbors to the south. We are cognizant of the fact that our good relations with Pakistan and Iran are vitally important, but I remind you again that we have rejected the colonial buffer idea and we resent being cornered into forgetting our integral rights and problems pertaining to our national honor.

We have happy relations with the Soviet Union, and have had ever since we became neighbors. The Soviet Union is helping us in our economic development. We remain assured that we can accept any foreign assistance free from political strain. Our motive is to build our country to maintain our independence, and this is our reason in accepting any offer of aid. We have good relations with China, and these have been strengthened in the past few years.

I come now to the pleasant duty in my remarks: to United States-Afghan relations. Here I would like to speak as friend to friend. I do not feel that your country or government demand from us flattery, compliments, or words that might serve newspaper purposes in cold war propaganda. I see better motives in your friendship. Our relations with the United States are always in our minds. These have existed from the beginning of our diplomatic relations with the foreign world since our independence. After many years of perseverance, we finally established diplomatic relations with the United States.

The United States aid and assistance program started in Afghanistan in 1950. I would like to divide this assistance program into two parts, before and after 1955.

The first amount of aid offered to us was \$100,000. Later this was increased to \$300,000. When first these token amounts of aid were offered, we debated whether or not to accept them. We felt we were being undervalued and not accepted with the importance with which we felt ourselves worthy. However, we hoped for improvement in the future. Prior to 1955, whenever we needed your cooperation in our development program, we were reminded of two things: first, of our so-called capacity for absorption; and, second, that the United States felt that as we were not in any group or military alliance, aid could not be accelerated. Nevertheless, the door was never closed. We needed military equipment for our national security and were shopping for this equipment; but, for reasons unknown to me until now, we were unable to get it.

The amount of aid given by the United States has increased since 1955 in the form of commitments, but there have been many delays in the actual accomplishments. This, I am sure, is not due to any lack of good will. Yet whatever the reasons, the effect was that the aid program was slowed down and delayed.

The United States' aid to Afghanistan has been governmental aid. So far aid or assistance directly from the people has not begun in any substantial manner. There are many areas in which your people could be directly interested, mainly in trade and investment. You do send us used clothes, but surely you can do better than that. We can buy many things that we need badly--tools, instruments, and machinery to be used in developing our rural and urban areas. This kind of trade can be developed by soliciting orders, not only by receiving them.

Also included in this area is the field of investment. There is at present no private American investment in Afghanistan. You may say that conditions do not encourage such investment. However, we have signed a mutual agreement which guarantees American investment in Afghanistan. In spite of this, at the present time, there are no such investments. True, Pan American Airways is there, but Afghanistan is the only country where there is no American Express Agency, no Pan American ticket office. Further may I add that the non-profit philanthropic organizations in the United States that have undertaken activities all over the world have not yet moved into Afghanistan, with the exception of the Asia Foundation. Neither the Rockefeller nor the Ford Foundations have projects in my country. Only very recently has CARE started a helpful program there. We also need more attention in your media of education and public information about Afghanistan and our future mutual relations.

The areas of future economic aid to Afghanistan can easily be earmarked. They are the fields of education, the second economic development plan, which will require about \$7,000,000, and the Helmand Valley project. All of these are multi-annual programs and need long term commitments. In regard to the Helmand Valley project, the additional development of the lower Helmand is a must for the project to be beneficial.

America is a country that has been blessed with great bounties and because of this she bears an obligation to those who have not been so well blessed. She should not look around at the world and wonder what it can do for her, she should wonder what she can do for it.

I would like to mention political relations also. We were very happy when President Eisenhower visited Afghanistan. We were assured of the good will and continued interest of the United States. We appreciated this and the moral support and assistance we have received.

I would like to add that the fine gesture we received from the United States in the person of Ambassador Byroade is deeply appreciated. We do not think in terms of money; at heart we are a sentimental people and appreciate quality. We rely on the moral and high quality; we look upon these two as the basis of our national cause.

FOREIGN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND AFGHANISTAN

Francis J. Swayze

Since the end of the last war, the government of Afghanistan has consistently pursued a policy of encouraging the economic and social development of its country. Large sums of national surplus, as well as borrowed and contributed capital, have been devoted to this end. On the whole this program has been well planned. First attention has been given to immediate strengthening of the natural agricultural and grazing economy of the country. Manpower resources have been broadened by education at home and abroad. Exports of domestic products have been encouraged together with the production of import substitutes to improve the balance of trade and make available additional capital. The program contemplates the establishment or improvement of energy sources, transportation and communication facilities, and other elements which form the necessary foundation of mechanized industry and a market economy. Surveys and explorations have been undertaken to locate natural resources for exploitation. All of this and more has gone into a sustained effort which has taxed the resources of the country in money and manpower to the utmost.

The beneficial results of this policy are readily apparent to the observer who has watched the development of Afghanistan over a span of years. To the guiders of its destiny and perhaps to many of its people in the wrenching process of social and economic transition, progress must have seemed painfully slow. And it is the bitter truth that despite all this devoted effort and careful administration of scanty surplus, Afghanistan is still at a rather early stage of economic development judged by the standards of modern industrial civilization and even by comparison with its more prosperous neighbors.

In pursuing its policy of development, the government of Afghanistan has not neglected the role which can be played by private funds and private enterprise. Continued attempts have been made to stimulate the accumulation of surplus private funds for investment. Construction and industrial banks have been organized to provide loan capital for such enterprises. In many cases the government through the central bank or other agencies has participated in the ownership or provided long-term loans for the private sector. As in the public sector, however, the resource base in capital, management, and technical ability has been so restricted that progress has been slow. Further injections of money and skills will be required before the bulk of private enterprise can rise above the level of the cottage and the bazar.

The government of Afghanistan has realized that the country simply does not have the surplus money and skills for rapid development of private enterprise and that it must look outside the country for help. Help of the kind and in the amount desirable has not yet materialized and is badly needed. What can be done to encourage foreign private enterprise in Afghanistan? What are the problems of establishment and operation of such an enterprise and how can they be solved?

Before examination of some of the tangible problems it will be helpful to appraise the attitudes of the parties involved which have a direct bearing upon the problems and possible roads to solution. There is little question of the desire of the Afghan government to encourage private enterprise to the fullest possible extent. This has been repeatedly expressed by high government officials. The policy has taken concrete form in the establishment of banking facilities and in ownership participation. It is, in fact, inherent in the basic Afghan traits of rugged independence and individual self-reliance. The fact that a measure of public funds have been channeled into activities which in more developed states are normally in private hands is commonplace in developing countries and not a reflection of policy. This is true also of currency controls and export-import regulations which have been imposed to conserve foreign exchange and direct it and surplus purchasing power into areas of immediate necessity under the development plan.

A concrete expression of the government attitude towards foreign enterprise can be found in the Foreign Investment Law of November 1958 which replaced the earlier and less favorable law of April 1954.¹ This document which is a model of its kind has been appended to this paper for reference. Three portions are of particular interest. The first is Article 4, which directs that investment shall be in "productive projects" with priority given to "projects which would increase the country's foreign exchange earnings or result in the saving thereof." The second is found in Articles 9 and 10 which provide for establishment of a high level "Investment Committee" with broad functions to facilitate, encourage, and promote foreign investment. Article 11 contains a provision that foreign investors shall employ and provide training for Afghans "whenever and wherever possible."

The attitude gathered from this law and other acts and declarations of the Afghan government is one of welcome to foreign private enterprise provided it is productive in nature, can contribute if possible a net foreign exchange gain, and is designed in the long run to promote maximum employment of Afghans and improvement of managerial and technical skills. It is interesting to note that the law specifically mentions mining as one of the fields in which foreign investment may be made.² This differs from the attitude in many developing nations which have become disillusioned with the benefits of extractive industries under colonial regimes.³ Controlled development of mineral resources, however, makes sense for Afghanistan.

The type of private enterprise particularly desired is not the seller or supplier of goods but the builder or producer who is prepared to lock in with the Afghan economy on a long-term basis and actively contribute to its development. It is, as characterized by Mr. Vance Brand in a recent address: "American free enterprise in its traditional role with all the force of its creativeness, its use of know-how, its participation in equity..."⁴ Foreign traders, merchants, importers, and exporters have a history of

1. Law Encouraging the Investment of Private Foreign Capital in Afghanistan, promulgated November 11, 1958.

2. Article 4.

3. See Benveniste and Moran, African Development, Stanford Research Institute, 1960, p. 88.

4. Address to Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce by Mr. Vance Brand, Managing Director, Development Loan Fund, January 5, 1961.

contribution to the traditional economic activity of Afghanistan extending back beyond the days when Balkh, the mother of cities, was queen of the great trade route through the Oxus Valley. Their counterpart today operating in a broader range and scope are the European and Asian trading companies which now form the bulk of foreign private enterprise in Afghanistan. They perform a most important function but they do not contribute to the formation of capital, the establishment of productive facilities, and the development of manpower resources which is so urgently needed.

The attitude of the foreign businessman towards investment or operations in a developing area is basically as simple as the problems of deciding to embark upon the enterprise and carrying it forward are complex. As businessman his fundamental interest, and indeed his only chance of survival and growth, lies in making a reasonable profit upon the money and effort expended upon a particular enterprise. This is a legitimate interest in any case. Where the businessman is manager of a corporate enterprise based upon accumulations of capital funds invested by others either as equity or loan, it is a professional duty as well. There are, of course, other subsidiary motives which go into the attitude of private enterprise towards foreign operations. Business is conducted in the end by human beings who are not always cold blooded, calculating, and logical in their approach to decisions. The American businessman has a heritage of adventure in new territories from the days of the expanding frontier. He undoubtedly has national as well as personal and professional interests at heart. He may be inclined to be adventurous or romantic, a gambler or a conservative. Even large corporations have an individual style which conditions their approach to opportunities for expansion. In the end these traits may sway the balance but always at the bottom must be the profit motive. If it is not there, it is not private enterprise.

What may be considered a reasonable profit will, of course, vary widely depending upon the nature of the enterprise and the amount of risk. It should certainly not be less than the return on capital which can be realized under normal conditions at home. In situations where the chance of loss is great and substantial investment in immovable assets is required, the businessman will rightly expect a larger return on and a more rapid amortization of the investment.

Both the profit motive and the amount of profit desired under certain circumstances can lead to misunderstanding between private enterprise and national governments. As has been noted by Dean Courtney Brown of Columbia, private enterprise, particularly in undeveloped areas, has always had a record of association with long-term country growth.⁵ Traditional trading and finance have concentrated on short run maximum profits. Extractive industries have on occasion been operated with minimum benefits to the economy of the country. In nations unused to the concepts of finance involved in modern industrial operations, the difference between a trading venture with its modest short-term financial needs and a long-term productive enterprise with its requirement for large scale investment is not always clearly understood. Frequently this results in a feeling that government and government financed operation is somehow of a higher order than private enterprise. This can cause misunderstanding particularly in countries where there have

5. Dean and Mrs. Courtney C. Brown, Journey Toward Understanding, Lane Press, 1958.

been large scale infusions of national or contributed funds into development programs.

In summary at this point, Afghanistan is engaged in a struggle to develop the country out of its traditional subsistence economy into an expanded market economy. This has strained its resources of men and money to the utmost. It badly needs and would welcome contribution from foreign private enterprise. This basic policy while somewhat qualified by a traditional fear of foreign exploitation or domination and by a suspicion or misunderstanding of the profit motive has found concrete expression in a favorable foreign investment law. The enterprise desired is of a long range productive nature. Private enterprise of this nature of industrial nations is prepared to embark upon investment and operations in developing countries such as Afghanistan provided there is a reasonable expectation of profit commensurate with the risk involved.

There is an obvious community of interest here. What problems have prevented a more substantial contribution by foreign private enterprise to the growth of the Afghan economy?

The most immediate problem is undoubtedly the lack of knowledge or misconception which exists concerning the political, economic, and social conditions in Afghanistan today. The quantity of money available for private enterprise overseas while enormous in the aggregate is not unlimited. The resources of individual enterprises are even more restricted. There are very many opportunities in dozens of countries. The businessman will normally be able to select only one or a few of these opportunities for expansion and his choice will naturally be the most favorable, all things considered. But before he can make a choice he must decide which are worth investigation.

In the case of Afghanistan this preliminary decision to take a look is a difficult hurdle indeed.

In the first place there is little accurate and timely information available. The best general political history of the country is over seven years old and its coverage of the last thirty years is rather scant.⁶ Travellers' tales abound but these are generally marked by spirited inaccuracy and personal anecdote rather than factual information. In any case they tend to become bemused with the interesting problems of social development and political conflict which may be illuminating but not directly helpful in resolving this particular problem.

The publications of the United States Department of Commerce which are frequently a reliable source of economic information are not too helpful here. The latest production available is over three years old.⁷ This is a sizeable time gap in the case of

6. William K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, 1953. Its narrow scope makes it of doubtful value for business interests.

7. Basic Data on The Economy of Afghanistan, World Trade Information Service, Part 1, No. 55-74, January 1958.

Afghanistan. It contains some valuable information but shows signs of weak factual base. The population estimate is between 8 and 12 million, city populations are rounded off to the nearest 100,000 and per capita income is estimated at between 30 to 60 dollars. These figures make an appraisal of domestic market possibilities rather difficult. Further, there is an alarming absence of any statistics on trade with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and other east bloc countries although reputedly this may have constituted as much as 30% of Afghanistan's international trade at that time.

Specialized studies on various aspects of the Afghan economy with more timely and accurate data and evaluations do exist. Unfortunately these are widely scattered and not readily available. Again it should be emphasized that private enterprise has limited risk capital and many opportunities. Some of these actively solicit its attention with the encouragement of the national government. These naturally command its first attention.

Beyond this there appears in the world press material which is a positive detriment to interesting private enterprise. It has become a journalistic cliché to picture the current situation in Afghanistan as a mere continuation of the "great game" of the days when the country was considered a buffer state between the imperial power centers of Russia and the British Raj.⁸ This is convenient and colorful, but if it has an element of truth, it is far from the whole truth. Afghanistan today stands on her own feet. With her slender resources of capital, she must needs accept the proffers of aid from other nations if she is to entertain any prospects of rapid development. This aid is not, of course, entirely disinterested but, while it would be foolish to deny the political interests involved, it seems equally foolish to consider the country, which may at any time fall victim to a major power, as a mere pawn in the cold war.

To the businessman interested in political stability as a basis for long-term enterprise these widespread opinions can be a major deterrent in deciding to investigate opportunities in Afghanistan.

Having decided to go ahead despite the lack of accurate knowledge or misconceptions prevalent on Afghanistan, the next problem is the inconvenience and "high cost of taking a look." This is technically known as development expense and it is a very real problem in the case of smaller enterprises involving, say, less than a million dollars investment. Even large corporations with many millions available to invest are loath to spend the time of skilled manpower, and its transportation and travel expense, in research of an enterprise unless they have sufficient advance information to suspect a possibility of success. This problem has been recognized by the Development Loan Fund, International Cooperation Administration and other United States government agencies in organizing conferences attended by foreign governments and representatives of United States industry

8. See James Morris, "Country of the Great Game", Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 30, 1960; and, by the same author, "Dangerous Game in Afghanistan", Saturday Evening Post, October 8, 1960. For a more restrained view, see Peggy and Pierre Street, "Battle in The 'Peaceful' Cold War", New York Times Magazine, October 23, 1960.

to consider specific enterprises.⁹ It has also been made the subject of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund West Africa Program.¹⁰

In the case of Afghanistan it is accentuated by difficulties of transportation, communication, and accommodation, by the lack of readily available sources of information, and by the slowness of decisions in undermanned and overworked government bureaus.

At this point, in order to identify more clearly the particular problems facing private enterprise in Afghanistan it may be helpful to develop them from the viewpoint of an American businessman who is attempting to appraise the chances of success at first hand.

While air service between Afghanistan and its neighbors has vastly improved both in quality and regularity in the past few years, the country is not yet served by the through schedules of trunk carriers. Travel by road from Pakistan still has an element of adventure and physical strain, despite continued improvement of the road between Peshawar and Kabul with the assistance of American aid. The businessman will note well the difficulties and delays of surface transport clearance at the Pakistan border. He will learn that except for the air cargo service of the Afghan airline, this is the only practical route for import from the West of machinery and raw materials and other necessities of industrial enterprise not produced or available in the northern provinces of the country. In considering possible energy sources beyond the slender excess of electrical power currently available at Kabul and Baghlan, he will find that petroleum products in the north are of Soviet origin and must be expensively trucked down through the awesome gorges of the towering Hindu Kush range. The quality of this fuel, while within limits, is not up to Western standards and may cause trouble for internal combustion engines. He will be told and perhaps find out for himself that beyond the trunk roads, high clearances and preferably four-wheel drives are preferred even in the good season and are a necessity during the winter rains or snows.

In short, the businessman in evaluating the basic necessities of an industrial or marketing enterprise will find that the transportation infrastructure is still in the formative stage. Improvement is on the way but it will be a few years before he can rely upon a smooth flow of materials, a rapid and economic distribution of product, and above all on the close knit, homogeneous market which is an essential feature of marketing the product of industry.

Communications will be a second major problem. There is now telephone service between Kabul, Europe, and the United States on an infrequently scheduled basis. The businessman will soon learn, however, that service between the provincial capitals either does not exist or is subject to long delays and frequent breakdowns. In pleasant contrast he will discover an efficient modern dial system in Kabul. The domestic telegraph, however, moves at the pace of automotive traffic. An exchange of airmail letters with the United States home office may well take two or three weeks and cables as much as four days. Modern industry moves only on a sound basis of transportation and rapid and accurate communication and the latter feature has far to go in Afghanistan.

9. Vance Brand, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

10. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *Annual Report*, 1959.

The next problem encountered on arrival at Kabul may seem a minor one but it is very real for an enterprise which must plan to staff an operation with some foreign talent, at least in its early days. This is the lack of satisfactory hotel accommodations in Kabul and the shortage of housing at reasonable rents to accommodate staff for extended periods of time.

Having noted these initial problems, the businessman will then attempt to assemble as much information as he can to enable him to judge the prospects of a successful enterprise. Basically the things he would like to know are those which would be required by a foreign lending institution such as the International Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, or the Development Loan Fund. An excellent presentation of factual material required can be found in a recent publication of the Stanford Research Institute¹¹ and Development Loan Fund has produced a similar, more generalized guide for its loan applications. The list is a long one. In the case of countries where there is even a short-lived tradition of foreign enterprise and financing much of this material of a general nature will be readily available. The businessman will soon discover, however, that this is not the case in Afghanistan. Many of the things he would like to know are not known at all and most of the others can be determined only imperfectly by laborious recourse to various sources.

This will not only make it difficult for him to make a decision but in itself will present a serious future problem if, as is likely, he will be looking for external loan capital to participate in financing his enterprise. As is said in the Stanford Report:¹²

"Therefore, the prospectus should include all the information upon which the promoters rely to justify the soundness and profitability of the particular project, together with all known conditions or circumstances existing in the country which will have a bearing on the establishment and operation of the business enterprise. It should be borne in mind by the promoters that in every overseas investment there are risks in addition to those usually associated with a local investment. Therefore, there are more subjects to be covered in a prospectus requesting foreign participation than normally would be required regarding a project to be financed locally."

The italics are ours. This is a rather large bill of goods. It is even larger in a country so little known to the outside world as Afghanistan.

The first problem to be tackled will be an evaluation of the stage of economic development of the country and of the prospects and rate of future progress. Here the businessman will probably decide that despite the active program which has been pursued by the government since the war, the country is still in an early stage of economic growth. In the last five years, however, the rate of capital formation has been increased and accelerated through liberal loans and grants from the United States and the Soviet Union. Technical

11. Harry J. Robinson, International Private Investment: A Guide to Prospectus Preparation, Stanford Research Institute, 1960.

12. Harry J. Robinson, op. cit., p. 3.

cooperation projects, education at all levels, and social service projects have all been vastly increased in scope and diversity. Substantial progress is apparent. But the businessman who is making the acquaintance of the country for the first time is likely to be impressed with the fact that on the whole the country is still struggling to emerge from its traditional economic pattern of agriculture, animal husbandry, rug manufacture, trading, and small and comparatively primitive industry. He will find that the bulk of export earnings still come from the traditional commodities of karakul, cotton, fruit, wood, wool carpets, and sausage casings. He will note the narrow range and technical crudity of the products of small industry. He has already experienced the difficulties of transportation and communication and at this point he is likely to form a tentative conclusion that the risks of private enterprise are great.

At the same time, if he is wise, he will consider the strong contrasts of old and new which show that the wind of social change and the growing warmth of basic economic progress is in the air. The co-pilot and perhaps the pilot of his airplane may be an Afghan who a year or two ago had not even flown. In the cabin are bales of karakul, coils of cable, tons of sausage casing, or dozens of electric refrigerators moving between Afghanistan, the Mediterranean ports, or central Europe in hours instead of months. On the road the nomad camel trains are passed by modern five-ton trucks with a tribesman at the wheel. At an airport site a bulldozer manned by a young Afghan complete with cigarette and baseball cap moves mountains with cheerful and contemptuous skill. In Kabul a young Afghan girl who discarded the veil only a scant year ago rides a bicycle to secretarial school. These are small signs of a great change - a leap forward, if you will. The long slow period of development of the elements of an industrial infrastructure is coming to an end. Transportation, communications, energy, public administration, extractive mining, cement, textiles, plantation crops, skilled and educated manpower are all at hand, or nearly so, in varying degrees of quantity and quality; yet many are still coming into being. Is it time for private enterprise?

This very process of development in the public sector has created one most serious problem for private enterprise by preempting capital surplus of funds and manpower. Experience has shown the necessity for a close association with local ownership and management to ensure maximum chance of success. In his discussions with public officials, bankers, and others, the businessman will find many reservations on the possibility of securing local equity capital to join in and strengthen his enterprise. He will learn that domestic and contributed public funds have been almost entirely absorbed by the first five-year plan in allocations to basic development projects. It is impossible to estimate the amount of private domestic funds available for long-term investment although there is said to be a substantial moneyed class. Yet despite the determined efforts of the government to channel this money into long-term investment in native enterprise, the bulk of it is probably still tied up in short-term financing of agricultural production and trading operations or is in real estate investment of a speculative nature. These are traditional fields in which the Afghan investor finds himself comfortable and assured of a quick turnover and a high return.

The Afghan banks, in all of which the Government holds a majority interest and whose operations are controlled by Da Afghanistan Bank, which is wholly a government institution, can take equity interest in private corporations. They are empowered to make loans to private enterprise including foreign persons or corporations. Here again, there is an extreme shortage of money for either long-term investment or loan and the usual loan

operation is over a short period at interest rates on the order of 8 to 10%. In discussing financing with the Afghan bankers, however, the businessman will learn of an important feature of operations in Afghanistan. This is the extremely centralized, almost personal control, by high-level government personages of all economic development activity. He will be told that if the Government approves of his enterprise, whatever necessary will be done. Despite the shortages, equity, or long-term loans, money will be found and the path through the mazes of bureaucracy made pleasant and easy. This may be both comforting and disconcerting. The American businessman well understands the value of personal relationships in business but he is more accustomed to the beneficial operation of such relationship within the framework of the well understood institutions of a modern commercial nation founded on free enterprise.

In exploring the possibilities of external loans he will find that while the Development Loan Fund has granted a loan to finance the purchase of new equipment for the Afghan airline, this has not yet been made final because of the lack of agreement on the use of funds repaid under the loan. Still the precedent exists and if the loan is successfully concluded it will open up a new area of financing.

The manpower shortage noted above will prove a most critical problem. There is presently no surplus of educated high-talent manpower in Afghanistan and among the ranks of educated persons very few have any knowledge or talent for business administration. Access to higher education and in particular to training overseas is subject to some measure of control by the government which continues to influence the choice of employment after graduation. Available graduates are still few in number and are eagerly snapped up by government bureaus and organizations created and operating under development plans. Once located, such men are comparatively immobile for it is difficult to change jobs without the consent of their employer. Those few men available for employment by private enterprise are likely to be the malcontents or persons with little talent.

While Afghanistan is surprisingly free of social or religious stigma, it would still be wise to give careful consideration to the social standing and religious sect of those selected for higher positions in private enterprise. This further limits the field of manpower available in this particular category.

Skilled men for technical or clerical operations are few in number. In the past this gap has been filled to some degree by manpower imported from India. Even if agreeable to the Afghan government, this is an unsatisfactory solution for private enterprise. In this category, however, the businessman will find that many Afghans have a natural aptitude for technical skills which can be developed with a moderate amount of intensive training. This has been clearly demonstrated in the machine shops of Morrison-Knudsen and in the aircraft and engine maintenance shops of Ariana Airlines. Clerical work comes harder. Unlike the Indian, the Afghan does not take kindly to the office work and the endless paper routine which seems to be indispensable to modern business. There is some hope here in the aspirations of emancipated young Afghan women for an independent life. Since the first Ariana flight stewardesses discarded the veil on July 5, 1959, more and more Afghan girls are found in office jobs. While there is an element of novelty in this, it seems sure to settle down into a pattern which will provide a valuable pool of workers for clerical and even productive tasks.

Both money and manpower are in short supply but there seems hope for improvement in the near future. Transportation, communications, and energy resources are developing with the aid of public capital. How about the materials necessary for production and a market for the product?

As Professor Michel has pointed out in a preceding article, the agricultural and animal husbandry material resources are well known and their development as a future base has been planned. Exploration and survey of possible mineral resources has been the subject of an active program. This has apparently not yet located important deposits with the possible exception of an oil strike in the north. Known resources are a slender base for development. If these resources are insufficient for its particular purpose, private enterprise must import raw or semi-processed materials. This brings the businessman face to face again with the problems of transportation both physical and political. Improvement of the physical problem of safe and speedy transportation from the port of Karachi is the subject of the transit project, a cooperative effort between the governments of Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakistan. Progress on this has been slow but when completed it will greatly facilitate the import and export of produce. Meanwhile, the difficulties and delays of surface transport are a serious problem for any enterprise in Afghanistan.

The political problem resulting from friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan will also hopefully be solved. As long as it continues, the businessman will be faced with the risk of transit slowdown or even border closing. Both are unpleasant to contemplate where there is a large fixed investment and basic operating cost.

Air cargo operations such as have been successfully used for the carriage to Puerto Rico of semi-processed goods for finishing and sale or reexport is a possibility but the cost is high and the product must be assured of a good market to carry this expense.

The present Afghan market is thin. Aggregate purchasing power is low and largely devoted of necessity to products necessary for existence. Communication and intercourse among the varied ethnic and tribal groups is just beginning to get underway. An urban market is developing but this also is still by and large on a subsistence level. The emancipation of women should have an immediate effect upon the growth of this market. There is little doubt that in time there will grow up something approaching the broad base market which will support substantial mechanized industry. At present, however, industry based on a domestic market must either cater to a basic country-wide need such as textiles or content itself with small scale operation. There is undoubtedly some scope for service enterprises which can count on the foreign community or foreign visitors as a substantial part of its market. Such activity should not be disparaged as this local but non-Afghan market can contribute to the establishment of enterprises which in the long run will become integrated into the Afghan economy.

As a result of his investigations, the businessman may summarize the most important difficulties as follows: the problem of the current stage of Afghan economic development and its future prospects; of a shortage of local equity money with which to associate; of securing long-term loan money either locally or from external sources; of a scarcity of management and technical skills; of unknown material resources, uncertain

transportation and communications, and a shortage of energy for industrial purposes; and of a widely dispersed local market of uncertain purchasing power. Balanced against these he can tabulate certain plus factors perhaps equally important: the Afghan government is stable and has consistently followed a sensible program of economic and social development; there are indications that this program is about to break through into a new stage of progress; there will be a gradual increase in surplus educated manpower available to staff management and supervisory positions in foreign operations; improved air and surface transportation and communications will open up new markets in the hinterland and consolidate existing markets; social evolution now underway will create an urban work force; the accelerated economic tempo must produce accumulations of private funds which can be tapped for equity capital; emancipation of women and improvement in per capita income will further broaden the market; there is a good foreign investment law and there is agreement permitting guarantee of investments by the International Cooperation Administration as to convertibility, expropriation, and war risk; and the attitude of the Government towards foreign private enterprise of a productive nature is favorable.

This then in broad terms is the business climate in Afghanistan. The foreign businessman must now make his own decision as to whether to proceed or no.

Until now American private industry has been slow to consider operations in Afghanistan and there has been very little activity. Morrison-Knudsen has, of course, a long record of construction work financed by the Afghan and United States Governments. Since 1957, Pan American has held a 49% interest in Ariana Airlines. Indamer Corporation is engaged in trading and service operations and plans to enter into agricultural production using mechanized equipment. These three companies represent American private enterprise. Other corporations such as Standard Vacuum and Intercontinental Hotels have expressed interest and even made preliminary steps toward an Afghan enterprise but without concrete results to date.

The reason for this slow progress in development of foreign enterprise undoubtedly lies in the serious problems discussed above. Now that the Afghan economy is approaching the stage when such enterprise in wider fields has a better chance of success, certain positive steps are suggested to encourage and promote its contribution.

The machinery for some of these exists in the foreign investment law cited above. Various government ministries are empowered to take other steps. It only requires a concerted drive for action.

1. The government, if it has not already done so, might, under the five-year plan, reserve a certain amount of capital funds for investment or loan to foreign private industry either specifically or in general. This could be administered through the existing banking institutions.
2. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Commerce, the Investment Committee might intensify its function as an information and liaison office with a permanent secretariat. Accurate and up-to-date

translations of laws and regulations governing the conduct of private enterprise should be provided. Reliable basic statistical data should be accumulated.

3. The Ministry of Planning might allocate certain specified fields of activity to the private sector and actively solicit and facilitate investigation by reputable foreign firms of opportunities for investment.
4. The Ministry of Education could build into its plans a specific program for education either at home or abroad of a reasonable number of selected students in the field of business management and administration.
5. A loan to existing development and industrial banks could be negotiated with the Development Loan Fund to provide dollar financing for modest enterprises. This has been explored but no action taken.
6. A program similar to that established by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in West Africa could be sponsored by the Government to develop specific opportunities and bring them to the attention of American enterprises interested in the particular field.
7. With the United States Department of Commerce, an up-to-date book of basic information for United States businessmen could be developed as a part of its "investment in" series.

These are representative of steps which could be taken immediately and should have a most favorable effect in promoting increased activity by foreign private enterprise in Afghanistan.

It is hoped that this brief and general discussion of a rather complex proposition may be helpful in promoting the establishment of sound foreign private enterprise in Afghanistan. For the long run there are immeasurable benefits to be gained by all concerned. And finally, despite the many problems he will encounter, the businessman can be assured that on the whole it is a great pleasure to do business in Afghanistan. The people are hospitable, courteous, charming and possessed of a rare and delightful sense of humor in their approach to business and private affairs. The physical aspects of the country are magnificent, the climate in the highlands unsurpassed. Beyond this there can be a very real sense of satisfaction in making a solid contribution to the emergence of a proud and independent nation into the world of today.

Acknowledgments

In the course of several years of close association with the problems of private enterprise in Afghanistan, including eighteen months residence in Kabul, I have been able to uncover very little factual material on this subject. What there is is of a general nature and not in readily available form. Therefore much of the material herein is based on conversations with knowledgeable persons and I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the following, among others:

H.E. Mr. Ghulhan M. Sherzade, Minister of Commerce;
H.E. Mr. Abdul Hai Aziz, Deputy Minister of Planning;
H.E. Mr. A. Karim Hakimi, Deputy Minister of Finance
and President of the Afghan Air Authority;
Mr. Faiz Mohammed Ahmedzai, President, Ariana Afghan Airlines; and
Mr. Abdullah Yaftali of the Ministry of Planning, formerly President
of the Government Monopolies Department.

Among helpful documents, in addition to those cited in the text, have been the 1959 Progress Report of the Ministry of Planning, a report of the International Monetary Fund on the Afghan Multiple Exchange System, the Tudor Report to the International Cooperation Administration on the Helmand Valley Development, and a Prospectus of Indamer Corporation.

Thanks are due to the able Public Administration Service team for making available a translation of the Foreign Investment Law of 1958, the Afghan Commerce Law, and their proposal for codification on the Income Tax Law of Afghanistan.

I have read with interest the article of Mr. Louis Dupree on American Private Enterprise in Afghanistan published by the American University Field Staff on December 1, 1960. Valuable contributions have also been made by Messrs. Erwin Balluder, Norman Seagrave and Frank Murphy of Pan American, and by Mr. Lee Dayton of Intercontinental Hotel Corporation. I am indebted to Mr. Stacy May of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for information and material on its West African Program.

Finally, I have been much enlightened, edified, and instructed by the able papers presented by participants at this conference and by subsequent open discussion on various interesting points.

LAW ENCOURAGING THE INVESTMENT OF PRIVATE
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN AFGHANISTAN

All foreign individuals and legal entities, duly authorized under this law, shall benefit from the facilities provided hereunder.

- Article 1: The following shall be considered private foreign capital for purpose of this law:
 - a) Foreign exchange transferred to Afghanistan through an authorized bank.
 - b) Necessary machinery, equipment, means of transport and raw materials imported for the establishment or the expansion of industry or other development project permitted under this law.
 - c) Licenses, patents, trade marks, inventions and other similar rights if these are owned by foreigners living outside Afghanistan.
- Article 2: The following shall not be considered private foreign capital for the purpose of this law:
 - a) Capital imported under legal commitment requiring the repatriation of this capital.
 - b) Capital imported to meet the living expenses of non-residents.
- Article 3: The evaluation of capital, if it is in the form of goods or legal rights, shall be undertaken by the Investment Committee established under Article 9 of this law or by a panel of experts appointed by this Committee.
- Article 4: Foreign capital imported under the provisions of this law shall be invested in industry, mining, agriculture, transport, communications, power development, tourism and other productive projects subject to the approval of the Investment Committee. Priority shall be given to projects which would increase the country's foreign exchange earnings or result in the saving thereof.
- Article 5: No discrimination shall be made between foreign and indigenous capital in levying taxes and duties.

Foreign capital invested in Afghanistan and registered under this law shall enjoy the following facilities:

- a) Exemption from corporate income taxes for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production on profits not exceeding 15 percent per annum of the registered capital of the enterprise.
- b) Exemption from import duties on essential imports for a period of three years.
- c) Shareholders or owners of capital shall be exempted from income taxes arising from such investments for three years from the date of commencement of production.
- d) Land owned by the central or local governments needed for approved enterprises under this law shall be leased for long periods on liberal terms.
- e) Products of approved enterprises shall be afforded moderate tariff protection for a defined period according to circumstances.
- f) Products of approved enterprises shall be exempted from export duties for a temporary period specified by law.
- g) Schools and government institutions shall be encouraged to use the products of local industries.
- h) Foreign enterprises shall be allowed to acquire land and other non-movable property needed for the project on long-term lease basis subject to the approval of the Investment Committee.

Article 6: Profits or dividends arising out of investments made under this law are allowed to be repatriated in the original foreign currency provided the annual profits or dividends repatriated do not exceed fifteen per cent of the registered capital.

- a) Should the profits exceed fifteen per cent in any one year the excess could be repatriated in a year when the profits are less on condition that not more than fifteen per cent is repatriated in any one year.
- b) Repatriation of profits and capital will take place at the authorized free market rate through an authorized bank.

Article 7: a) Capital invested under this law could be repatriated after five years from the date of investment after meeting all outstanding obligations including taxes.

- b) Repatriation of not more than one fifth of the capital may be effected in any one year after the initial five years.
- c) Repatriation shall be in the original currency and at the authorized free market rate through an authorized bank.

- d) Repatriation of the whole capital shall be allowed after one year as an exception to section (a) of this article if the enterprise fails. This exception must be approved by the Investment Committee.
- e) After ten years, repatriation of the whole of capital could take place without the restrictions mentioned in paragraph (b) above.

Article 8: Investors desiring to repatriate profits or capital in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 shall apply to the Investment Committee. The Committee shall take a decision within three months of the receipt of such an application, otherwise the decision shall be considered in the investor's favor.

Article 9: An Investment Committee shall be established in the Ministry of Commerce and shall be composed of: the Minister of Commerce as Chairman, the Minister of Mines and Industries, the President of Da Afghanistan Bank, the President of the Chamber of Commerce and one representative each from the following Ministries: Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Planning. The Investment Committee may invite experts and representatives of other agencies to its meetings whenever necessary. The Committee shall also have a permanent secretariat forming a department within the Ministry of Commerce.

Article 10: The functions of the Committee shall be as follows:

- a) To approve applications for private foreign capital under this law and to submit these decisions for the approval of the Cabinet.
- b) To evaluate the part of the capital in goods or in legal rights in the light of documents submitted, international prices, and the views of experts called upon. The Committee must give final decisions on such matters within three months of the date of a documented application.
- c) To register the foreign exchange invested as well as goods and legal rights involved. The Committee shall also keep a register of all relevant facts required under this law. Present capital invested in Afghanistan and not registered under this law shall not benefit from the provisions of this law unless authorized by the Investment Committee.
- d) To authorize the repatriation of profits and capital after careful scrutiny of the financial status of the enterprise basing decisions on the audited balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts.
- e) To make available all types of economic and statistical information as well as copies of relevant reports on development to prospective investors.
- f) To form a liaison between investors under this law and the various Government Agencies in order to facilitate the issuing of permits and licenses, to assess taxes and to obtain visas for employees of foreign enterprises.

- g) To use all types of publicity media to familiarize prospective foreign investors with Afghanistan's economic potentialities in an endeavor to attract them to invest their capital in productive fields.

Article 11: Foreign investors shall employ and provide training facilities for Afghan nationals whenever and wherever possible.

Article 12: In the event that an enterprise shall be nationalized or taken over by the Government in an emergency under the law the government guarantees to pay the owners equitable compensation. Should a disagreement occur on the amount of this compensation an arbitrator acceptable to both parties shall be called upon to settle this disagreement.

Article 13: a) Applications for the investment of foreign private capital under the provisions of this law should be addressed to: The Chairman of the Investment Committee (the Minister of Commerce).

- b) The application should be submitted in Farsi and in either English or French and should embody the following information:

Name of applicant.
Country of origin of the capital.
Type of capital proposed.
Amount of capital proposed.
Type of enterprise proposed.
Proposed location.
Degree of Afghan participation if any.
Applicant's representative in Afghanistan.

Article 14: After permission is granted for the investment of capital it must be brought in within a period of one year, otherwise the permission is automatically rescinded. The Committee may extend the period of validity if acceptable reasons for the delay are offered.

Article 15: This law shall be implemented by the Minister of Commerce.

Article 16: Upon the promulgation of this law, the Foreign Investment law dated Assad 5, 1333 and any other law or provisions thereof which are contrary to or conflict with this law, shall be abolished.

Article 17: This law shall come into effect from the date of its promulgation.

(November 18, 1958)

THE SOVIET AID PROGRAM

John N. Gatch, Jr.

Introduction

Russian interest in Afghanistan historically has been great, and was graphically described by Ambassador Byroade in his speech to this conference. Since World War II, however, and particularly during the last decade, this interest has been manifested in a new form. The Soviet Union has evidently decided to make Afghanistan one of the chief areas in which to wage the battle of "peaceful co-existence." By lavishing economic and military assistance on Afghanistan the Soviets hope to demonstrate to other nations in the area (and in the rest of the world) the fruitful results of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Soviet efforts in Afghanistan have been coupled with a cultural offensive which culminated in 1960 with the signing of a Soviet-Afghan cultural agreement and the formation in Afghanistan of an Afghan-Soviet Friendship Association.

[Note: The figures given below should be considered as estimates. They represent a composite of figures published locally in Afghanistan, educated estimates by American observers there, and figures published officially by the Afghan Government. They are intended to convey an idea of the magnitude of Soviet efforts rather than a precise definition.]

Economic and Technical Assistance

1950-55

The Soviets gained an opening wedge in Afghanistan as a result of some Pakistan-Afghan border difficulties in 1950 which resulted in the temporary stoppage of the import into Afghanistan of petroleum products from Pakistan. The extent of land-locked Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan port and transit facilities was forcibly brought home to the Afghan Government. In order to ensure a more reliable source of supply the Afghans turned north and signed a four-year agreement with the U.S.S.R. in July 1950. The Soviets agreed to export petroleum products, cotton cloth, sugar, and other commodities in return for Afghan wool and raw cotton. The barter was to be conducted under exchange rates favorable to Afghanistan. The agreement went beyond barter as the Soviets agreed to permit free transit of Afghan goods through Soviet territory, and to build gasoline storage tanks in various Afghan centers. Although the 1950 difficulties with Pakistan were set right, the Soviets never lost their momentum. By 1952 Afghan-Soviet trade had doubled, and a trickle of Soviet technicians had entered the country. In 1954 the Soviets loaned the Afghans approximately \$18 million for proposed projects including the construction of a pipeline across the Oxus River, * more storage tanks, several wheat silos, a flour mill, a bakery,

* This project failed to materialize.

and--most important from a propaganda standpoint--for the paving of the streets of Kabul. This latter project gained much favorable publicity for the Soviet Union, although the Afghans now point out that it was they who actually did the paving, not the Soviets, who furnished the asphalt and the paving equipment.

1955-60

The pace of Soviet assistance quickened in 1955. Renewed Pakistan-Afghan difficulties closed the border between the two countries, this time for five months. The Soviet Union exploited this new opportunity to the full. The 1950 transit agreement was renewed and a new barter agreement was signed. Late in 1955 the Soviets made "a great leap" forward. Bulganin and Khrushchev stopped in Kabul on their way home from India and offered the Afghans a \$100 million line of credit on favorable terms for economic development. The agreement was signed on January 28, 1956. The principal projects (together with approximate costs) that have been completed or are under way through this line of credit are listed below.

1. Naghlu Hydroelectric Project (\$14 million)
2. Pul-i-Khumri Hydroelectric Station #2 (\$3.5 million)
3. Jangalak Industrial Complex (\$2 million)
4. Kabul Air Field (\$6 million)
5. Bagram Military Air Field (\$6.5 million)
6. Salang Pass Road (\$27 million)
7. Darunta Irrigation and Hydroelectric Project (\$22 million)
8. Fuel Storage Facilities (\$4 million)
9. Qizil Qala Port Facilities (\$5 million)

TOTAL.....\$90 Million

The balance presumably will be used for cost re-adjustments or for the Afghan Second Five-Year Plan.

In 1957 the Soviets granted Afghanistan an additional special credit of \$15 million for oil exploration. Soviet technicians carried out the exploration in northern Afghanistan, and in the spring of 1960 a Soviet team made what apparently is a major oil strike in the Shibarghan-Mazar-i-Sharif area of northwestern Afghanistan. Preliminary estimates indicate that a pool of six kilometers radius containing 45 million tons (300,000,000 barrels) has been tapped. As an adjunct to this strike there has been discovered a field of 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas under pressure. The full implications of this new discovery have not yet been realized, but the presence of oil in Afghanistan is bound to change the economic picture there.

In 1959 the Soviets agreed to build the important Kushk-Kandahar road and the Shindand military airfield in western Afghanistan. The combined costs of these two projects are estimated at around \$85 million. There have been conflicting statements made as to whether the money furnished by the U.S.S.R. is to be considered as a grant or a long-term, low interest loan. One other major project involving Soviet financing is the bridging

of the Kunar River in northeastern Afghanistan. No financial details are available on this project as yet.

In addition there is some evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to underwrite as much of the foreign exchange requirement of the Second Five-Year Plan as the Afghans wish.

Military Assistance

In August, 1956 the Afghan Government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union under which Afghanistan would get in exchange for barter goods various items of military hardware from the Soviet bloc. A Soviet military training mission followed and is presently operating in Afghanistan. It is difficult to put a realistic price tag on the equipment obtained from the Soviet bloc. Using published figures covering the arms supplied to the United Arab Republic as a comparison, the total amount could run as high as \$75 million.

Final Notes

1. Total Soviet assistance, including the military, can be placed at approximately \$300 million through 1960.
2. There are estimated to be about 1600 Soviet civil and military technicians in Afghanistan.



REMARKS BY JACK BENNETT
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
AT THE
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL NEAR EAST CONFERENCE
ON
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 16, 1960

It is not my purpose to come to you as a statistician reciting numbers relative to the dollar value of aid we have provided Afghanistan during the past several years. My concern goes rather to the quality and the purpose of that aid; in fact, it is when we attempt to put price tags on economic assistance to less fortunate lands that we run into difficulties. There are so many factors entering into a determination of the aid commitment. Let us consider a few.

In the first instance, we live with the realization that there is each year a limit fixed on the total amount of dollar resources at the command of our Mutual Security Program to meet the urgent and earnest requests from the lesser-developed countries of the free world. These resources have not by far met the aspirations of those who since the end of World War II have been fired with an almost fanatic zeal to improve their lives in a material sense. These annual gaps between aid requests and resource availabilities reflect both a growing impatience of the people to get on with their job and a too-great dependence upon foreign aid resources for the fulfillment of their development aspirations. We try to assure ourselves, therefore, that U. S. economic aid to a developing country must stimulate, and not serve as a substitute for, nor a deterrent to, a greatly increased utilization of domestic human and material resources within that country. Foreign aid cannot at best be more than a relatively small contribution to the total product of brain and brawn. Moreover, we try to assure ourselves that U. S. economic aid does not encourage a country to undertake a pace of development that is obviously unattainable in the light of domestic human and material resources, even when augmented by magnanimous foreign assistance, lest an attempt to ingest more than can be digested result in economic illness.

When we begin with a realization that we have not had at our command sufficient dollar resources to meet the logical requests of other people for economic assistance, we realize the necessity of allotting the scarce resources in a manner to ensure that each dollar is so planted as to produce the most fruits. But again we must remember that it is not we nor our dollar assistance which is developing the economics of the beneficiary countries. Neither can we nor they guarantee results which depend upon the cooperative effort of millions of peoples. One great temptation is to generalize about the character of foreign aid requirements--a temptation to which too often we as well as the foreign government succumb. It may be agreed that one country has reached that stage of development wherein it can mobilize the domestic investment capital, raw materials, skilled and unskilled labor, economically priced energy-fuels, and managerial competence to command foreign capital assistance for the creation of a steel mill--assuming, of course, an assured market. This by no means suggests that every other country could meet these prerequisites. Another country

might well find that efforts to build a steel mill through a diversion of resources from more urgent requirements retard rather than advance economic development.

A great part of the development effort is lost if some parts of the economy advance without regard to a lack of advancement in other essential segments, with a result as incongruous as a two-legged horse. Underlying our efforts in each country is a desire to see improved the lot of those people who cannot help themselves to a better life because of a lack of certain important elements within the economy of that country. In one instance, transportation may be inadequate to permit the transport of the product of the farm to the market. In another country educational facilities may not have provided either the knowledge of how better things may be done or even the inspiration for the achievement of better things. Substandard health conditions in still another country may have caused a lack of basic energies for the achievement of more productive work. With all these factors eliminated as deterrents to greater progress, a country may yet lack the capital necessary to spark major development. Whatever the deterrents and whatever the efforts we may make to assist the developing country, we and they are faced with the great truth that we cannot alone bring about progress within the country by virtue of our own efforts or through the grant of our own resources. The effort must be made by the country itself. The success or the failure of the efforts will be the success or the failure of the country or the people of the country themselves. If in one country we provide new highways or railroads to allow for the transportation of products from the farm to the city and consumer goods from the city to the farm, that alone does not ensure that progress will be made nor that products going in opposite directions will actually move on those highways or those railroads. It may very well be that additional farm products cannot be produced because adequate fertilizer is not available or seed of a proper character has not been imported into the country. It may well be that a knowledge of modern farming methods has not yet been brought to the farmers still following antiquated methods; but, again, given the fertilizer within the country and the seeds and the knowledge, there may not be adequate credit to enable the farmer in the planting season of the year to buy on credit the facilities and the supplies which he needs in order that he may produce more and thereby repay the borrowed money at harvest time, having left over enough for his own needs and perhaps to finance himself for the next year. In many instances the farmer's attempts at obtaining credit are hampered by reason of general defects in land titles, meaning that he is denied mortgage credit or must pay a prohibitive rate of interest, thereby bringing no extra benefit to himself but rather to the moneylender. In some countries the rivers and streams would provide ample resources of water for land irrigation but instead damage the land with floods at some seasons and provide no relief from disastrous droughts at others.

The timing of the application of technical and material aid into an economy of a lesser-developed country is of extreme importance. The peoples of the lesser-developed parts of the world are impatient to get on with the job of improving not only their own lives but the lives also of their children yet to come. There is an awakening around the world to the fact that the energies which these peoples possess can be so directed as to produce for them benefits more nearly comparable to those enjoyed by other peoples of the more developed world with perhaps less expenditure of energy. At the same time that we recognize that time is short, we recognize, too, that money is short. The developed countries of the world have up to now been generous in the supply of aid which they provide for the

lesser-developed parts of the world; but, despite that generosity, the amount of the material and technical resources provided to the lesser developed parts of the world has not been adequate to bring about the revolution in the lives of the people of these countries which they feel should have taken place. Given, therefore, the shortage of time and the inadequacy of the total foreign resources available to do the job quickly, the most important element for consideration is the application of the technical and material resources first to those elements demanding the highest priority. As I have said before, the establishment of the list of priorities cannot be done on a world-wide basis, because the problems of each country are unique to that country; and it is not easy on a short examination of the economy of any given country to establish the order of priorities. Even though the best possible order of priorities may be established in any given year, circumstances may very well have disordered that list of priorities to the extent that it is no longer appropriate in the following year. It means that planning--a continuing and flexible thing--is absolutely necessary if the limited resources are to be devoted to the job in the most effective way and in the shortest possible time.

We have felt in our approach to the foreign aid requirements of Afghanistan that one of the first items of priority would be that of assisting their own efforts to open new land for cultivation through irrigation. The government of Afghanistan itself began a major development program in the Helmand Valley in 1946, when it engaged American contractors to construct irrigation dams and power stations to regularize the flow of water to areas already under irrigation and to open up vast additional areas of land upon which nomadic shepherds could settle and thereby benefit themselves and their country by more fruitful employment. There have been many difficulties encountered in this effort. A nomadic shepherd cannot be converted into a prosperous farmer merely by providing some land and some water. There are many other elements involved. The man must be taught modern farming methods; he must be provided with fertilizer and must be taught the proper use of fertilizer.

Afghanistan is greatly deficient in educational facilities. In the last year for which figures are available (1958) there were only about 10,000 students at the secondary school level. Only as recently as December 1959 did the first 13 persons graduate with college degrees in engineering and agriculture. Kabul University, the country's only institution of higher learning, has a little over 1,000 students. To increase the number of Afghans with general education and with vocational skills and competence, we have been assisting Afghan educational leaders in developing basic programs in both the academic and in the in-service fields, including a comprehensive plan for Kabul University. At the same time, a program for elementary, secondary, and vocational education has been developing, seeking to bring about a better balance between higher education and primary and secondary education.

Although major highways are being built or improved, many parts of Afghanistan remain isolated. Until there has been a great improvement and expansion of the highways of the country, the economy must suffer from high transportation costs, and consequently higher prices, for the raw materials moving to the markets and for the reverse flow of industrial products. A large portion of U. S. aid is being devoted to the development of all-weather highways serving markets in Afghanistan and abroad. Considerable additional aid in the field of transportation has gone and continues to go to the construction of three

airports for domestic service, to the construction of an international field, and to establishing and equipping an airline serving both local and foreign ports.

More and more attention is being given within Afghanistan to the increase in agricultural production through better farming methods and the more efficient use of irrigation, especially in the Helmand Valley. The U. S. aid program is contributing most significantly to the progress in this field in all major aspects, including training of extension workers, support of the Faculty of Agriculture of Kabul University, forestry and soil conservation, research, and agricultural credit.

The requisites for industrial expansion, comprising an important segment of the foundations for economic growth, include expanding training opportunities for business management and technical personnel, improvement in the climate for domestic and foreign investment, establishment of adequate industrial credit facilities, and the development of power and transportation. The United States aid program has components bearing on all these fields.

Among other important areas of assistance toward the development of Afghanistan are material and technical help in mining, advisory services in fiscal and administrative management, and power development.

I have attempted to show in the foregoing that the United States aid effort in Afghanistan seeks to help the Afghan people overcome the most glaring of impediments to the realization of their aspirations for a better way of life, and I have stressed the character rather than the quantity of the assistance, especially since the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan has amply touched upon the magnitude of aid in his earlier remarks. Our great concern, now that the more urgent problems have been identified and steps taken to deal with them, is that Afghanistan attempt to make without delay long-range development plans. From such planning, in which expert technical assistance will surely be needed, other areas needing attention may be identified, targets for achievement by the economy as a whole may be set, with due regard to the availability of material and human resources; and there can be assurances of a balance among the various fields of endeavor, such as agricultural, industrial, management, educational, fiscal, and the like. At this stage of development we believe that careful expert planning is a must.



